Cooper v. Smith, 03CA6.

CourtUnited States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
Citation800 NE 2d 372,155 Ohio App.3d 218
Docket NumberNo. 03CA6.,03CA6.
PartiesCOOPER, Appellant, v. SMITH et al., Appellees.
Decision Date07 November 2003

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

D. Scott Bowling, for appellant.

Anderson & Anderson and Robert C. Anderson, for appellees.

HARSHA, Judge.

{¶ 1} Lester Cooper appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court dismissing his complaint, which sought reimbursement for gifts he had given to his ex-fiancee, Julie Smith, and her mother, Janet Smith. Cooper contends that the gifts he gave to Julie were given in contemplation of marriage and should be returned to him now that the engagement has ended. In addition, he contends that the gifts he gave to Janet should be returned to him under a theory of unjust enrichment. With the exception of the engagement ring, the gifts Cooper gave to Julie were irrevocable inter vivos gifts. Thus, he is not entitled to their return. Moreover, because enrichment of the donee is the intended purpose of a gift, there is nothing "unjust" about allowing Janet to retain the gifts she received from Cooper in the absence of fraud, overreaching, or some other circumstance. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

{¶ 2} In May 2001, Cooper suffered serious injury that caused him to be hospitalized for an extended period of time. While he was hospitalized, Julie, whom Cooper had met the year before, and Janet made numerous trips to visit him. Although Julie was legally married to another man at the time, a romantic relationship developed between Cooper and Julie. While still in the hospital, Cooper proposed to Julie, and she accepted, indicating that she would marry him after she divorced her husband. Although Julie obtained a divorce from her husband in October 2001, she and Cooper did not marry.

{¶ 3} Cooper ultimately received an $180,000 settlement for his injuries. After being released from the hospital, Cooper moved in with Janet and Julie. Over the next couple of months, Cooper purchased a number of items for Julie, including a diamond engagement ring, a car, a computer, a tanning bed, and horses. Cooper also paid off Janet's car loan and made various improvements to her house, such as having a new furnace installed and having wood flooring laid in the kitchen. By December 2001, the settlement money had run out.

{¶ 4} In June 2002, an incident occurred between Janet and Cooper, and he moved out of the house. However, he and Julie continued their relationship. One month after moving out, Cooper informed Julie that he intended to sue Janet to recover the money he had invested in her house. Julie responded by telling Cooper that she could not be with him if he sued her mother. That same month, Cooper filed suit against both Julie and Janet.

{¶ 5} In December 2002, Cooper's case proceeded to trial before the magistrate. At trial, Cooper testified that the gifts he gave to Julie were given in contemplation of marriage. He also attempted to show that the gifts he had given to Janet, including the improvements to her house, were conditional gifts. He indicated that he had paid off Janet's car loan so that when the settlement money ran out, they could live on the money that was previously being used for the monthly car payment. He also indicated that he paid for the improvements to Janet's house because he believed he would be living there in the future.

{¶ 6} At the conclusion of Cooper's case-in-chief, appellees moved to dismiss his complaint. The magistrate granted the motion, concluding that even if Cooper's evidence was viewed in the most favorable light, appellees were entitled to dismissal. The magistrate concluded that the gifts Cooper gave to Julie were not given in contemplation of marriage since Julie was legally married to another man at the time. The magistrate further found that even if the gifts were given in contemplation of marriage, Cooper was not entitled to their return because he unjustifiably broke the engagement. With respect to the gifts Cooper gave Janet, the magistrate found that there was no evidence that the gifts were given on any condition. Rather, the magistrate concluded that the gifts were final and could not be recovered since "a gift is an unearned enrichment that cannot be converted into an unjust enrichment."

{¶ 7} After the magistrate filed his decision recommending that Cooper's complaint be dismissed, Cooper filed objections. In March 2003, the trial court overruled Cooper's objections to the magistrate's decision and entered a judgment dismissing Cooper's complaint. Cooper now appeals and raises the following assignments of error:

"ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1—The trial court erred as a matter of law by adopting the magistrate's decision granting appellees' motion to dismiss. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2—The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to restore various assets retained by appellee Julie Smith under theories of gifts in anticipation of marriage and unjust enrichment. ASSIGMENT OF ERROR NO. 3—The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to restore various assets retained by appellee Janet Smith under a theory of unjust enrichment."

