Cooper v. United States
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-cv-00088-JNP |
| Parties | TODD HAROLD COOPER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Before the court are Petitioner Todd Harold Cooper's (“Cooper”) Motion to Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [ECF No. 1], Supplemental Motion to Vacate and Set Aside a Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) [ECF No. 46-1], and Supplemental Motion to Vacate and Set Aside a Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) [ECF No 46-2].[1] In essence, Cooper argues that his mandatory life sentence under the federal three-strikes law violates the Constitution. For the reasons set forth below the court DENIES Cooper's § 2255 motions.
Cooper grounds his motions in his assertion that the sentencing judge erroneously sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence under the federal three-strikes law. The federal three-strikes law, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) “is a recidivist statute” that “enhances the sentence of a defendant who is convicted of a serious violent felony when the defendant previously was convicted of at least two other serious violent felonies.” United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the enhanced penalty provision provides:
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).
The law sets forth three categories of offenses that count as a “serious violent felony,” and thus, a strike. First, the “enumerated clause” lists a series of enumerated offenses that qualify as serious violent felonies. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). The list of enumerated serious violent felonies includes any “Federal or State offense, by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of . . . robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118).” See id. Sections 2111, 2113, and 2118 each describe robbery as the taking or attempting to take something of value from the person or presence of another, by force and violence or by intimidation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 111 (robbery within federal territorial jurisdiction), 2113 (bank robbery), 2118 (robbery involving controlled substances). Second, the “elements clause” designates as a serious violent felony “any other offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Third, the “residual clause” identifies as a serious violent felony “any offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more . . . that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. Accordingly, a sentencing judge could find that a particular offense qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated clause, the elements clause, or the residual clause.
However, the Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), and United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019) called the constitutionally of the residual clause into question. In each of those cases, the Supreme Court held statutory language that is similar to the language in § 3559's residual clause void for vagueness. See Johnson, 576 U.S. at 597-602 (); Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. at 1223 ( the residual clause of the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague); Davis, 138 S.Ct. at 2336 ( the residual clause at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague). Given the substantial similarities between the residual clauses already held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and the § 3559 residual clause, courts across the country have found § 3559's residual clause unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Bell, No. 22-5111, 2023 WL 2583384, at *4 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2023) (); Langford v. United States, No. 4:16-cv-00132-RGE, 2019 WL 12025155, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2019) (); United States v. Minjarez, 374 F.Supp.3d 977, 992-93 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (); United States v. Goodridge, 392 F.Supp.3d 159, 173 (D. Mass. 2019) (). Indeed, the government concedes that “the portion of the definition beginning with ‘or that, by its nature' [i.e., the residual clause] is no longer valid.” ECF No. 53, at 12.
To summarize, the government can seek a mandatory life sentence under the federal three-strikes law if an offender is convicted of an offense qualifying as a strike and the offender already has two previous outstanding strikes. An offense counts as a strike for purposes of the federal three-strikes law only if it qualifies as a serious violent felony under the enumerated clause or the elements clause. To the extent that a sentencing judge adjudicated an offense as a serious violent felony-or strike-under the residual clause, the sentence suffers from a constitutional defect.
Finally, prior to a trial or plea where the government seeks an enhanced sentence under the federal three-strikes law, the government must serve a copy of the prior convictions upon which the government bases the sentencing enhancement on the court and counsel for the defendant. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(4)). This document is called an information or a notice of sentencing enhancement (“Notice”). “Clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.” Id.
The government sought an enhanced sentence under the federal three-strikes law in the underlying case (Case No. 1:00-cr-00051) because of the prior strikes on Cooper's record. Before the trial, the government filed a Notice, indicating that it intended to seek a mandatory life sentence for Cooper under 18 U.S.C. § 3559. The Notice listed the following offenses as potential qualifying strikes:
ECF No. 46-1, at 28. While the government's Notice did not specifically clarify which of the above convictions constituted Cooper's first two strikes, the government clearly stated that either the conviction for armed bank robbery in the District of Utah or the conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence in the District of Utah could serve as a third strike. In response to Cooper's present motion, the government identifies offenses (1), (4), and the underlying District of Utah bank robbery conviction as the relevant three strikes. To that end, the court provides additional background on offenses (1) and (4), then describes the events leading to the third strike-the strike that gave rise to Cooper's mandatory life sentence.
Offense (1) is a California robbery conviction that stems from an incident in Santa Cruz, California in October 1981. Cooper and a co-defendant broke into a home. The resident returned during the course of the crime. Cooper and his partner tied the resident up and Cooper threatened the resident with a hunting knife. While Cooper expressed a desire to kill the resident, his partner talked him out of it. The pair left with $6,500 from the home. Cooper was convicted under California Penal Code § 211 and received a three-year prison term. A California court later denied probation. As one of the grounds for the probation denial, the court cited California Rule of Court 414...
To continue reading
Request your trial