Cooper v. Uber Techs.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
• Writing for the Court: HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
• Decision Date: 01 October 2021
• Docket Number: CV-21-1314-PHX-DMF
• Parties: Brian S. Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Uber Technologies Incorporated, Defendant.

Brian S. Cooper, Plaintiff, v. Uber Technologies Incorporated, Defendant.

No. CV-21-1314-PHX-DMF

United States District Court, D. Arizona

October 1, 2021

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Brian S. Cooper filed a pro se Complaint on July 28 2021 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff is not incarcerated (Doc. 2). Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Id.), which is a request for leave to proceed in this matter in forma pauperis. In September 2021, Plaintiff consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 14). Thereafter, the Court granted Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2) and ordered that service of the Complaint may not proceed until further Court order screening the Complaint and, if appropriate, authorizing service (Doc. 15).

Before appearances and consent of defendants, there is not full consent for undersigned to enter dispositive orders. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, undersigned proceeds by report and recommendation.

I. SCREENING/REVIEW PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solemn, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 fn. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “applies all in forma pauperis complaints, ” not merely those filed by prisoners). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that lacks such statement fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all factual allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pertinent question is whether the factual allegations, assumed to be true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Where a complaint contains the factual elements of a cause, but those elements are scattered throughout the complaint without any meaningful organization, the complaint does not set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim” for purposes of Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint may be dismissed where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, lacks sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory, or contains allegations disclosing some absolute defense or bar to recovery. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, fn. 1 (9th Cir. 1997).

To survive dismissal, a complaint must give each defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). In the absence of fair notice, a defendant “should not be required to expend legal resources to guess which claims are asserted against her or to defend all claims ‘just in case.'” Gregory v. Ariz. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC, 2011 WL 3203097, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 27, 2011).

Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must “construe the pleadings liberally ... to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Under the pleading standard set by the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, however, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.'” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29.

When the court dismisses the complaint of a pro se litigant with leave to amend, the “court must provide the litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend effectively.” Id. (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro se litigant will likely repeat previous errors.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects; this type of advice “would undermine district judges' role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231, 124 S.Ct. 2441, 159 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004).

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”

This Court is a limited jurisdiction court; this court has no jurisdiction beyond that conferred upon it by federal statute. Brandt v. Bay City Super Mkt., 182 F.Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1960). Unlike state courts, federal courts only have jurisdiction over a limited number of cases, such as cases involving a question of federal law (federal question jurisdiction) or a significant controversy between citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.” Further, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that a federal court must not disregard or evade the limits on its subject matter jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Thus, the Court is obligated to evaluate its subject matter jurisdiction in each case and to dismiss a case when such jurisdiction is lacking. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).

For federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that district courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is applicable only when the plaintiff sues under a federal statute that creates a right of action in federal court. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-12 (1986); see also Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987). For example, a complaint that alleges only a federal constitutional violation, for example, is insufficient. The Court's “limited jurisdiction cannot be invoked so simplistically.” Yokeno v. Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 340 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986)) (it is a “long-settled understanding that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction”). “[A] complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'” Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

III. COMPLAINT DEFICIENCIES

The Complaint against sole defendant Uber Technologies Inc. consists of a court form entitled “Complaint and Request for Injunction” (Doc. 1 at 1-7) followed by a typed attachment entitled “Complaint for violation of civil rights” (Id. at 7-22). The Complaint is not verified (Id. at 1-22). The Complaint alleges federal question jurisdiction and lists as purported bases: 18 U.S.C. §1030; 18 U.S.C. § 1503; 18 U.S.C. § 1519; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; “14^th amendment violation”; “5^th amendment violation”; H.R. 4173 Dodd/Frank Act; “H.R. 2515 Whistleblower Protection Act” (Id. at 3, Section II(A)).

The Complaint lists various legal theories:

Uber Technologies Inc., counsel, and associates at the time of this claim are violating and have been violating [Plaintiff's] Right to Due Process, Privacy Laws, Anti-hacking laws, civil rights, Hippa Laws, tampering with evidence, obstruction of Justice, Whistleblower protection Act, and did conspire, as to plan against [Plaintiff]. Uber Technologies Inc. not only violated above said offenses, but as a business who was conducting business illegally for 5 years also violated the EFTA through violating one-time

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