Cooper v. Hoeglund

• Decision Date: 05 April 1946
• Docket Number: No. 34116.,No. 34115.,34115.,34116.
• Citation: 221 Minn. 446,22 N.W.2d 450
• Parties: COOPER v. HOEGLUND et al. In re ELZEA'S ESTATE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

22 N.W.2d 450

221 Minn. 446

COOPER v. HOEGLUND et al. In re ELZEA'S ESTATE.

No. 34115.

No. 34116.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 5, 1946.

Appeal from District Court, Benton County; Anton Thompson, Judge.

Action by Bertha Evelyn Elzea, special administratrix of the estate of Elwin E. Elzea, deceased, against Nels E. Hoeglund, administrator of the estate of Rex Loraen, Joe M. Pittman and Abie Orbuch, to recover for the wrongful death of Elwin E. Elzea in a truck collision, wherein Cecile May Cooper was substituted for Bertha Evelyn Elzea. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Sexton & Kennedy and John Bowman, all of St. Paul, for appellant Hoeglund.

Quigley, Donohue & Quigley, of St. Cloud, for appellants Pittman & Orbuch.

Meagher & Geer, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

PETERSON, Justice.

This action for wrongful death is brought by the representative of the estate of Elwin E. Elzea against the representative of the estate of Rex Loraen, Joe M. Pittman, and Abie Orbuch. Plaintiff recovered a verdict. Defendants appeal.

Late in the afternoon of February 28, 1944, but when it was still daylight, Elzea and Loraen were killed as a result of a head-on collision between auto trucks driven by them on a paved trunk highway at a point outside the corporate limits of a municipality.

1. Defendants contend that the evidence does not show negligence on their part. We think that there was evidence reasonably tending to show that defendant Pittman was driving the truck of defendant Orbuch in a southerly direction in the west lane of the pavement; that he slackened his speed for a distance of about 300 feet before reaching an intersecting gravel road into which he intended to make a left turn; that decedent Loraen was driving a truck loaded with hogs in a southerly direction so closely behind the Orbuch truck that he could not stop in time to avoid a collision with it, if it stopped; that, because he was driving so closely behind the Orbuch truck, he could not see whether the east lane was free from oncoming traffic; that at the same time Pittman and Loraen were approaching the gravel road from the north decedent Elzea was approaching it from the south at a speed estimated to be from 35 to 45 miles per hour; that Pittman either failed to give any signal at all of his intention to make a left turn or to stop, or that he gave one that was not visible to Loraen; that Pittman stopped suddenly in front of Loraen; that Loraen, in order to avoid running into the rear of the Orbuch truck, swerved suddenly to get into the east lane and got directly in the path of the Elzea truck; that Elzea turned toward the outside of the shoulder and the ditch; that in so doing the Elzea truck hit the right front side of the Loraen truck, turned it around, and dragged it approximately 75 feet across the ditch to a nearby farm gate; that both trucks were badly wrecked; and that Elzea and Loraen were killed as a result of the wreck. Findings of these facts are implicit in the verdict.

Defendants seriously challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain findings of most of these facts. We have examined the record carefully and have come to the conclusion that, when viewed objectively, the facts found by the jury are reasonably supported by the evidence. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the evidence in detail to demonstrate the correctness of the verdict. Not only is such a demonstration no part of the function of an appellate court, but it serves no useful purpose. Smith v. Ramsey County, 218 Minn. 325, 16 N.W.2d 169; Holmes v. Conter, 212 Minn. 394, 4 N.W.2d 106; 1 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 415a.

