Cooper v. State
| Decision Date | 20 April 1923 |
| Docket Number | 24,099 |
| Citation | 139 N.E. 184,193 Ind. 144 |
| Parties | Cooper v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Clay Circuit Court; Thomas W. Hutchinson, Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against William W. Cooper. From a judgment of conviction, the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Overson & Manning and B. C. Moon, for appellant.
U. S Lesh, Attorney-General, and Mrs. Edward Franklin White Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
Appellant was convicted of uttering and passing as genuine to the Riddell National Bank of Brazil, Indiana, on July 23, 1921, a certain forged check for $ 750, which purported to have been signed by William W. Houk, and indorsed by A. S. Calhoun, to whom it was made payable. Overruling appellant's motion for a new trial is the only error assigned.
The evidence introduced by the state was to the effect that the check was drawn on the First National Bank of Brazil, Indiana, and that William W. Houk, and A. S. Calhoun were persons of good repute and credit in that vicinity; that, under the name of A. S. Calhoun, appellant opened an account at the Riddell National Bank and asked and obtained credit for a deposit of $ 500, and $ 250 in money, in exchange for the check, between nine and ten o'clock in the forenoon of July 23, 1921; that about nine o'clock the same forenoon appellant presented to the Citizens National Bank of Brazil, Indiana, another forged check for $ 750, which purported to have been drawn by William W. Houk, on the First National Bank of Brazil, Indiana, in favor of J. S. Williams, and under the name of J. S. Williams, asked and obtained credit for a deposit of $ 500, and $ 250 in money, in exchange for that check; that when he was at each bank he wore a blue shirt with collar attached, without a coat, and said that he was a farmer; that at half past nine that forenoon appellant went to a hotel in Brazil, carrying his coat on his arm, and in a room there changed his faded blue shirt for a light-colored dress shirt, put on a collar and tie and his coat, paid twenty-five cents for the use of the room, hired a taxicab for $ 7, and drove along the route of an interurban railroad to Terre Haute, making the trip in thirty-five or forty minutes; that five days later, at about ten minutes past nine in the forenoon of July 28, 1921, appellant presented to the Farmers Trust Company, of Columbus, Indiana, a check purporting to have been drawn on the First National Bank of Columbus, by A. M. Remy, in favor of R. S. Thomas, for $ 750, and under the name of R. S. Thomas obtained credit for $ 500, and $ 250 in money; and that about half past nine the same forenoon appellant presented to Irwin's Bank, at Columbus, Indiana, a forged check for $ 850, which purported to have been drawn by A. M. Remy, of Columbus, in favor of A. P. Collier, and under the name of A. P. Collier obtained from that bank credit for a deposit of $ 500, and $ 350 in money. In each instance he wore a blue shirt, without a coat, and said that he was a farmer, and in each instance the person whose name had been affixed to the check, and the farmer in whose favor it purported to have been drawn, by whom it purported to have been indorsed, and in whose name he obtained the money and made the deposit, was a person of good credit.
Appellant was arrested on September 20, 1921, and his trial commenced on the twenty-ninth. He did not testify, and the only defense offered was one of mistaken identity, defendant's witnesses testifying that he was in Kokomo, and did certain acts there in the forenoon of July 23, 1921, at about the time when the forged check was deposited in the bank at Brazil, and also at noon that day, and that he had long worn gold fillings in his teeth, which none of the witnesses had observed when they said they saw and talked with him at Brazil and Columbus.
Appellant objected to the introduction in evidence of the check deposited with the Farmers Trust Company at Columbus, five days after the crime was alleged to have been committed, for which he was on trial, but the court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence "for the sole and only purpose of going to the intent with which the party may have uttered this instrument, if the jury find that he did." It is insisted that "evidence of subsequent crimes is inadmissible," and many cases are cited by counsel for the appellant where such evidence was held inadmissible in prosecutions for rape, incest, and receiving stolen goods. But counsel have cited no decisions to that effect in prosecutions for forgery. All the authorities in Indiana and the great weight of authority throughout the country hold that in a prosecution for uttering forged paper it is competent to show that shortly before or shortly after the event charged, the accused uttered similar forged instruments to an extent which makes it improbable that he should have been ignorant of the forgery, as bearing on the intent with which the particular act was done. McCartney v. State (1852), 3 Ind. 353, 56 Am. Dec. 510; Harding v. State (1876), 54 Ind. 359, 365; Thomas v. State (1885), 103 Ind. 419, 432, 433, 2 N.E. 808, and authorities cited; State v. Allen (1899), 56 S.C. 495, 35 S.E. 204; State v. Murphy (1908), 17 N.D. 48, 115 N.W. 84, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 609, 16 Ann. Cas. 1133; Schultz v. United States (1912), 200 F. 234, 118 C.C.A. 420; Commonwealth v. Coe (1874), 115 Mass. 481, 501; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (9th ed.) §§ 34, 35, 39; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (11th ed.) p. 1142, § 920. And many authorities hold that, where a number of like offenses were committed in a like manner, as if by following a novel system, evidence that the accused committed one of such offenses is competent on the question of his identity as the person who committed another for which he is on trial. McGlasson v. State (1897), 37 Tex. Crim. 620, 40 S.W. 503, 66 Am. St. 842; Thomas v. Commonwealth (1922), 194 Ky. 491, 239 S.W. 776; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th ed.) §§ 34, 39; Underhill, Criminal Evidence (2d ed.) § 91; 12 R. C. L. p. 167, § 30.
The several acts proved in the case at bar were all done within a few days, within a few miles of each other within the territory in which appellant represented an employer, as agent, and in each instance the method followed was the same, with almost the same result. It was clearly competent for witnesses to identify appellant as the person who did all of those...
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