Cooper v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 04 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-02231-KJD-VCF |
| Parties | JOSEPH COOPER, Plaintiff, v. LAS VEGAS METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (EFC NO. 1) AND COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1-1)
Before the Court are pro se plaintiff Joseph Cooper's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) and complaint (ECF No. 1-1). Cooper's in forma pauperis application is granted and his complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Cooper's filings present two questions: (1) whether Cooper may proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and (2) whether Cooper's complaint states a plausible claim for relief.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a plaintiff may bring a civil action "without prepayment of fees or security thereof" if the plaintiff submits a financial affidavit that demonstrates the plaintiff "is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis includes a declaration under penalty of perjury that plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff declares that in the past 12 months he has received no wages, and that he receives disability payments. Although plaintiff does not state how much money he receives in social security payments, he states that he has no cash or money in the bank, that his only monthly expense is a bus pass, and that he does not own a home, a car, or any other things of value. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
Section 1915 also requires that if the Court grants an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must review plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief, or if the complaint seeks damages against a defendant who is immune from that relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a complaint "that states a claim for relief" must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." The Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal states that to satisfy Rule 8's requirements, a complaint's allegations must cross "the line from conceivable to plausible." 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, (2007)). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) "if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Buckey v. Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992).
Though "[n]o technical form is required for complaints" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)), (Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)). The amended complaint must be "complete in itself, including exhibits, without reference to the superseded pleading." LR 15-1. "A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed'" and "a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). If the Court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaintwith directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1). Section 1983 is a federal law; thus this Court has federal question jurisdiction over Cooper's claims. Plaintiff is not incarcerated, and he states he is a member of the Cherokee tribe. (Id. at 3). Cooper alleges that the Las Vegas Metro Police Department towed his vehicle and fractured his wrist, chest, and shoulder in violation of Federal Indian Law, civil rights, the A.D.A., and the U.S. and Cherokee-Nation constitutions. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that this Court has jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights of the Cherokee Constitution and the Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution which states that Congress has the power to regulate Indian Tribes. (Id.) Plaintiff brings claims for "police abuse", false arrest, and personal injury. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff asks for damages for pain and suffering, $20 million dollars, and removal of his charges from his record. (Id. at 9).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.S. Section 1983, a plaintiff must plead that the named defendant (1) acted "under color of state law" and (2) "deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes." Gibson v. U.S., 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 "does not create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by governmental officials." Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Municipalities may not be held liable on a respondeat superior theory under Section 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). A municipal entity may be liable when its "policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury." Id. at 694. Municipalities and other local government units areincluded in that group of "persons" referred to in Section 1983. Id. A complaint must allege "that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). A single act by a non-policymaking official does not show the existence of a policy, custom, or practice. Rivera v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014). "[O]nly if a plaintiff shows that his injury resulted from 'permanent and well settled' practice may liability attach for injury resulting from a local government custom." McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000).
To establish liability for a Section 1983 violation, plaintiff must establish that defendant's actions were (1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1505-1506 (9th Cir. 1990). To hold an individual defendant personally liable for damages under Section 1983, the causation inquiry must be focused on whether the individual defendant was in a position to take steps to avert the incident giving rise to the deprivation but failed to do so intentionally or with deliberate indifference. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
The plaintiff also has not alleged any facts that the LVMPD has a policy or custom that is the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations in the complaint, so the Court must dismiss the Complaint against the LVMPD. Because the LVMPD is the only defendant (plaintiff has not listed any officers as defendants in this case), the Court must dismiss this case without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Cooper should take this issue (regarding the named defendant) and following issues into consideration if he files an amended complaint.
It appears that Cooper's "police abuse" claim and his personal injury claim is a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force -- deadly or otherwise -- in the course of an arrest must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its"reasonableness" standard. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 700 (9th Cir. 2005); citing to Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989)("[T]he 'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: The question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them[.]"
The plaintiff has alleged that the "LVMPD" fractured his wrist, chest, and shoulder. If plaintiff amends his complaint to include the LVMPD officer(s) as defendants, using the liberal pleading standard, then his claims against the individual officers would likely be allowed to proceed as an excessive force claim in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court has found that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts must not interfere with pending state criminal prosecutions, even if the civil litigant alleges violations of his constitutional rights. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine federal courts may not stay or enjoin pending state criminal court proceedings, nor grant monetary damages for constitutional violations arising from them. Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986). "Younger principles apply to a claim for damages based on constitutional challenges which can be asserted in pending state proceedings that implicate important state interests, and that the correct disposition is to defer - not to dismiss - when damages are at issue." Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Once the state proceeding has run its course, the Court can decide whether the damages action should proceed. "If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted [Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, (1994)] will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other...
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