In view of these facts, the jury was warranted in finding the defendants guilty of negligence. Pittman's failure to give Loraen a visible signal constituted a violation of Minn.St.1941, § 169.19, subds. 5-8, Mason St.1940 Supp. §§ 2720-193(b, c), 2720-194, 2720-195. Loraen was driving so close to Pittman as to permit an inference that it was closer than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, and for that reason was a violation of § 169.18, subd. 3(10), (§ 2720-189[a]). His driving from behind the Orbuch truck into the east lane directly into the path of Elzea's oncoming truck was a violation of § 169.18, subds. 1(1) and 3(5), (§§ 2720-182[1] and 2720-186[a]). There may have been other violations of statute, but these are sufficient to warrant findings of negligence. Under § 169.96 (§ 2720-291), a violation of the statute of which these sections are a part is "prima facie evidence of negligence." Landeen v. DeJung, 219 Minn. 287, 291, 17 N.W.2d 648, 651. We have held that a violation of statute of the sort mentioned justifies a finding of negligence. Nees v. Minneapolis St. R. Co., 218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758 (stopping without giving proper signal); Martini v. Johnson, 204 Minn. 556, 284 N.W. 433, and Peterson v. Doll, 184 Minn. 213, 238 N.W. 324 (driving more closely than is reasonable and prudent); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W. 2d 413, 139 A.L.R. 1242, and Geisen v. Luce, 185 Minn. 479, 242 N.W. 8 (turning into lane of oncoming car).

2. The facts shown support a finding that the negligence of Pittman and Loraen was the proximate cause of the collision between the Loraen and Elzea trucks. Their negligence was concurrent. Pittman's negligence, by combining with Loraen's negligence and causing him to turn into the path of Elzea's oncoming truck, set in motion a chain of events culminating in the collision. Walker v. Stecher, 219 Minn. 152, 17 N.W.2d 317; Cf. Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N. W.2d 788. The fact that neither the Loraen truck nor the Elzea truck had any physical contact with the Orbuch truck is no reason for holding that Pittman's negligence was not a proximate cause. It is sufficient that Pittman's negligence set in motion the chain of events that proximately caused the ultimate harm. Smith v. Carlson, 209 Minn. 268, 296 N.W. 132.

3. Defendants urge that Elzea's contributory negligence appears as a matter of law and thus bars recovery. This contention is based upon the fact that Elzea drove his truck in excess of 35 miles per hour in violation of the governor's executive order fixing 35 miles as the maximum speed for motor vehicles. The order was promulgated under authorization of L.1943, c. 252,¹ "in order to conserve essential materials" as a wartime measure, and the order recites that it was issued for such purpose. Defendants contend that the violation of the order constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence which, for want of a showing to overcome it, compels a finding of negligence under cases like Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 1 N.W.2d 409. Plaintiff contends that violation of the governor's order does not constitute negligence, because protection from harm caused by violation thereof is not a purpose of the statute; and that, in order to make out a prima facie case of negligence based upon violation of a statute regulating speed, it was necessary under § 169.96 (§ 2720-291) to show a speed in excess of 60 miles per hour, the maximum lawful speed fixed by § 169.14, subd. 2(2), (§ 2720-178 [b] 2), as applicable at the time, the place and under the circumstances here. We think that plaintiff's contention must be sustained. An action based upon an alleged violation of statute will not lie where the statute was enacted for a purpose wholly different from that of preventing the harm complained of. Westlund v. Iverson, 154 Minn. 52, 191 N.W. 253; Everett v. Great Northern R. Co. 100 Minn. 309, 111 N.W. 281, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 703, 10 Ann.Cas. 294; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693, 79 Am.St Rep. 350; Rosse v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 216, 71 N.W. 20, 37 L.R.A. 591, 64 Am.St.Rep. 472; Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N.W. 669; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 163; Restatement, Torts, § 286. The plain reason is that only a party for whose benefit a statute was enacted can claim protection under it. That being true, violation of a statute not enacted to protect individuals from the acts prohibited does not constitute a defense to an otherwise valid cause of action. Mechler v. McMahon, 184 Minn. 476, 239 N.W. 605; Fraser v. Great Northern R. Co., 166 Minn. 308, 207 N.W. 644; Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 14 N.W. 575; Rampon v. Washington Water Power Co., 94 Wash. 438, 162 P. 514, L.R.A.1917C, 998; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, § 196. In the Mechler case, 184 Minn. 480, 239 N.W. 608, we said: "If the statute or ordinance was not enacted for the benefit of the party invoking it, the general rule is that it is wholly immaterial, although the acts which constitute its violation may be admissible on the question of common-law negligence. In other words, the general rule is that the violation of such statute or ordinance is not even a circumstance to be considered on the question of negligence or contributory negligence. Whether...