Cooney v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 27 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 12813.,12813. |
| Citation | 143 F.2d 312 |
| Parties | COONEY et al. v. COOPER et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John P. Griffin, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
Ernest E. Baker, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellees.
Before GARDNER, JOHNSEN, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.
In February 1913 the United States Letter Carriers' Mutual Benefit Association of the National Association of Letter Carriers, a fraternal beneficiary association, operating under the laws of Missouri, issued a benefit certificate to one Fagan of St. Louis, Missouri, a member of the association. By the terms of the certificate the association became liable upon the death of Fagan to pay to the person entitled as beneficiary under the laws of the association the sum of $2,491.73. Fagan died in November 1941. Confronted with the demands of rival claimants to the proceeds of the certificate, the association brought this suit in interpleader to settle their rights. These rival claimants are Cooper and Demand, appellees, claiming as beneficiaries designated by Fagan, and Cooney and Peisker, appellants, claiming to be the legal beneficiaries under the provisions of the laws of the association.
The constitution of the association contains the following provision:
Section 2 of Law IV of the association limits the qualified beneficiaries to the following:
* * * * *
"(4) A certificate may be made payable to a bank or other corporation in trust for the beneficiaries; or to a person who may receive the proceeds for the benefit of the beneficiary or beneficiaries within the classes designated by the General Laws of the Association."
Section 7 of the same law provides:
The beneficiary originally designated in the certificate, Fagan's wife, died in June 1941. On the 8th day of August, 1941, Fagan designated as successor beneficiary, George Cooper, trustee for August Demand. Demand is the son of a brother of Mrs. Fagan. He was never a dependent of Fagan, nor a member of his family. Under the laws of the association Demand is a qualified beneficiary only if the word "relatives", as used in grade 13 of the first class of permissible beneficiaries, is interpreted to include a deceased member's relatives by affinity. If "relatives" is so interpreted, Demand "might be a distributee of the personal estate" of Fagan upon his death intestate, survived neither by a wife nor kindred of the blood capable of inheriting. Missouri Revised Statutes 1939, § 308, Mo.R.S.A. Appellants, Cooney and Peisker, are qualified beneficiaries under grade 8 of the first class of permissible beneficiaries, being children of Fagan's sister of the whole blood. They are the only survivors of Fagan related to him by consanguinity and included within grades 2 to 8, inclusive, of the first class of permissible beneficiaries. It follows that, if Demand was not qualified under the laws of the association as a permissible beneficiary, the appellants are entitled to the proceeds of the certificate under Section 7 of Law IV of the association providing that:
The district court concluded that Demand was a relative of Fagan within the meaning of grade 13 of the first class of permissible beneficiaries. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of George Cooper, trustee for August Demand.
No Missouri case interpreting the term "relatives", as used in the certificate of a fraternal beneficiary association, has been called to our attention, and none has been found. The noun "relatives" is a word of flexible meaning. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Onali, 8 Cir., 125 F.2d 580, 582. It is to be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is employed, with regard to the character of the writing in which it appears, and in accord with the statutes governing the transaction which the writing records. In Missouri, as in all jurisdictions, the word "relatives" in wills, conveyances, and statutes of descents and distributions is construed, in the absence of a clearly manifested contrary intention, as including relatives by consanguinity and as excluding relatives by affinity. Rauch v. Metz, Mo.Sup., 212 S.W. 353, 355; McMenamy v. Kampelmann, 273 Mo. 450, 200 S.W. 1075. It is well settled in Missouri that a benefit certificate is different from an ordinary life insurance policy and is testamentary in character. Smith v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America, 319 Mo. 1120, 6 S.W.2d 870, 876. In Hofman v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 73 Mo.App. 47, 55, and in Peterson v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of...
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