Cooper-Levy v. City of Miami
| Decision Date | 06 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-cv-21939-BLOOM/Otazo-Reyes |
| Parties | LATOYLA YASHEEN COOPER-LEVY., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant City of Miami's (“City”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No [16] (the “Motion”). Plaintiffs Latoyla Cooper-Levy (“Cooper-Levy”), Phillip Sylverin (“Sylverin”), Sherman Rivers (“Rivers”), and Joseph Simmons (“Simmons”), filed a Response, ECF No. [17], to which the City filed a Reply, ECF No. [22]. The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
This case arises as a result of the City's alleged violations of certain individuals' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs, all of whom are homeless individuals, filed their Complaint asserting two claims, pursuant to 42 U.SC. § 1983, for violating their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See generally ECF No. [1]. Plaintiffs allege that the City engages in a practice and custom of unlawfully seizing and destroying personal property belonging to homeless individuals like Plaintiffs by conducting sweeps of homeless encampments with insufficient notice. Id.
This is not the first time the City of Miami has been sued for allegedly violating the Fourth Amendment rights of homeless individuals. In 1992, Michael A. Pottinger, as representative of a class of homeless persons, filed a lawsuit against the City of Miami under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City's police department had “a custom, practice and policy of arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in basic activities of daily life . . . in the public places where they are forced to live.” Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“Pottinger I”). The plaintiff in Pottinger sought to enjoin the City from arresting homeless individuals engaging in “life-sustaining conduct” in public spaces and from seizing or destroying their property in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. After the City and police were found to have violated the rights of homeless individuals, the parties ultimately reached a settlement and entered into a consent decree, which remained in effect from 1998 to 2019, and prohibited “the arrest of the homeless for being homeless and the seizure of their property.” Pottinger v. City of Miami, 359 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1179 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“Pottinger II”). Three years ago, in Pottinger II the district court granted the City's motion to terminate the consent decree, and the decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit. See id., aff'd sub nom. Peery v. City of Miami, 977 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir. 2020).
Against this backdrop, the Complaint alleges that in 2019, the City adopted Administrative Policy regarding the Treatment of Homeless Persons' Property (APM-1-19), which “establish[ed] a standard practice for the handling, temporary storage, and disposition of property belonging to homeless persons.” ECF No. [1] at 17-21 (“Policy”). The Policy also requires City personnel to “attempt to secure personal items such as identification, medicines, and eyeglasses and other small items of importance . . . readily identifiable as intimate personal property.” Id. at 18, section I.1. Even so, the Policy provides that homeless individuals' property may be disposed of by the City if the property is determined to be “contaminated” or otherwise poses a health or safety concern to City personnel or members of the public. Id., section I.2.a.
According to the Complaint, in 2021, as a part of a continued effort to address homelessness in Miami, the City drafted a “Street Clean up and Encampment Resource Plan” in an attempt to facilitate the cleaning of homeless encampments by conducting ongoing “sweeps.” ECF No. [1] ¶ 23. As Plaintiffs allege, City staff during these sweeps arrive at homeless encampments with dump trucks and instruct homeless individuals to move their belongings before the City removes and disposes of all remaining personal property at the encampment. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiffs further allege that the City does not sort the personal property or attempt to secure important personal items before disposal. Id. ¶ 36.
According to the Complaint, the City conducted two such sweeps affecting Plaintiffs: the first occurring in May, 2021 at ¶ 17th Street and 7th Avenue; and the second in August, 2021 under the bridge on N.W. 11th Street between N.W. 5th Avenue and N.W. 3rd Avenue. Id. ¶¶ 45-46, 59, 61, 70, 82. Each of the four Plaintiffs alleges that during these incidents, the City disposed of personal property that was not abandoned or contaminated and failed to provide adequate notice of when and where the City's sweeps would occur. Id. ¶¶ 51, 66, 77, 87.
The incident in May, 2021 involved Cooper-Levy. The Complaint alleges that while away from the encampment attending a job orientation, the City removed and disposed of her “U.S. passport, birth certificate, Social Security card, identification, telephone, clothing, work uniform, shoes, sleeping tent, and an urn containing her mother's ashes.” Id. ¶ 52. Cooper-Levy alleges that her personal property, was not abandoned, contaminated, and did not pose a health hazard or safety issue. Id. ¶ 51. According to the Complaint, upon her return to the encampment, CooperLevy discovered a notice left by the City under a brick which contained information about how to retrieve stored property. Id. ¶ 54. However, upon following the instructions on the notice, City staff told Cooper-Levy that they did not have any of her belongings. Id. ¶ 55. The City made no attempt to save items that belonged to her, made no attempt to determine if her property was contaminated or contained dangerous items, and made no offer to store her property. Instead, the City irrevocably seized and destroyed her property. Id. ¶ 56.
The second incident alleged involves Simmons, Sylverin, and Rivers. Plaintiffs allege that the City arrived to conduct a sweep on or about the morning of August 2. Id. ¶ 61. According to the Complaint, City personnel arrived at the encampment around 9:00 a.m. with a crane and dump truck, giving those present a few minutes to move their property before disposal. Id. ¶ 62. Sylverin alleges that the City disposed of his property that was not abandoned or contaminated, including his tent,[1]identification, furniture, and family photos. Id. ¶ 64. Rivers and Simmons similarly allege that the City disposed of their personal property that was not abandoned or contaminated, including tents, identification documents, prescription medication, new clothing, a bike, toiletries, and sixty dollars in change. Id. ¶ 76.
As a result, Plaintiffs seek damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In the Motion, the City requests dismissal of the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil of Procedure.
A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( that Rule 8(a)(2)'s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a complaint rest on “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)).
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all possible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F.Supp.2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006).
In the Motion, the City urges the Court to take judicial notice of the procedure and relevant facts in the Pottinger litigation. The City argues that the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability, that Plaintiffs lack standing for declaratory and injunctive relief, and that declaratory and injunctive relief is improper. The Court considers each argument in turn.
As a preliminary matter, the Court considers the significance of Pottinger since the parties devote a significant amount of the briefing to it. The City argues that the Court should take judicial notice of facts arising out of the Pottinger litigation. Plaintiffs respond that Pottinger was factually different from the allegations contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint, and therefore Pottinger is not relevant other than to provide context. The Court agrees.
Significantly both parties agree that, irrespective of Pottinger, homeless individuals remain entitled to “seek relief in an individual action” under § 1983 to vindicate violations of their constitutional rights. Peery, 977 F.3d at 1072. In addition, neither party is claiming...
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