Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 15 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-1166.,05-1166.
• Citation: 237 S.W.3d 87
• Parties: COOPER CLINIC, P.A. d/b/a Pro-Med Walk-In-Clinic, Appellant, v. Linda BARNES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Trenton McMillan, a Minor, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

237 S.W.3d 87

COOPER CLINIC, P.A. d/b/a Pro-Med Walk-In-Clinic, Appellant, v.Linda BARNES, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Trenton McMillan, a Minor, Appellee.

No. 05-1166.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 15, 2006.

Ledbetter, Cogbill, Arnold & Harrison, LLP, by: J. Michael Cogbill and Rebecca D. Hattabaugh, Fort Smith, AR, for appellant.

Milligan Law Offices, by Phillip J. Milligan, and Robinson Wooten, PLC, by: Jon P. Robinson, Fayetteville, AR, for appellee/cross-appellant.

ANNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Justice.

On June 8, 2000, Trenton McMillan, a three-year-old boy, was brought by his father, Ralph Lord, to AppellantCooper Clinic, P.A. d/b/a Pro-Med Walk-in-Clinic, for treatment of a bump on his head.Lord claimed that another child had accidentally hit Trenton in the head with a golf club.Susan S. Staudt, D.O., a doctor of osteopathic medicine and an employee of Cooper Clinic, examined Trenton, noting that in addition to the large bump on the boy's forehead, his body was covered in bruises and his teeth were chipped and decaying.Dr. Staudt assessed Trenton as being a battered child.

Under the Child Maltreatment Act of 1991, Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-501 et seq., a physician that has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been subjected to maltreatment is required to immediately report the abuse to the Arkansas child abuse hotline.SeeArk.Code Ann. § 12-12-507(Supp.2005).A mandatory reporter under the act is subject to civil and criminal penalties for failure to report suspected abuse.Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-504(Repl.2003).While Dr. Staudt was aware of the mandatory reporting requirement, she did not report the suspected abuse of Trenton to the child abuse hotline.Instead, Dr. Staudt relied on the father's assertions that Trenton's mother, Kim McMillan, who lived in Oklahoma at the time, had abused Trenton and that he would promptly report the abuse to the police.Lord subsequently brought Trenton back into the clinic to undergo a blood glucose test because he had been experiencing stomach pains, nausea, vomiting, and mood swings.Dr. Staudt was the attending physician when Trenton was brought in the second time, but she did not ask Lord if he had reported the abuse and, once again, she did not report the abuse herself.

On April 1, 2001, or approximately ten months after his visit to Cooper Clinic, Trenton died from blunt force trauma to his abdomen.Trenton's father and step-mother, Ralph and Marilu Lord, were convicted of the negligent homicide of Trenton.Subsequently, on March 29, 2002, AppelleeLinda Barnes, as personal representative for the estate of Trenton McMillan, deceased, filed a wrongful-death action in Crawford County Circuit Court against Ralph and Marilu Lord, Susan S. Staudt, D.O., and Cooper Clinic.

The complaint alleged that Cooper Clinic was liable for damages to the estate because (1) Cooper Clinic failed to report the suspected child abuse under Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-504, (2) Cooper Clinic was liable under the theory of respondeat superior for Dr. Staudt's failure to report the abuse, (3) Cooper Clinic was liable for the medical negligence of Dr. Staudt, and (4) Cooper Clinic was liable for its own negligent supervision of Dr. Staudt and the attending nurse, Carol Johnson.The medical-negligence claims were eventually dismissed without prejudice.

Prior to trial, Dr. Staudt filed a motion to dismiss, based on the appellee's failure to complete service of process on Dr. Staudt within 120 days of filing the complaint as required under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2006).Apparently, the appellee had made two separate attempts to serve Dr. Staudt via certified mail, but service on the doctor had never been successfully completed.The circuit court granted the doctor's motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against her without prejudice.The appellee subsequently filed a separate suit against Dr. Staudt that is currently pending.

