Coon v. People of State

• Decision Date: 20 June 1881
• Citation: 39 Am.Rep. 28,99 Ill. 368,1881 WL 10553
• Parties: PHINEAS COONv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

99 Ill. 368

1881 WL 10553 (Ill.)

39 Am.Rep. 28

PHINEAS COON

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Jun. 20, 1881.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. JOSIAH MCROBERTS, Judge, presiding.

Coon was indicted in the court below for an assault with intent to commit a rape. A trial resulted in a judgment of conviction. The defendant thereupon sued out this writ of error. Messrs. BROWN & MEERS, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. JAMES K. EDSALL, Attorney General, and Mr. JAMES R. FLANDERS, State's attorney, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE DICKEY delivered the opinion of the Court:

In this case, the proofs are far from satisfactory as a foundation for the conviction of the accused of any offence known to the law as crime. It is not necessary, however, that the sufficiency of the evidence to that end should be discussed or determined, as the judgment must be reversed for errors as to the law.

The only witnesses for the prosecution, who make any statements tending to show any conduct on the part of the accused, which, in any sense, can be held to constitute crime, are two little girls, one of them eleven years old, and the other nine. Against the objection of the counsel for the prisoner, the court permitted a series of leading questions to be put to each of these witnesses, and to be answered. The questions and answers referred to relate to most material parts of the accusation. In fact, on a careful reading of the bill of exceptions, it appears that very nearly every portion of the testimony imputing even improper conduct to the accused, is expressed by the words “yes” and “no,” made as answers, in every instance, to questions directly indicating that the answer given was the answer sought by the prosecution. It is said that the tender years of the witnesses rendered it allowable to pursue this course of examination. It is true that leading questions may lawfully be resorted to under certain circumstances, as, where the propounding of general questions has been tried and there has been a failure to get specific answers, either by reason of the stupidity of the witness or of a disposition to prevaricate, developed by an examination upon such general questions, and in perhaps some other special cases. It is a question on which the court should exercise a sound discretion. The general rule, however, is, that leading questions are improper, and this general rule ought not to be departed from unless for some proper and apparent cause. No such cause is shown here. The tender age of these witnesses, instead of furnishing a good reason for departing from the rule with some apparent necessity, did, in fact, furnish a cogent reason why leading questions should not have been permitted; for we all know that children of such age are usually more liable to be misled in that way than are witnesses of more mature years. We do not say that leading questions may not, under some circumstances, be permitted, properly and lawfully, nor is it intended to decide that the erroneous toleration by the court of leading questions will, in all cases, constitute sufficient cause for reversing the judgment of such court; but in a case like this, where the...