Cooper v. Hopkins
| Decision Date | 03 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:78-CV-207WS. |
| Citation | 945 F.Supp. 940 |
| Parties | James COOPER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jessie HOPKINS, Sheriff of Madison County, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
Ronald Welch, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiffs.
Rebecca Cowan, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.
Before the court are the motions of the plaintiffs in the above styled and numbered cause for attorney fees and expenses on behalf of their respective counsel, Ronald Welch, Tara Walker, and Terry Wallace, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.1 This court's jurisdiction is predicated on Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 13312 and 1343.3
This prisoners' rights case began in 1978 when a group of inmates (hereinafter "plaintiffs") in the Madison County Jail, Madison County, Mississippi, filed a class action lawsuit against Madison County and its officials (hereinafter "Madison County") pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 The plaintiffs alleged that conditions and practices at the Madison County Jail violated the rights secured to the plaintiffs by the Eighth5 and Fourteenth6 Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F.Supp. 881 (N.D.Miss.1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir.1974); and Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983). As the litigation proceeded, the parties were able to negotiate an interim agreement, which was accepted and entered by the district court as an interim judgment. The interim judgment included a variety of remedial measures and directives aimed at bringing the jail into compliance with the requirements of the United States Constitution.7
One year after the interim judgment was entered, the parties agreed to allow the district court to refer their dispute to United States Magistrate Judge John R. Countiss, III. Soon thereafter, the Magistrate Judge entered a final judgment in the case on December 14, 1981. After the final judgment was entered, the plaintiffs filed four motions asking the Magistrate Judge to hold Madison County in contempt for various violations of the interim judgment. Three of these motions were dismissed. However, the fourth contempt motion was not dismissed until Madison County agreed to new terms for compliance monitoring and until the plaintiffs reported that Madison County was in substantial compliance with the final judgment dated December 14, 1981.
More than one decade after entry of the final judgment, Madison County filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6) for relief from the judgment, touting the 1992 construction of the $4.7 million dollar Madison County Detention Center. The plaintiffs opposed Madison County's motion, contending that at the time Madison County was not in substantial compliance with the final judgment entered December 14, 1981. Plaintiffs asked the Magistrate Judge to find Madison County in contempt for violating the consent judgment; to appoint a monitor to oversee the county's compliance with the 1981 consent judgment; and to assess costs to the county. After an evidentiary hearing on Madison County's motion, the Magistrate Judge entered a memorandum opinion and order on September 28, 1993, wherein he held that Madison County had failed to show that relief from the final judgment was warranted — with the exception of the matter of contact visitation for pretrial detainees which, since the final judgment of December 14, 1981, had been found by the United States Supreme Court not to be constitutionally mandated. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984) (). The Magistrate Judge found that Madison County had failed to abide by the terms of the final judgment dated December 14, 1981, once its jail facilities had been moved into the new Madison County Detention Center. The Magistrate Judge denied Madison County's motion for relief from judgment and held Madison County and its officials in contempt of court for being in continuing violation of the final judgment dated December 14, 1981. See Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir.1994). Additionally, the Magistrate Judge ordered the appointment of a monitor to oversee the defendants' remedial progress. The Magistrate Judge did not rule on the plaintiffs' request for costs. Furthermore, he did not enter a separate judgment in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thereafter, Madison County moved for permission to take an interlocutory appeal of the Magistrate Judge's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. This motion was denied by United States Magistrate Judge James C. Sumner on October 12, 1993.8 However, on October 27, 1993, Magistrate Judge Sumner reconsidered his October 12, 1993, order and amended the memorandum opinion and order of Magistrate Judge Countiss dated September 28, 1993, to provide that interlocutory appeal could be taken pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) which provides in pertinent part that, "... the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States ... granting ... injunctions."
The Fifth Circuit heard the interlocutory appeal and held that Magistrate Judge Countiss had not abused his discretion when he had found that Madison County had failed to demonstrate either changes in factual conditions or changes in the law to justify his granting Madison County's Rule 60(b) motion for relief. Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d at 544-45. The Fifth Circuit also held that the Magistrate Judge's finding of contempt was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of his discretion. Id. The Fifth Circuit's decision was rendered on October 5, 1994.
On October 18, 1994, counsel for the plaintiffs Ron Welch submitted his verified motion for attorney fees and expenses to this court. Counsel for the plaintiffs Tara Walker sought additional time to present her motion for attorney fees on behalf of herself and Terry Wallace, and her motion was submitted on November 17, 1994. Thereafter, this court scheduled and heard the oral arguments of the parties.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 19889 enables federal courts to grant attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs as part of costs in prisoners' rights case. In the case sub judice, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Magistrate Judge's denial of the county's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the final judgment and his finding of contempt. As such, the plaintiffs have prevailed and their attorneys are presumptively entitled to an award of fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 428-30, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1937, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Shipes v. Trinity Industries, 987 F.2d 311, 319 (5th Cir.1993), citing Von Clark v. Butler, 916 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir.1990); and Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 930 (5th.), vacated in part, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.1990). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 432-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939.
Once the lodestar is calculated, based on considerations such as the nature and extent of the services supplied by the attorneys and the value of their services according to the customary fee and the quality of the legal work, the district court then determines whether the lodestar should be adjusted on the basis of the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974). The twelve Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor involved; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to this case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations; (8) the amount of time involved and results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of counsel; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. See Clark v. Butler, 916 F.2d 255 (5th Cir.1990), citing Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir.1982) (Copper Liquor III), modified on other grounds, 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1175 (5th Cir.1986).
Counsel for the plaintiffs Ron Welch made his appearance in this litigation on November 2, 1993, after Madison County filed its notice of appeal. Hence, all the hours claimed by Ron Welch are hours spent on Madison County's appeal of the memorandum opinion and order of the Magistrate Judge dated September 28, 1993. Welch has submitted contemporaneous time records which purport to show that he spent a total of 120 hours not only preparing the plaintiffs' appellate brief and submitting his motion for attorney fees, but also for drafting motions on behalf of the plaintiffs for on-going monitoring and attorney access to the Madison County Detention Center. Welch contends that his usual rate per...
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Mitchell v. Sheldon
...the word," but where it was "difficult to find counsel" for other reasons) (internal quotations omitted). Compare Cooper v. Hopkins, 945 F. Supp. 940, 948 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (denying multiplier on this basis where the plaintiff's attorney in question had only participated in the case "at the......