{¶ 8} Civ.R. 41(B)(2) permits a defendant in a nonjury action to move for dismissal of the action after the close of the plaintiffs case. Dismissals under Civ.R. 41(B)(2) are similar in nature to directed verdicts in jury actions; however, the standards for the two motions are not the same. See Civ.R. 41(B)(2) and Comment 3. Because a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) dismissal is used in nonjury actions, it requires the trial court and reviewing court to apply different tests. Cent. Motors Corp. v. Pepper Pike (1979), 63 Ohio App.2d 34, 48, 13 O.O.3d 347, 409 N.E.2d 258.

{¶ 9} Civ.R. 41(B)(2) specifically provides that the trial court may consider both the law and the facts. Thus, under the rule, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, does not view the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff but instead actually determines whether the plaintiff has proven the necessary facts by the appropriate evidentiary standard. See L.W. Shoemaker, M.D., Inc. v. Connor (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 748, 612 N.E.2d 369; Harris v. Cincinnati (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 163, 607 N.E.2d 15. Even if the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, dismissal is still appropriate where the trial court determines that the necessary quantum of proof makes it clear that plaintiff will not prevail. Fenley v. Athens Cty. Genealogical Chapter (May 28, 1998), Athens App. No. 97CA36, 1998 WL 295496, citing 3B Moore, Federal Practice (1990), Paragraph 41.13(4), at 41-177. However, if the judge finds that the plaintiff has proven the relevant facts by the necessary quantum of proof, the motion must be denied and the defendant required to put on evidence. Central Motors Corp.

{¶ 10} To the extent that the trial court's determination rests on findings of fact, those findings will not be overturned on appellate review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Friend v. Elsea, Inc. (Sept. 26, 2000), Pickaway App. No. 98CA29, 2000 WL 1468499. However, the application of legal standards to those findings is reviewable de novo, thus presenting us with a mixed question of law and fact. Fenley, citing 3B Moore, Federal Practice (1990), Paragraph 41.13(1), at 41-166; Connor, supra.

{¶ 11} Cooper's first assignment of error merely states the underlying theme of his appeal and contains no arguments. Instead, his second and third assignmerits of error serve as the arguments in support of his first assignment of error. Thus, a resolution of those assignments of error will necessarily resolve Cooper's first assignment of error.

{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, Cooper contends that the court erred in concluding he did not state a claim for recovery under a theory of gifts in contemplation of marriage. Acknowledging that the Ohio appellate districts are split on the issue, Cooper urges us to adopt a "no-fault" rule regarding gifts in contemplation of marriage. Under such a rule, gifts given in contemplation of marriage are returned to the donor if the marriage does not occur, regardless of who is at fault in ending the engagement. Julie, on the other hand, urges us to adopt a fault-based rule regarding gifts in contemplation of marriage. She contends that Cooper should not recover the gifts he gave her because he unjustifiably broke the engagement by suing her mother.

{¶ 13} The term "gifts in contemplation of marriage" refers to gifts made during the engagement period, following the couple's agreement to marry. Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue (1996), 44 A.L.R.5th 1, 17. Gifts in contemplation of marriage become problematic when the marriage does not occur. If a donor gives gifts in contemplation of marriage and the marriage does not occur, is the donor entitled to recover the gifts? If the donor is entitled to recover the gifts, is that right absolute or is it subject to limitations?

{¶ 14} The majority of cases addressing gifts in contemplation of marriage deals exclusively with engagement rings. However, our research has uncovered some cases, including two from Ohio, that address gifts other than engagement rings. See Somple v. Livesay (July 31, 1979), Mahoning App. No. 78CA16; Zsigmond v. Vandemberg (Dec. 29, 1995), Portage App. No. 95-P-0006, 1995 WL 815349 (likening the recovery of gifts after an annulment to the recovery of gifts given in contemplation of marriage). After reviewing the cases from Ohio and elsewhere, we have identified five possible approaches to the present issue.

{¶ 15} Under the first approach, the donor is denied recovery if the donee was legally married to someone else at the time the donor and donee became engaged. See Morgan v. Wright (1963), 219 Ga. 385, 133 S.E.2d 341; Lowe v. Quinn (1971), 27...

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