Cooper v. Walker Cnty. E-911
| Decision Date | 26 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:16-cv-1746-TMP |
| Parties | DANA COOPER, Plaintiff, v. WALKER COUNTY E-911, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. Defendant Walker County E-911 filed a motion (doc. 23), supported by evidence (docs. 24, 30), seeking adjudication of all of the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff Dana Cooper filed a response in opposition, supported by evidence. (Doc. 35). Defendant filed a reply brief. (Doc. 41). Also at issue is the plaintiff's motion to strike portions of Rhonda Walden's declaration (doc. 32) and her motion to strike the opinion testimony of Dr. Gilreath (doc. 33). The defendant has responded to the motions to strike. (Docs. 39, 40). The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking summary adjudication of her claims that she was denied due process under both the Alabama and United States Constitutions. (Doc. 31). The defendant filed a response in opposition, supported by evidence. (Docs. 37, 38). In addition, the defendant has moved to strike portions of the reply brief filed by plaintiff in support of her motion for partial summary judgment. (Doc. 42). All matters have been fully briefed. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988).
Viewing the evidence provided by both parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, the following facts are considered true for purposes of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.1
Walker County E-911 is an emergency communications district formed in accordance with the Emergency Telephone Service Act, Alabama Code § 11-98-1, et seq. It is governed by a seven-member board of directors. Walker County E-911 receives all of its funding from the Alabama 911 Board, which is funded by a charge levied on telecommunications bills.
Dana Cooper applied for a job as a 911 emergency dispatcher with Walker County E-911 on August 17, 2009. She filled out an application form in which she agreed to conform to Walker County E-911's rules and regulations. Immediately above her signature on the application appeared the following:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the company's rules and regulations, and I agree that my employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at either my or the company's option. I also understand and agree that the terms and conditions of my employment may be changed, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time by the company. I understand that no company representative, other than it's [sic] president, and then only when in writing and signed by the president, has the authority to enter into any agreement for employment for any specific period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
(Doc. 30-2, p. 2).2 Cooper asserts that when she applied for the job Wilson told her that, once she completed a 90-day probationary period, she could be fired only for cause. (Cooper affi., doc. 31-4, para. 6). Consistent with this assertion, Tim Stockman, the chairman of the board of directors of Walker County E-911, stated that it would violate Walker County E-911's policy to fire an employee without cause. (Stockman depo., doc. 31-8, p. 59).
Terms of Cooper's employment also were defined by an employee handbook. Walker County E-911 provided a copy that was signed and dated by the plaintiff on August 8, 2014, and includes the following provisions relevant to this action:
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(Exh. 8 to...
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