Cooper v. Nutley Sun Printing Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. A--26,P,No. 103,103,A--26
• Citation: 175 A.2d 639,36 N.J. 189
• Parties: James COOPER et al. and Newark Typographical Locallaintiffs-Appellants, v. NUTLEY SUN PRINTING CO., Inc. et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 189

36 N.J. 189

175 A.2d 639

James COOPER et al. and Newark Typographical Local No. 103 Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NUTLEY SUN PRINTING CO., Inc. et al., Defendants-Respondents.

No. A--26.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Oct. 23 and 24, 1961.

Decided Nov. 20, 1961.

Thomas L. Parsonnet, Newark, for plaintiffs-appellants. (Parsonnet, Weitzman & Oransky, Newark, attorneys; Victor J. Parsonnet, Newark, on the brief.)

Richard Heller, Passaic, for defendants-respondents. (Heller & Laiks, Passaic, attorneys.)

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

The issues presented on this appeal involve the effect which our courts should give to the constitutional rights of employees in private employment to organize and select their representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining.

The complaint was filed in the Superior Court Chancery Division. It alleged that: On September 2, 1959, the nine individual plaintiffs were members of the plaintiff union (Local No. 103). Defendants, employers of the individual plaintiffs, were engaged in the printing and publishing of a newspaper and other types of printing. Between September 2, 1959 and September 28, 1959, defendants (a single employing unit for the purpose of this appeal) discharged the plaintiffs, Cooper, Ritter and Williams, because of their membership in Local No. 103. During this period defendants ordered the six other individual plaintiffs 'to have nothing to do with plaintiff Local No. 103, and to refrain from becoming members therein,' and 'threatened plaintiff Lukas with bodily harm if he joined any Union strike against the defendants.' It was also alleged that because of these acts the six individual plaintiffs declared a strike and together with Cooper, Ritter and Williams commenced picketing defendants' place of business; the strike still continues. The complaint further stated that prior to instituting the present action, the individual plaintiffs filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board alleging the defendants were guilty of unfair labor practices. The Board rejected jurisdiction over the matter because defendants were not sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce to justify the Board's intervention. Plaintiffs demanded judgment 'ordering defendants to reinstate plaintiffs Cooper, Ritter, and Williams to their jobs with full back pay from the time of their discharge to the time of reinstatement and thereupon to re-employ the other individual plaintiffs at the jobs and wages enjoyed by them, and with the full seniority rights at the time of the commencement of the strike, upon their tender of return to employment.' In their answer defendants denied the individual plaintiffs, Cooper, Ritter and Williams, were discharged because of their union activities. While defendants admitted the National Labor Relations Board had rejected jurisdiction, they contended that jurisdiction over the matter lay exclusively in the Federal courts or agencies. Defendants further contended the complaint failed to allege a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The pretrial order embodied the above issues.

At the outset of the trial, plaintiffs contended their rights as set forth in the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, Art. I, § 19, had been violated. That section provides:

'Persons in private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively. Persons in public employment shall have the right to organize, present to and make known to the State, or any of its political subdivisions or agencies, their grievances and proposals through representatives of their own choosing.' (Emphasis added)

They urged the 'constitutional provision is self-implementing' and the courts have the duty to redress any infringement upon these rights. Therefore they sought what they considered to be the proper remedy, namely, the relief demanded in their complaint. The defendants contended that the discharges resulted solely from 'reasons of economy.' Since the parties agreed that an appeal would be taken regardless of the trial court's decision, they did not introduce evidence to resolve the factual dispute. Plaintiffs simply made an 'offer of proof * * * which will tend to prove that some of the plaintiffs were discharged because they joined the Union, and that the others went on strike to support the right of the plaintiffs to join the Union and to bargain collectively.' Thereupon the court replied:

'On the basis of that offer, Mr. Parsonnet, I am of the opinion that I do not have jurisdiction to grant the relief which you seek and I will refuse to accept the proof. In the event that the Appellate Court decides that my determination is erroneous the matter would then come back here for proof on the facts.'

Accordingly, a judgment was entered stating, '(T)he Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief demanded by the Plaintiffs' and ordered 'Judgment for the Defendants.' Plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Division and we certified the appeal before argument there.

We cannot tell the basis upon which the trial court found it lacked 'jurisdiction.' By their pleadings the parties assume the defendants are engaged in interstate commerce. If the court meant that through the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.) Congress had given exclusive jurisdiction in interstate labor disputes to the National Labor Relations Board, it was in error. Congress has pre-empted the field, requiring that all labor disputes which involve interstate commerce be submitted to the National Labor Relations Board. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601 (1957); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 77 S.Ct. 607, 1 L.Ed.2d 618 (1957). But in some circumstances the Board may reject jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (1959) provides:

'(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction * * *

(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State * * * from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.'

Thus it is clear that once the Board has delined to assert jurisdiction over a labor controversy because of its minimal impact on interstate commerce, state tribunals are free to exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter. See Michelman, 'State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities,' 74 Harv.L.Rev. 641, 646 (1961); Aaron, 'The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,' 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1086, 1092 (1960). In the present case, the parties agree the individual plaintiffs submitted the dispute to the National Labor Relations Board and the Board declined to assert jurisdiction. After the complaint was filed, Local No. 103 petitioned the Board as to whether it would assert jurisdiction. The Board declined because of the slight impact of the defendants' operations on interstate commerce. Nutley Sun Printing Co. Inc. et als. and Newark Typographical Union Local No. 103, 128 N.L.R.B. 58 (1960).

In view of the Board's refusal to take jurisdiction and the quoted provisions of 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c)(2), it is clear that the Chancery Division was not barred by federal pre-emption from assuming jurisdiction in the present case.

If the trial court was of the opinion that it lacked 'jurisdiction' to resolve the controversy because it could not grant the relief sought, it was also in error. In the absence of controlling legislation, the courts have traditionally been the proper forums for dealing with matters affecting labor relations. Hughes v. Superior Court of State of California, 339 U.S. 460, 467, 70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985, 993 (1950); Independent Dairy Workers Union of Hightstown v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local No. 680, 30 N.J. 173, 182, 152 A.2d 331 (1959). Our Superior Court is a court of 'original * * * jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes,' N.J.Const.1947, Art. VI, § 3, par. 2. The present complaint, having to do with labor relations, is within the general jurisdiction so conferred. Whether the complaint fails to allege a cause of action upon which relief may be granted is immaterial to the question of the court's jurisdiction. Peterson v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 454, 79 A.2d 50 (1951). As was said by Justice Black, speaking for the court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939, 943 (1946):

'For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy.'

Thus, even if the trial court believed it could not grant the relief sought, it had jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the case. The court probably was aware of that fact since it entered judgment for the defendants. Without jurisdiction, it was powerless to enter judgment for either party. See Maguire v. Van Meter, 121 N.J.L. 150, 1 A.2d 445 (E. & A. 1938). This leads to the conclusion that the court used 'jurisdiction' improperly.

If the court believed that plaintiffs failed 'to state a claim upon which relief can be granted' and therefore dismissed the action, it was also in error. Our Constitution recognizes that employees have 'the right to organize and bargain collectively.' tively.' If plaintiffs' allegations are to be believed, and they must be at this...