Cooper v. Urban
| Decision Date | 17 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-19-DWD |
| Parties | MICHAEL COOPER, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW URBAN and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum (“Motion”) (Doc. 29) of Defendant, the United States of America (“United States”). Plaintiff and Defendant, Matthew Urban, filed separate Responses and Memorandums in Opposition to the Motion (Docs 31 & 32). The United States replied to each of those filings (Docs. 33 & 34). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed a two-count Complaint, grounded in negligence, against Urban and the United States. (Doc. 1). In Count I, Plaintiff alleged Urban, a Senior Airman in the United States Air Force, was driving from one Air Force Base to another Air Force Base on February 17, 2020. . Urban was allegedly acting under the orders and with the permission of the United States. (Doc. 1, pg. 2). Plaintiff's vehicle was traveling on Interstate 270 in Madison County Illinois, when it “was struck by the vehicle.. .Urban was driving,” allegedly within the scope of his employment with the United States. (Doc. 1, pg. 2).
Urban allegedly fell asleep, causing his vehicle to strike Plaintiff's vehicle and resulting in injuries to and suffering by Plaintiff. . In Count II Plaintiff made the same allegations, vicariously, against the United States. .
The United States filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint. (Doc. 19). With respect to Count II, the United States “deni[ed], at the time of the collision Defendant Urban was acting as an employee of the United States and operating a motor vehicle in the scope and course of his employment with the United States.” (Doc. 19, pg. 2). On this basis, the United States asserted sovereign immunity. (Doc. 19, pg. 3). In doing so, the United States invoked the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Doc. 19, pg. 3).[1],[2]
Now, the Motion requests a grant of summary judgment on Count II of the Complaint. (Doc. 29). The Motion includes a statement of material facts, which is summarized as follows.[3],[4] The United States Air Force authorized a Permanent Change of Station, reassigning Urban from Sheppard Air Force Base in Wichita County, Texas, to Whiteman Air Force Base in Johnson County, Missouri. . Urban certified that he would depart Sheppard Air Force Base on January 31, 2020. . He was required to report to Whiteman Air Force Base by February 29, 2020. . If Urban traveled by private vehicle, which he did, then the Permanent Change of Station Order authorized two days of non-chargeable leave. . The United States Air Force did not assign a means or route of travel. (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 2). However, Urban submitted itineraries, describing his routes of travel, to a “military training leader” at Sheppard Air Force Base.[5] (Doc. 29-3, pg. 3). Plaintiff and Urban admit, though, airmen are not required to report intended travel routes for Permanent Change of Station Orders and such Orders are not contingent on travel itineraries.[6] (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 3; 31, pg. 15; 32, pg. 3).
Before reporting to Whiteman Air Force Base, Urban traveled to his home in Barrington, New Jersey, where, between February 3 and 14, 2020, he was authorized 12 days of non-chargeable leave to participate in the voluntary United States Air Force Recruitment Assistance Program. . While doing so, Urban did not receive compensation beyond his normal pay and benefits or payment for meals, lodging, travel, or expenses. (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 3). Urban was required “to file a letter of verification from the recruiting squadron with the travel voucher in order not to be charged leave for th[e] period” of participation in the Recruitment Assistance Program. (Doc. 29-2, pg. 5). Further, as a general matter, the United States Air Force rules and regulations applied to Urban and, at the time of the accident at issue, the United States Air Force had the general authority to grant Urban leave, order Urban to report to a specific place at a specific time, cancel Urban's leave, change orders relating to Urban, and order Urban to end or cancel any leave.[7] .
On February 16, 2020, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Urban departed Barrington, New Jersey, in his private vehicle, for Johnson County, Missouri. (Docs. 29, pg. 3; 29-3, pg. 3). At approximately 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on February 16, 2020, Urban parked at a rest area near Indianapolis, Indiana, to sleep for 7 to 8 hours. (Docs. 29, pg. 3; 29-3, pg. 3). Some hours later, at approximately 1:00 a.m. on February 17, 2020, Urban resumed his travel by departing the rest area. (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 4). The accident at issue occurred around 3 to 4 hours later in Madison County. (Docs. 31, pg. 2; 31-1, pg. 1).
Due to the accident, Urban did not arrive at Whiteman Air Force Base in Johnson County, Missouri, until March 6, 2020, at which time he began 8 weeks of convalescent leave. (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 2). Urban's “duty status,” for the time period between Air Force Bases, was not recorded until he arrived in Missouri. (Docs. 29, pg. 4; 29-2, pg. 3).
III. Analysis
In this case, the Court is presented with the single question of whether, at the time of the accident at issue, Urban was acting within the scope of his employment with the United States. This question arises in the context of a motion for summary judgment.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant demonstrates there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, such that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); accord Driveline Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015); citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Assertions that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must be supported by citations to particular parts of the materials of record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(A). Alternatively, the assertions must be supported by a showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(B).
If the movant presents evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to provide evidence of specific facts that create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012) ). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant for a jury to return a verdict for that party. See Driveline Systems, 936 F.3d at 579 (). However, speculation about a material fact, unsupported by evidence, cannot defeat summary judgment. See Moje v. Fed. Hockey League, LLC, 377 F.Supp.3d 907, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing Sbika v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2018); Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 1994)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all of the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Driveline Systems, 936 F.3d at 579 (citing Aregood, 904 F.3d at 482). The Court does not assess credibility, choose between competing inferences, or balance the weight of conflicting evidence. See id. ).
Substantively, § 1346(b)(1) of the FTCA provides district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States that seek money damages for injuries caused by the negligent act or omission of any Government employee acting within the scope of employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Midwest Knitting Mills, Inc. v. U.S., 950 F.2d 1295, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1991); accord Nationwide Ins. Co. v. U.S., 114 F.Supp.2d 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The circumstances must be such that “the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); accord Midwest Knitting Mills, 950 F.2d at 1297; Nationwide, 114 F.Supp.2d at 749-50. Likewise, § 2674 of the FTCA renders the United States liable, relating to the tort claims in title 28, “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
For a servicemember, “acting within the scope of his office or employment” means “acting in line of duty.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Questions about these terms are considered under the state law of respondeat superior. See Duffy v. U.S., 966 F.2d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
In Illinois, when considering whether an employee's acts were within the scope of employment, courts consider whether the conduct (1) was the kind the employee was employed to perform, (2) occurred substantially within the authorized time and space limits of the employer, and...
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