Coonts v. Potts

• Decision Date: 03 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1267.,02-1267.
• Parties: Tylene J. COONTS, Larry Coonts, and Robert M. Sweere, Appellants, v. John POTTS, Sr., Gary Koop, Vernon Johnson, Trampus Taylor, and Hobie Johnson, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

316 F.3d 745

Tylene J. COONTS, Larry Coonts, and Robert M. Sweere, Appellants, v. John POTTS, Sr., Gary Koop, Vernon Johnson, Trampus Taylor, and Hobie Johnson, Appellees.

No. 02-1267.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 13, 2002.

Filed: January 3, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert M. Sweere, argued, Springfield, MO, for appellant.

Patricia A. Keck, argued, Springfield, MO, for appellee.

Before LOKEN, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Tylene and Larry Coonts (collectively referred to as the "Coontses" and individually by their first names) appeal the District Court's¹ summary judgment in favor of Gary Koop, Vernon Johnson, Trampus Taylor, Hobie Johnson, and John Potts (collectively referred to as appellees and individually by their last names). The Coontses sued the appellees on claims for violation of their civil rights, trespass, illegal arrest, malicious prosecution, and conversion revolving around the seizure of several pieces of furniture. The Coontses and their attorney also appeal the District Court's assessment of sanctions against counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We affirm the District Court's decision.

Facts

The essential facts are not in dispute. This action stems from the appellees' retrieval through a writ of execution of furniture and appliances purchased on credit by the Coontses from Potts' business, Long Dollar Furniture and Appliance ("Long Dollar"), between December 1998 and April 1999. At the initial purchase in December 1998, the Coontses agreed that they would make payments of $200 a week on the debt. On April 16, 1999, Tylene signed a new sales contract that included all of the items purchased by the couple in December along with other newly purchased items. The total cost of the items purchased was $4,406.16, and at the time of signing the new agreement, the Coontses had paid approximately half of the debt. The contract stated that the Coontses would continue to pay $200 a week and that Potts and Long Dollar retained a purchase money security interest in all of the items until the debt was paid in full.

In the spring of 2000, the Coontses defaulted by failing to make several payments. Potts then filed a small-claims petition against Tylene in state court. The complaint requested the return of the items or payment of the remaining balance due thereon and late charges. In both a small-claims trial and a subsequent circuit court trial, the courts awarded judgment to Potts and Long Dollar. Tylene failed to satisfy the judgment in full and filed no further application for relief from the judgment or notice of appeal. Thereafter, Potts submitted to the circuit court clerk an "Execution/Garnishment Application and Order" along with a copy of the judgment. The clerk completed the writ of execution, signed it on behalf of the court as required by statute, and forwarded it to the Douglas County Sheriff's Office to levy on the property.

On July 27, 2000, Sheriff Koop called Potts to inform him that deputies would be serving the writ that day and collecting the items listed. However, the sheriff indicated that his office did not have the means to transport or store the items. Sheriff Koop asked Potts to transport and store the items for the sheriff's department until they could have an auction to sell the items at a later date. The group then proceeded to the Coontses' residence to collect the items. To obtain access to the property, the group cut a padlock on the entry gate. As they neared the residence, Tylene refused them entry to collect the items. Consequently, Johnson arrested and handcuffed her, charging her with "interference with legal process" pursuant to Mo.Rev. Stat. § 575.160. She was taken to the police station and charged; however, she was never prosecuted for this violation. The property was not collected at that time.

The group returned to the Coontses' residence on August 1, 2000, to levy on the property and serve an unrelated eviction notice on the Coontses. The group again cut the gate lock, and upon entering the property, they encountered Tylene. Upon informing her that they were there to take the property, Tylene refused to allow them inside, and they again arrested her. She fought, kicked, hit, and attempted to bite the officers until they handcuffed her and placed her in a police car. Larry arrived at the house soon after and did not resist the levy. At that point, the officers released Tylene from the police car. When she reentered the home, she grabbed a candle and threw it at the large-screen television, one of the items the Coontses purchased from Long Dollar, and destroyed the screen. She was then arrested for interference with judicial process, resisting arrest, third-degree assault on a police officer, and property damage. At that point, the officers moved the items listed on the writ of execution from inside the Coontses' home to the porch, where Potts' employees took the items and loaded them on a moving truck.

After retrieving the items, Potts transported them to his store where he stored the property in the basement and marked the items with signs indicating that the property belonged to the Douglas County Sheriff's Department. Potts later contacted Sheriff Koop to inquire about the status of the items and when an auction might be held. Sheriff Koop indicated that he should continue to hold the items for the sheriff's department until the legal issues had been resolved. The items remain at the warehouse.

After the levy, the Coontses filed this lawsuit on February 20, 2001. They raised a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as other state law claims. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In an order issued December 27, 2001, the District Court granted the sheriff's and deputies' motion for summary judgment against the Coontses, and denied the Coontses' motion for summary judgment against the officers. The court issued a show-cause order to the Coontses' attorney and received his brief on the issue of Rule 11 sanctions. Thereafter, the District Court issued an order on January 11, 2002, assessing sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) in the amount of $2,000 against the Coontses' attorney for asserting frivolous claims for malicious prosecution, excessive force, and trespass, none of which counsel addressed in his briefs for summary judgment. Thereafter, on January 18, 2002, the District Court rendered the final order in the case by granting Potts' motion for summary judgment against the Coontses. The Coontses and their counsel appealed these orders on January 29, 2002.

I.

Summary judgment is proper when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489 (8th Cir.1991). When considering whether to grant summary judgment, a court must examine all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories ... admissions on file ... [and] affidavits." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review de novo the District Court's interpretation of Missouri law. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); First Bank of Marietta v. Hogge, 161 F.3d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1998).

II.

The Coontses raise nineteen points on appeal in a twenty-five page brief. It is unnecessary, however, to address all of these issues separately. The gravamen of the Coontses' appeal is whether the appellees violated their civil rights under § 1983² by seizing the property via the writ of execution. They allege that enforcement of the writ of execution violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure because the writ was not signed by a judge.³ Because it was not, the Coontses contend it was issued without probable cause and is, thus, invalid. Additionally, they argue that the sheriff, the deputies, and Potts are not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity for their acts in enforcing the writ. As developed in this record, the Coontses arguments are unavailing.

In a § 1983 action against public officials or those acting with public officials, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). However, before reaching the issue of whether such a right is "clearly established," the inquiry must first focus on whether the plaintiffs have actually asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991).

A seizure under the Fourth Amendment occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property." Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). In this case, the furniture and appliances were "seized" by the deputies pursuant to the facially-valid writ of execution. The seizure was authorized by Mo.Rev.Stat. § 105.240, which allows officers to "break open doors and enclosures to execute a warrant or other process ... to levy an execution, or execute an order for the delivery of personal property" if the door or enclosures are not opened based on the officers' announcement of his purpose to the judgment debtor. The Coontses argue that this seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because a detached magistrate did not review the writ of execution for probable cause justifying entry into the house. However, the Coontses have not properly challenged the constitutionality of these statutes, and we, therefore, do not address this issue.

The writ of execution,...