Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1689,90-1689
• Citation: 929 F.2d 1078
• Parties: Alvin Ray COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHERIFF, LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1078

929 F.2d 1078

19 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1270

Alvin Ray COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SHERIFF, LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-1689

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

April 30, 1991.

Alvin Ray Cooper, Amarillo, Tex., pro se.

Charlotte Bingham, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, Tex., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before JOHNSON, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant, Alvin Ray Cooper, a state prisoner, sued officials of the county jail in Lubbock County, Texas, pursuant to Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, claiming, inter alia, an unconstitutional

deprivation of food and seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief from such deprivation in the future. Finding that the district court erred in dismissing Cooper's suit, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, we vacate and remand for further disposition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Cooper filed this civil rights suit against various Lubbock County jail officials. He originally alleged that the defendants were denying him food. He specifically asserted that he was denied food on December 30, 1989, and again for five consecutive days from January 10, 1990, through January 15, 1990, the day he signed his complaint. He also alleged that the jail staff had already stated that he would not be fed on January 16, 1990. Cooper sought compensatory and punitive damages, a temporary restraining order, and a permanent injunction.

The defendants answered by stating that jail policy required that all inmates dress fully for all meals. They further claimed that "[i]f an inmate is not fully dressed and refuses to fully dress for a meal, he voluntarily rejects the meal." They alleged that food was, thus, always available to Cooper but that his "failure to eat was due to his own voluntary refusal to fully dress during meals."

Individual defendants Sheriff Keesee and jail administrator Addington also asserted that they have qualified immunity for their actions and that Cooper had failed to allege any facts that overcame this immunity.

The magistrate judge concluded that Cooper's complaint alleged at worst that the defendants had acted negligently toward Cooper. The magistrate judge found that the complaint also failed to state whether Cooper was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. The magistrate judge gave Cooper thirty days to file an amended complaint. He also advised Cooper of the heightened pleading requirement that the immunity defense imposed.

After obtaining an extension of time, Cooper filed an amended complaint. In it, he alleged that the defendants had refused him food for thirteen days, ending on January 21st, twelve of which days had been consecutive. During at least some of those days Cooper had been housed in solitary confinement. He further asserted that the defendants knew, or should have known, that their conduct subjected Cooper to "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. ¹ By this time, as his return address evidences, Cooper was no longer housed in the Lubbock County jail. He did not repeat his original request for various forms of equitable relief.

The defendants' new answer claimed that Cooper's amended complaint still failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome their qualified immunity. Their answer also pointed out that Cooper's amended complaint named as defendants four county commissioners ² who were not parties to this suit. In his reply, Cooper conceded that he had refused to dress fully before meals. He asserted, however, that the "defendants made on the spot disciplinary measures by refusing to allow the plaintiff to receive his meals."

Under the liberal construction given to pro se pleadings, the magistrate judge should have construed Cooper's reply to the defendant's new answer as a motion to amend the complaint. See McGruder v. Phelps, 608 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir.1979). Nothing in the record suggests that Cooper delayed in clarifying his complaint because of bad faith or other "dilatory motive."

See Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1981). Thus, the court should have granted Cooper's motion to amend. Cooper's complaint, then, is that the defendants punished him without due process of law and that the form of punishment violated the eighth amendment.

The magistrate judge filed a report recommending that Cooper's suit be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge found that the defendants' "refusal to feed [Cooper] under the jail regulations was due to his own obstinacy in refusing to conform to the jail regulations." He further found that Cooper had failed to allege that he had suffered any harm as a result of this lack of food. Concerning the qualified immunity defense, the magistrate concluded that Cooper's allegations "do not state a claim showing a violation of clearly established law."

Before the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, Cooper filed a "notice of appeal" in which, inter alia, he again argued that punishment may not deprive a prisoner of the "necessities of life." He also stated that the defendants knew, or should have known, that their actions violated this "undisputable" law. Cooper also alleged a specific physical harm--a "substantial weight loss," which prison medical records would verify.

The district court treated Cooper's "notice" as his objections to the magistrate judge's report. The court then adopted the magistrate judge's opinion as its own and, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissed, without prejudice, Cooper's complaint for failure to state a claim.

This court received a letter from Cooper indicating his intent to appeal. We treat that letter as a timely notice of appeal. See Incas & Monterey Printing & Packaging, Ltd. v. M/V SANG JIN, 747 F.2d 958, 963 n. 15 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2361, 86 L.Ed.2d 261 (1985); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). In his brief, Cooper also asks this court to appoint counsel because he suffers "such mental anguish" that he is unable to "attend to the matters of this case."

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this court accepts "all well pleaded averments as true and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, 762 F.2d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1985). We do not uphold the dismissal " 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Meals & Dress Requirement

Given Cooper's admissions, the district court could properly assume that Cooper's "obstinacy"--his failure to dress fully before meals--was the immediate cause of his lack of food. The magistrate judge's conclusion that Cooper failed to allege that he "suffered ... nutritional harm or other problems" was, however, incorrect. In fact, Cooper alleged harm by stating that he had suffered "substantial weight loss." As outlined above, his complaint also alleged that the defendants' conduct violated his due process rights by inflicting a punishment upon him without due process of law; and that the continual deprivation of food he suffered was "cruel and unusual" punishment. Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed these claims of harm.

The defendants argue that their conduct does not violate the Constitution, because they merely followed prison regulations that required Cooper to be dressed fully before his meals could be served. The defendants claim that the regulation preconditions meals on a dress requirement. They do not deny Cooper's allegation that he went without food for the number of days alleged, but they characterize Cooper's failure to dress properly for meals as a "voluntary reject[ion]" of those meals. Although Cooper agrees that prison regulations required him to dress for meals, he asserts that the regulations do not specify what consequences would follow from his failure to comply. He asserts that the jail guards made an "on the spot disciplinary decision" by refusing to feed him. Despite this disagreement concerning the interpretation of the regulation at issue, no copy of this regulation appears in the record. Dismissal was, therefore, premature because the present record is inadequate to support the district court's implicit conclusion that the defendants acted within the regulation's authority.

Even if the regulation required the defendants to respond as they did, a dismissal of Cooper's complaint does not necessarily follow. The mere existence of such a regulation is not an automatic shield against a civil rights suit. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1304-06 (5th Cir.1974) (permitting use of prison's "dark hole" only if conditions exceeding state's statutory requirements are met). Complaints against the enforcement of prison regulations which deny a prisoner some privilege may, in the proper circumstances, be dismissed as frivolous. See, e.g., Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517, 518-19 (5th Cir.1987) (state can reasonably deny privileges such as access to prison law library because prisoner refuses to use his "committed name" as an alias for prison identification purposes). Whether, however, a prisoner's meals constitute a like "privilege" is questionable.

Also, the magistrate judge erred when, citing Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir.1988), he held that because there was "no evidence this harm [Cooper's lack of food] was caused maliciously or deliberately by responsible people," Cooper had failed to state a sufficient claim. The court in Beck, on the...