Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 12cv3032-JLS (JLB) |
| Parties | LINDSAY R. COOPER; et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY, INC.; et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER: (1) GRANTING GE'S MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (2) GRANTING TEPCO'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Presently before the Court is Defendant Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.'s ("TEPCO") Motion to Dismiss, ("TEPCO MTD," ECF No. 153), and Defendant General Electric's ("GE") Motion to Dismiss, ("GE MTD," ECF No. 152). Plaintiffs have filed a Response in Opposition to TEPCO's Motion, ("Opp'n to TEPCO MTD," ECF No. 155), and to GE's Motion, ("Opp'n to GE MTD," ECF No. 154). TEPCO filed a Reply, ("TEPCO Reply," ECF No. 157), as did GE, ("GE Reply," ECF No. 156). Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the law, the Court rules as follows.
On March 11, 2011, an earthquake struck Japan, giving rise to tsunami waves that struck Japan's Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant ("FNPP"). Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") ¶¶ 112, 113, 119, 127, ECF No. 71. The plant's radioactive core melted down causing severe damage to the plant and releasing radiation as a result. Id. ¶ 182. Plaintiffs are members of the U.S. Navy crews of the U.S.S. RONALD REAGAN, crews of other vessels participating in the Reagan Strike Force, land-based service personnel, and/or their dependents. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs were deployed to Japan as part of a mission known as "Operation Tomodachi." Id. Plaintiffs allege that the FNPP released radioisotopes and exposed them to injurious levels of ionizing radiation during the mission. Id. The release of radiation and subsequent injuries resulted from "negligently designed and maintained" Boiling Water Reactors at the FNPP. Id. ¶ 83.
Plaintiffs initiated this action against TEPCO, the owner and operator of the FNPP, on December 21, 2012. TEPCO moved to dismiss. The Court granted TEPCO's motion without prejudice. ECF No 46. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), which TEPCO moved to dismiss, and the Court granted in part and denied in part this motion, again permitting Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 69. Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), naming GE as an additional defendant, along with three other manufacturer defendants EBASCO, Toshiba, and Hitachi.1 ECF No. 71. TEPCO then moved for reconsideration of the Court's order regarding its second motion to dismiss. ECF No. 73. The Court amended its order and granted TEPCO's motion for certification of interlocutory appeal and stayed the case at the district court level. ECF No. 107. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court's denial of TEPCO's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' SAC. See 860 F.3d 1193.
Plaintiffs' TAC asserts both individual and class action claims. See generally TAC. Their causes of action include negligence, strict products liability, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, loss of consortium, and survival and wrongful death. Id. Plaintiffs make these claims against TEPCO as the owner and operator of the FNPP, id. ¶¶ 85, 96, and against GE as the designer of the Boiling Water Reactors within the FNPP. Id. ¶¶ 88, 141. Both GE and TEPCO have moved to dismiss this case against them. The Court addresses each Motion in turn.
In its Motion, GE argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. GE MTD at 19-21. Next, GE argues that this Court should conduct a choice-of-law analysis and apply Japan's Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of June 17, 1961 ("Compensation Act"), which precludes GE from liability for nuclear events. GE MTD at 21-32.2
GE argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) Plaintiffs fail to satisfy diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and (2) Plaintiffs' attempt to invoke jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA") fails to show that "class certification will ever be warranted." GE MTD at 19-20.
The United States Supreme Court has "consistently interpreted § 1332 as requiring complete diversity: In a case with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, the presence in the action of a single plaintiff from the same State as a single defendant deprives the district court of original diversity jurisdiction over the entire action." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).
GE argues Plaintiffs fail to establish diversity jurisdiction because they fail to meet the section 1332 requirement of complete diversity of citizenship. GE MTD at 19. Plaintiffs do not oppose this contention. See generally Opp'n to GE MTD. In the TAC, Plaintiffs allege that GE is incorporated in New York and has its principle place of business in Connecticut. TAC ¶¶ 87-88. Plaintiffs state that Plaintiff Jedediah Irons is a citizenNew York. Id. ¶ 81. Because both GE and Mr. Irons are citizens of New York, complete diversity is defeated and this court lack subject matter jurisdiction under section 1332.
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 provides "expanded original diversity jurisdiction for class actions." United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2010). Jurisdiction under CAFA requires the total number of members of the proposed plaintiff class be 100 or more persons and the primary defendants not be "States, State officials, or other governmental entities against whom the district court may be foreclosed from ordering relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5); see also Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2007). Once these threshold requirements are met, federal courts are vested with "original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds . . . $5,000,000" and in which any member of the class is a citizen of a State different from any defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
GE argues that this is not a class action, and thus "Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of CAFA's minimal diversity provision." GE MTD at 19. GE points to statements by Plaintiffs' counsel that acknowledge that the case is "primarily a mass tort case," not a "class case." Id. (quoting Aug. 31, 2017 Status Conference Tr. at 59, ECF No. 145). Further, GE argues that the TAC reveals no basis to believe that class certification will ever be warranted. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that their TAC satisfies all the CAFA requirements and that jurisdiction is appropriate. Opp'n to GE MTD at 11-12.
Here, there are 239 named Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs allege no claims against any State or governmental entity. See generally TAC. The prayer for relief demands $1,000,000,000, meeting the amount in controversy requirement. See TAC Prayer. Further, Lindsay Cooper is a citizen of California, while GE is a citizen of New York (state of incorporation) and Connecticut (principle place of business), thus minimal jurisdiction is also satisfied. Accordingly, the TAC meets the CAFA jurisdictional requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(b).
Despite GE's contentions that there are insufficient allegations to certify the class alleged here, none of these alleged flaws are "so obviously fatal as to make the plaintiff's attempt to maintain the suit as a class action frivolous." See Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Court concludes that there is subject matter jurisdiction under CAFA.
GE requests the Court perform a choice-of-law analysis as to the issue of GE's liability, arguing Japanese law applies and precludes GE from liability.3 GE MTD at 21-32. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should defer making a choice-of-law analysis at this point, although California substantive law should apply to the case and GE is strictly liable.4 Opp'n to GE MTD at 14-24.
In a diversity case, the district court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1987). California applies a three-step "governmental interest" analysis to choice-of-law questions:
First, the court examines the substantive law of each jurisdiction to determine whether the laws differ as applied to the relevant transaction. Second, if the laws do differ, the court must determine whether a "true conflict" exists in that each of the relevant jurisdictions has an interest in having its law applied. "If only one jurisdiction has a legitimate interest in theapplication of its rule of decision, there is a 'false conflict' and the law of the interested jurisdiction is applied." On the other hand, if more than one jurisdiction has a legitimate interest, "the court must move to the third stage of the analysis, which focuses on the 'comparative impairment' of the interested jurisdictions. At this stage, the court seeks to identify and apply the law of the state whose interest would be the more impaired if its law were not applied.
Abogados v. AT&T Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). Generally, the preference is to apply California law, rather than choose the foreign law as a rule of decision. Strassberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1978). "[T]he party seeking to dislodge the law of the forum[] bears the burden of establishing that the foreign jurisdiction has an interest, cognizable under California conflict-of-law principles, in the application of its law to the dispute at hand." McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).
Before the Court conducts the choice-of-law analysis, it addresses Plaintiffs'...
To continue reading
Request your trial