Coon v. Shields
| Decision Date | 28 December 1934 |
| Docket Number | 5403 |
| Citation | 39 P.2d 348,88 Utah 76 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | COON v. SHIELDS |
Petition for rehearing denied, May 15, 1935.
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; David W. Moffat, Judge.
Action by Della Coon against Claude L. Shields. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
AFFIRMED.
P. C Evans and R. John Cummings, both of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Bagley Judd & Ray, of Salt Lake City, for respondent.
MOFFAT, J., being disqualified, did not participate.
This is an action for damages against a surgeon arising out of alleged carelessness and negligence in the treatment of a leg injury. Della Coon sustained a fracture of both bones of the leg just above the ankle. She employed Dr. Claude L. Shields of Salt Lake City to treat the injury; and the treatment was undertaken in that city. Gas gangrene set in, and the doctor amputated her leg near the hip in order to save her life. The controversy arises over plaintiff's contention that the doctor was careless and negligent in the following particulars: (1) That he failed to clean and disinfect the wound; (2) that he failed to remove bruised, lacerated, and contaminated tissues; (3) that he bandaged the leg so tightly it prevented proper circulation of the blood to the injured tissues; (4) that he failed to take cultures; (5) and that he failed to inspect or otherwise obtain information of the invasion of "destructive infective processes."
The lower court directed a verdict for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals. The assignments of error attack the rulings of the court upon testimony submitted by the plaintiff as expert testimony and the refusal of the court to submit the case to the jury.
A comparison of the facts, as developed by the evidence, with the allegations of negligence in the complaint, will be of some aid in expressing our views of this case. As to the alleged failure to clean and disinfect the wound, the evidence on both sides discloses that Dr. Shields washed it with soap--a medical soap--and water, scrubbed it with a brush, and poured into it an iodine solution as a disinfectant. The allegation of failure to remove bruised, lacerated, and contaminated tissues is covered by evidence that the doctor cut away loose fragments of skin and bone, brushed out as much dirt and foreign substances as he could find, which brushing removed parts of the flesh that were loose. As to the bandage being so tight that it interfered with the blood circulation, plaintiff testified that it felt tight; her husband testified that it was tight, basing his opinion upon its appearance; the doctor testified that it was just tight enough to hold the foot in place--the foot was nearly severed from the leg, and, if not so bound, would have flopped around; but there was no evidence that circulation of the blood was interfered with. The description of the accumulation of blood and other matter indicated the fact to be quite the contrary; this was verified by the doctor's statement that circulation was not interfered with; the X-ray doctor's statement that the bandage was not tight; and the latter's description of the position of the leg in its wire container. The evidence is uncontradicted that cultures were taken and disclosed negative results; however, they were not taken as the initial step in treatment of the injury. The nearest to a conflict in the evidence came in the proof submitted upon the issue of a failure to inspect the wound for the purpose of avoiding infection. Mrs. Coon testified in substance that the bandage was one continuous piece and was not removed by the doctor on the occasions that he visited her. Her husband's testimony in substantiation of this was to the effect that in appearance the bandage was the same each time he saw it. On the other hand, the doctor testified that the bandage was in two parts, one to hold the foot in place, which was not removed, the other of antiseptic gauze about the wound and drains, leaving the wound open to view, which gauze was easily removed; and was frequently removed and the wound treated. The apparent conflict in evidence dissolves with the testimony of plaintiff on cross examination in the nature of admissions that during a great deal of the time she was under the influence of drugs and not aware of everything that was taking place. Such admission leaves the defense testimony as to removals of the gauze around the wound on occasions of visits not accounted by plaintiff uncontradicted.
So much for the facts. They are more consistent with action taken than with averments of failure to act. However, the real controversy between the parties arises over expert testimony offered by plaintiff to the effect that iodine is not a disinfectant; that cultures should have been taken as an initial step in the treatment; that scrubbing with a stiff brush was injurious and not beneficial to the wound; that the leg should have been exposed to the air in order to kill the gas bacilli; and that, in the opinion of the expert offered by plaintiff, Dr. Shields' treatment was improper. This evidence was rejected by the court.
In a case such as this confusion often arises over a failure to distinguish between the expert's opinion as to the proper method of treatment applied conforms to what is generally accepted to be the proper method. The practice of medicine or of surgery has not become so standardized that it is unreasonable for two doctors to have different opinions as to the proper method of treating injuries. If, then, there is reason for the existence of that difference, neither opinion can be proven erroneous by offering as proof thereof merely the other. It does not fall upon the shoulders of the judge or jury to determine whether or not there is a good and sufficient reason for the existence of such a difference that reason is assumed to be valid when it appears from the evidence that the divisions of opinion are such that it cannot be said of any one opinion that it is generally accepted to be the right one. Consider for the moment the controversy over iodine in this case. Counsel for plaintiff presented an extract from the work of one Dean Lewis which is very emphatic in stating that iodine is worthless as an antiseptic. We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Dean Lewis, nor, for that matter, the sincerity of plaintiff's expert who would probably testify to the same effect. Dr. Lewis is very convincing with his reference to millions of failures during the World War and the many successes with another form of treatment, but who are we to come forward and say: Yes, ...
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...care and diligence as is ordinarily exercised by physicians in the same locality. Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257; Coon v. Shields, 88 Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348. The trial court found that the doctor did not use reasonable care in handling the case. This finding is well supported by evid......
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