During the trial, Cooper Clinic motioned for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, claiming that because the clinic did not qualify as a mandatory reporter under the Child Maltreatment Act, it could not be held directly or vicariously liable for a statutory violation of section 12-12-507, that the clinic was not vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Staudt because the statute of limitations on the estate's claim had lapsed before the action was filed against Dr. Staudt, and that the clinic's acts did not proximately cause Trenton's death.The circuit court rejected these claims and ultimately denied the clinic's directed-verdict motion.

The appellee also motioned for a directed verdict based on the theory that Cooper Clinic had violated Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-507.Under this point, the appellee contended the undisputed evidence that Dr. Staudt assessed Trenton as a battered child and did not report the suspected abuse was sufficient to satisfy the requirements for holding a person liable under the mandatory reporting provision of Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-504.The circuit court denied the appellee's motion, and the case was submitted to the jury.

The jury was asked to answer special interrogatories, and it found in favor of the appellee, affirmatively concluding that Cooper Clinic and its employees were liable for failure to report the child abuse that proximately caused Trenton's death.The clinic was acquitted on the negligent-supervision claim.The jury awarded the estate $500,000 in compensatory damages against Cooper Clinic and Ralph and Marilu Lord, and awarded an additional $2,000,000 in punitive damages against the Lords.Cooper Clinic appeals from the jury's verdict.

I.Cooper Clinic as a Mandatory Reporter Under the Child Maltreatment Act

On appeal Cooper Clinic submits that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict because it is not a mandatory reporter under Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-507(Supp.2005), and thus, as a matter of law, the clinic cannot be held liable, either directly or vicariously, for failure to report suspected child abuse.In support of this argument, Cooper Clinic states that it is not one of the individuals specifically listed under section 12-12-507.Furthermore, the clinic points out that the statute does not specifically list a professional association, such as Cooper Clinic, as a mandatory reporter.The appellee counters with the argument that Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-504(b), the section that levies civil liability on mandatory reporters who fail to report child abuse, provides that "[a]ny person, official, or institution required ... to make notification of suspected child abuse who willfully fails to do so" shall be held civilly liable for damages proximately caused by the omission.Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-504(b)(Repl.2003).According to the appellee, the inclusion of the term "institution" in the penalty portion of the Child Maltreatment Act clearly encompasses the institutions that employ the mandated reporters specified in section 12-12-507.

This court reviews issues of statutory construction under a de novo standard.Turnbough v. Mammoth Spring Sch. Dist. No. 2,349 Ark. 341, 346, 78 S.W.3d 89, 92(2002).Because it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute, we are not bound by the trial court's determination of the statute's meaning.Id.The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.Id.The first rule in determining the meaning of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.Id.This court will construe a statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, with meaning and effect given to every word in the statute if possible.Id.When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, conveying a clear and definite meaning, we need not resort to the rules of statutory construction.Id.A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning.Farrell v. Farrell,365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619(2006).

Additionally, it is a longstanding rule that this court construes statutes that are penal in nature, and more specifically statutes imposing burdens and liabilities that do not exist at common law, in favor of the party sought to be penalized.Cooper Realty Invs. Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd.,355 Ark. 156, 162, 134 S.W.3d 1, 4(2003)(quotingThompson v. Chadwick,221 Ark. 720, 723, 255 S.W.2d 687, 689(1953)).

We now apply these principles to the statute in question, Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-504(b), which provides:

Any person, official, or institution required by this subchapter to make notification of suspected child maltreatment who willfully fails to do so shall be civilly liable for damages proximately caused by that failure.

Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-504(b)(Repl.2003)(emphasis added).

The persons required to make notification of suspected child abuse are listed in Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-507(b):

When any of the following has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been subjected to child maltreatment . . . he or she shall immediately notify the child abuse hotline:

(1) Any child care worker or foster care worker;

(2) A coroner;

(3) A day care center worker;

(4) A dentist;

(5) A dental hygienist;

(6) A domestic abuse advocate;

(7) A domestic violence shelter employee;

(8) A domestic violence shelter volunteer;

(9) An employee of the Department of Health and Human Services;

(10) An employee working under contract for the Division Youth Services of the Department of Human Services;

(11) Any foster parent;

(12) A judge;

(13) A law enforcement official;

(14) A licensed nurse;

(15) Any medical personnel who may be engaged in the admission, examination, care, or treatment of persons;

(16) A mental health professional;

(17) An...