Cooper v. McNeil
| Decision Date | 23 April 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:06-cv-950-J-33TEM.,3:06-cv-950-J-33TEM. |
| Citation | 622 F.Supp.2d 1242 |
| Parties | Jason J. COOPER, Petitioner, v. Walter A. McNEIL,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Jason J. Cooper, Raiford, FL, pro se.
Thomas D. Winokur, Attorney General's Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents.
Petitioner Jason J. Cooper, an inmate of the Florida penal system who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. # 1) (hereinafter Petition) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on October 30, 2006. Petitioner challenges a 2003 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on the following grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's (a) failure to impeach Officer Steinberg at the suppression hearing, (b) failure to call the Petitioner to testify, as he requested, and (c) failure to call the witnesses that Petitioner asked to be investigated; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's (a) failure to object to the State's racially motivated peremptory challenge of an African-American juror, Mr. Harold, (b) failure to competently argue that the State's explanation was pretextual, and (c) failure to preserve the issue for appellate review; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object to the improper questions asked during the cross-examination of Petitioner; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object and request curative instructions regarding the State's improper closing arguments; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object and move for a mistrial when the State improperly informed the jury of the specific nature of his crime of dishonesty; and (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the cumulative effect of the errors set forth in grounds one through five.
Respondents have responded. See Respondents' Answer in Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. #11) (hereinafter Response). In support of their contentions, they have submitted exhibits.2 Petitioner was given admonitions and a time frame to respond. See Court's Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. # 4). Petitioner has responded. See Petitioner's Reply to the Respondents' Response to Order to Show Cause (Doc. # 15). This case is now ripe for review.
On January 22, 2003, Petitioner Cooper was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, one count of resisting an officer without violence to his or her person, one count of possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis and one count of possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. Ex. A at 11-12, Information. Petitioner proceeded to trial on the first count, and the jury found him guilty as charged. Ex. B, Transcript of the Jury Trial Proceedings (hereinafter Tr.) at 12, 263; Ex. A at 71. The court adjudged him guilty in accordance with the verdict, found him to be a habitual felony offender and sentenced him to twelve years of imprisonment. Ex. A at 87-94.
Petitioner appealed and raised the following claims: (1) the trial court deprived Petitioner of his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury chosen in a nondiscriminatory manner, and (2) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion challenging the imposition of a minimum mandatory term of three years. Ex. D, Initial Brief of Appellant. The State filed an Answer Brief. Ex. E. On August 12, 2004, the appellate court per curiam affirmed without issuing a written opinion. Cooper v. State, 880 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Ex. F. The mandate was issued on August 30, 2004. Ex. G.
On or about October 20, 2004, Petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850, raising the following grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's (a) failure to impeach Officer Steinberg at the suppression hearing, (b) failure to call the Petitioner to testify, as he requested, and (c) failure to call the witnesses that Petitioner asked to be investigated; (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's (a) failure to object to the State's racially motivated peremptory challenge of an African-American juror, Mr. Harold, (b) failure to competently argue that the State's explanation was pretextual, and (c) failure to preserve the issue for appellate review; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object to the improper questions asked during the cross-examination of Petitioner; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object and request curative instructions regarding the State's improper closing arguments; and (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel's failure to object and move for a mistrial when the State improperly informed the jury of the specific nature of his crime of dishonesty. Ex. H at 1-16. Petitioner then amended the motion to add the following final claim: (6) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the cumulative effect of the errors set forth in grounds one through five. Id. at 17-32.
The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the first ground of Petitioner's motion for postconviction relief. Id. at 57-117, Transcript of the Evidentiary Hearing (hereinafter EH Tr.). The court denied relief on all of the grounds. Id. at 49-54. On appeal, Petitioner submitted a brief raising only ground one. Ex. I. The State filed an Answer Brief. Ex. J. On May 31, 2006, the appellate court per curiam affirmed without issuing a written opinion. Cooper v. State, 931 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Ex. K. The mandate was issued on June 27, 2006. Ex. L.
The Petition is timely filed within the one-year period of limitation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Response at 3-4.
"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id.
This Court has carefully reviewed the record and concludes Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The pertinent facts of the case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Smith v. Singletary, 170 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir.1999). Thus, the Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development." Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1034, 124 S.Ct. 2104, 158 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). Therefore, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted by this Court.
Since this action was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (hereinafter AEDPA), April 24, 1996, the Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA. Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 1573, 155 L.Ed.2d 319 (2003); Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1215 n. 10 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1104, 122 S.Ct. 2310, 152 L.Ed.2d 1065 (2002); Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 103, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000). Under AEDPA, however, the review Stewart v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir.2007).
The Eleventh Circuit has explained this deferential review:
[Section] 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief for a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was: "(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable[3] application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Marquard, 429 F.3d at 1303. The phrase "clearly established Federal law," as used in § 2254(d)(1), encompasses only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state court decision. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)); Osborne v. Terry, 466 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir.2006).
Schriro, 127 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (footnote omitted). This presumption of correctness applies equally to factual determinations made by state trial and appellate courts. Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.2003) (footnote omitted) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981)).
Finally, for a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's determination will be entitled to deference for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that...
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