Cooper v. United States Postal Serv., 3:03CV01694(DJS)

CourtUnited States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
Writing for the CourtDOMINIC J. SQUATRITO
Docket NumberNo. 3:03CV01694(DJS),3:03CV01694(DJS)
PartiesBERTRAM COOPER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL., Defendants.
Decision Date23 September 2011

BERTRAM COOPER, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, ET AL., Defendants.

No. 3:03CV01694(DJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SO ORDERED: September 23, 2011


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Bertram Cooper ("the Plaintiff") brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants United States Postal Service ("the Postal Service"), John E. Potter, and Ronald G. Boyne (collectively, "the Postal Service Defendants"), and against Intervenor Defendants Full Gospel Interdenominational Church, Inc., Dr. Philip Saunders Heritage Association, Inc., and Sincerely Yours, Inc. ("SYI") (collectively, "the Intervenor Defendants"), alleging violations of his rights, and the rights of all citizens, under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court assumes that the parties are familiar with the background facts of this case as a result of other aspects of this controversy having been brought here and decided and that it need not restate them in detail here. In brief, this case involved whether, and to what extent, it is constitutional for the Postal Service to allow the Church to operate a business

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known as a contract postal unit in Manchester, Connecticut (the "Manchester CPU"), which, pursuant to a contract with the Postal Service, provides certain postal services to the public.1

In the court's April 18, 2007 decision on the parties' motions for summary judgment, the court determined that religious displays at the Manchester CPU violated the Establishment Clause and issued a permanent injunction ordering the removal of religious displays from the Manchester CPU and further ordering the Postal Service to ensure compliance with the court's injunction prohibiting CPUs from acting in a manner that proselytizes or advances religion. Cooper v. United States Postal Service (Cooper I), 482 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Conn. 2007). In response to a motion to amend the judgment, the court amended the injunction to apply only to the Manchester CPU. Cooper v. United States Postal Service (Cooper II), 245 F.R.D. 60 (D. Conn. 2007)

The Intervenor Defendants appealed to the Second Circuit from the amended decision.2 This court stayed enforcement of the amended injunction pending the disposition of the appeal. The Second Circuit subsequently vacated the judgment of this court

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and remanded the case for the further amendment of the injunction "limited to that part of the CPU fulfilling the Postal Services's mandated public function," i.e., "[t]he postal counter, post office boxes and shelving units. . . ." Cooper v. United States Postal Service (Cooper III), 577 F.3d 479, 496-97 (2d Cir. 2009). The court issued a further amended injunction on May 27, 2010, which ordered the removal of all religious material from the Manchester CPU's postal counter, post office boxes and the shelving unit housing postal products. (Dkt. # 120.)

Now pending before the court is the plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs3 , which was filed pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (the"EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. §2412(d). For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (dkt. # 124) is DENIED.

DISCUSSION

LEGAL STANDARD

The EAJA provides in pertinent part that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an

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award unjust." 28 U.S.C. §2412 (d)(1)(A). Both parties agree that the plaintiffs are prevailing parties for purposes of the EAJA. The parties disagree, however, as to whether the position of the United States was "substantially justified," and that issue is dispositive of the plaintiffs' pending motion.

In the context of the EAJA, "substantially justified" means "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The government bears the burden of proof on this issue and, in order to meet its burden, "must demonstrate...

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