Cooper v. City of Westerville
| Decision Date | 18 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-427 |
| Parties | Timothy H. Cooper, Plaintiff, v. City of Westerville, Ohio, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Timothy Cooper brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 against defendants the City of Westerville, Ohio and three of its employees, David Collinsworth, City Manager; Julie Colley, Assistant City Manager; and Jason Bechtold, Economic Development Administrator for the City of Westerville. Cooper alleges that defendants wrongfully terminated a commercial real estate tax abatement in violation of his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Cooper further alleges that defendants' retention of certain payments that he made in lieu of property taxes constitutes unjust enrichment under Ohio law.
This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion is granted as to the §1983 claim, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim.
In July 2004, Office Park LLC ("Office Park") entered into a Community Reinvestment Area Agreement ("CRAA") with the City of Westerville in which the city agreed to issue a 50% real estate tax abatement to Office Park for its construction of two commercial condominiums located at 612 Office Parkway, Westerville, Ohio 43082 ("Property"). The terms of the CRAA required Office Park to make payments in lieu of taxes, also known as "PILOT" fees, to the City of Westerville in order to keep the tax abatement.
Cooper alleges that he became interested in purchasing the Property and that while negotiating the purchase of the Property with Office Park, Office Park used the 50% tax abatement to influence Cooper's ultimate decision to make the purchase. Further, Cooper alleges that Office Park failed to disclose to him the terms and conditions of the CRAA; specifically, the required payments of PILOT fees to the City of Westerville in order to keep the real estate tax abatement. As such, Cooper claims that Office Park did "entice, persuade and induce" him to purchase the property when it represented and promised that he would receive the real estate tax abatement, just as Office Park had, upon closing. Compl. at ¶ 18. Office Park is not a party to the present action.1
Cooper signed the purchase agreement with Office Park for the Property on January 26, 2005 and the sale closed on August 18, 2005. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11. Cooper and Office Park did not enter into any agreement or contract for the assignment or assumption of any obligations that Office Park held under the CRAA with the City. Id. at ¶ 8.
Cooper alleges that shortly after the closing he began receiving invoices from defendants for unpaid PILOT fees. Id. at ¶ 13. Though maintaining that he did not owe such fees, Cooper paid the City of Westerville $3,028.27, $151.41, $2,225.49, and $111.27 (totaling $5516.44) for unpaid PILOT fees on June 14, 2007. Id. at ¶ 15.
On May 7, 2010, defendants sent a letter to the Delaware County Auditor requesting that it terminate the real estate tax abatement for Cooper's Property for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 tax years. Compl. at ¶ 21; Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Doc. 14-2.2 Defendants also took theposition that the 2007 PILOT fees Cooper paid were instead delinquent real property taxes. Id. Complying with defendants' request, Delaware County officials terminated the real estate tax abatement for Cooper's Property. Compl. at ¶ 22.
Cooper first filed a complaint on June 23, 2011 in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and various state law claims. Cooper v. City of Westerville, et al., Case No. 11CVH06-0735 the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law; and b) the right to just compensation for the taking of property." Compl. in Case No. 2:11-cv-638 at ¶ 20.
On August 10, 2011, Cooper filed two motions in his first lawsuit. First, Cooper sought leave to amend his complaint under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to remove the §1983 claim and to add state law claims. Cooper's second motion requested the Court to remand the action back to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.
The magistrate judge granted Cooper's motion for leave to amend his complaint on September 7, 2011. On September 29, 2011, this Court granted Cooper's motion to remand and ordered the case remanded to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. On April 18, 2012, Cooper voluntarily dismissed his remaining state law claims against the defendants.
On April 17, 2013, Cooper filed the instant action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas asserting a §1983 claim against the City of Westerville and three of its officials. Cooper v. City of Westerville, et al., Case No. 13CV04-4293 (Franklin Cnty. Ct. C.P.). Defendants removed the case to this Court on May 3, 2013 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
In Count I of the complaint, Cooper asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that when defendants acted to terminate the tax abatement on his property it deprived him of various constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments including "1) the right to freedom of contract, 2) the right not to be assessed and subjected to collection activity for a debt he did not owe, 3) the right not to have an alleged civil debt converted into a tax and then reported as a delinquent tax, and 4) the right not to be deprived of property without due process of law." Compl. at ¶ 28. In Count II, Cooper alleges that the City was unjustly enriched by his June 14, 2007 payment of $5,516.44 for PILOT fees that he did not owe. Id. at ¶ 36.
Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings as to both counts. Defendants argue that the §1983 claim is barred by the statute of limitations and that the unjust enrichment claim fails to state a claim for relief.
Courts apply the same analysis to motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) as they apply to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Warrior Sports, Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party isnevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id. (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). "The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead 'sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible." Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" need not be accepted as true, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considers the pleadings, which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) (); Hous. Auth. Risk Retention Group, Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 378 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 2004). While the allegations in the complaint are the primary focus in assessing a Rule 12(c) motion, "matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint[ ] also may be taken into account." Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The applicable statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims arising in Ohio requires that claims be filed within two years of their accrual. Huntsman v. Perry Local Sch. Bd. of Educ.,379 F. App'x 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing LRL Props. v. Portage Metro Hous. Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995)).
In actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984). In Cooper's complaint, May 7, 2010...
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