Copeland v. City of Union

Decision Date05 September 2017
Docket NumberED 105224
Citation534 S.W.3d 298
Parties Terry L. COPELAND, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF UNION, Missouri, Defendant/Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Bryan P. Cavanaugh, 512 Sunnyside Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63119, For Plaintiff/Appellant.

Richard J. Behr, Jason W. Kinser, 7777 Bonhomme, Suite 1400, Clayton, MO 63105, For Defendant/Respondent.

SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, J.

Introduction

Terry L. Copeland (Appellant) appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant's petition filed March 2, 2016, alleges the following in support of his request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City of Union, Missouri (Respondent).

Appellant is an individual resident and current elected City Collector of Respondent, which is a fourth-class city in Franklin County, Missouri, organized pursuant to Section 79.010 RSMo 2000. On April 6, 2010, Appellant was elected to the position of City Collector. Appellant was reelected in April 2014, and plans to run for election again in April 2018. Appellant claims certain of Respondent's amending ordinances in its revised Code of Ordinances are illegal and have injured Appellant as Respondent's City Collector.1

On October 12, 2009, Respondent's Board of Aldermen passed Amending Ordinance 3493, authorizing Respondent's Mayor to enter into an agreement with Franklin County by which Franklin County would collect all real and personal property taxes on behalf of Respondent, beginning in 2010. Prior to the passage of Ordinance 3493, the authority to collect real and personal property taxes owed by Respondent's residents was vested in the City Collector.

Also on October 12, 2009, Respondent's Board of Aldermen passed Amending Ordinance 3494, which provided that the salary of the City Collector for the term beginning in April 2010 would be $1.00, without any additional compensation or benefits.

On February 8, 2010, Respondent's Board of Aldermen passed Amending Ordinance 3521, which provided that (1) all real and personal property taxes owed to Respondent would be collected by Franklin County, beginning with the 2010 tax year; (2) the collection of other taxes, license fees, and all other monies owed to Respondent would be performed by the City Administrator; (3) the collection of delinquent taxes and payments would be performed by the City Administrator; (4) the City Finance Officer would make an annual report to the Board of Aldermen with respect to monies collected by Franklin County and the City Administrator; and (5) the City Collector would perform only the duties assigned by the Mayor, Board of Aldermen, or City Administrator. The ordinance further provided that it would become effective "upon expiration of the current elected term of the Collector on or about April 12, 2010." UNION, MO., CODE Section 125.380 (2017).

Appellant complained to Respondent officials that the amending ordinances unlawfully eliminate all of the duties of the City Collector, but Respondent has refused to repeal or change the ordinances. Specifically, Appellant's petition seeks a declaratory judgment that the three amending ordinances culminating in the current municipal code Section 125.380 directly conflict with Sections 79.050, 79.240, 79.310 (providing for the appointment or election, removal, and duties of fourth-class city collector); 94.230, 94.290, 94.320, 94.330, 95.360 (providing for collector's duties re: city license tax, tax book, delinquent tax, bond tax, and monthly settlement with city treasury); and 140.670 (city collector duty to hand over city delinquent taxes to county collector) RSMo 2000, which create and bestow the office of City Collector with rights and duties. Appellant also claims they violate Section 71.010 RSMo 2000, which provides generally for city ordinances to conform to state statutes regarding the same subject matter.

On April 16, 2016, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and on May 11, 2016, Appellant filed his Response. On June 30, 2016, Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. On July 5, 2016, the matter was argued and taken under submission. On December 5, 2016, the trial court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss, and dismissed Appellant's petition with prejudice. On January 11, 2017, the trial court entered its Final Order and Judgment dismissing Appellant's petition with prejudice and entering judgment in favor of Respondent. This appeal follows.

Point on Appeal

Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting Respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the petition states a claim for relief in that it sufficiently pleads facts showing Respondent's amending ordinances are void because they purport to take away statutorily required duties from the City Collector in violation of Missouri statutes.

Standard of Review

Our standard of review when considering a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Moynihan v. Gunn, 204 S.W.3d 230, 232-33 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). When the trial court fails to state a basis for its dismissal, we presume the dismissal was based on at least one of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss. Id. at 233. Further, we can affirm the trial court's dismissal on any ground before the trial court in the motion to dismiss, even if that ground was not relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the claim. Id. When reviewing the dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim, appellate courts treat the facts contained in the petition as true and construe them liberally in favor of the plaintiffs. Id.; Ste. Genevieve Sch. Dist. R II v. Bd. of Aldermen of City of Ste. Genevieve, 66 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Mo. banc 2002).

Discussion

The thrust of Appellant's petition is that Ordinance 3521 and the new section of city code it created, Section 125.380, are void because they purport to allow Respondent to do two things contrary to state law. First, Appellant pleads Respondent unlawfully transferred the duty of collecting property taxes from the City Collector to Franklin County. Second, Appellant alleges Respondent illegally transferred the City Collector's remaining duties to other of Respondent's employees.

Ordinances are presumed to be valid and lawful. Missouri Bankers Association, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Mo. banc 2014). An ordinance must be construed to uphold its validity unless it is expressly inconsistent or in irreconcilable conflict with a statute or provision of the Missouri Constitution. Id.; Home Builders Ass'n of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 107 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Mo. banc 2003). Whether the ordinance conflicts with state law is a question of law this Court reviews de novo. Missouri Bankers Association, Inc., 448 S.W.3d at 271 ; State ex rel. Sunshine Enterprises of Missouri, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of St. Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Mo. banc 2002).

Article VI, Section 16 of the Missouri Constitution authorizes the powers exercised by Respondent through Ordinance 3521 and the new Section 125.380 it created, as follows:

Any municipality or political subdivision of this state may contract and cooperate with other municipalities or political subdivisions thereof, or with other states or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or with the United States, for the planning, development, construction, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a common service, in the manner provided by law.

Mo. CONST. ART. VI, Section 16.

The contracting and cooperating powers set forth in Article VI, Section 16, were statutorily implemented by the legislature in Sections 70.210 through 70.320. Specifically, Sections 70.220 and 70.280 authorize the actions exercised by Respondent through Ordinance 3521 and the revised city code Section 125.380 it created. Section 70.220 provides in pertinent part:

Any municipality or political subdivision of this state, as herein defined, may contract and cooperate with any other municipality or political subdivision, or with an elective or appointive official thereof, or with a duly authorized agency of the United States, or of this state, or with other states or their municipalities or political subdivisions, or with any private person, firm, association or corporation, for the planning, development, construction, acquisition or operation of any public improvement or facility, or for a common service; provided, that the subject and purposes of any such contract or cooperative action made and entered into by such municipality or political subdivision shall be within the scope of the powers of such municipality or political subdivision.

Section 70.220.1.

The legislature also expressly provided that the powers conferred by Section 70.220 may be exercised through a duly enacted ordinance, as Respondent did in this case. Section 70.230. Fourth-class cities like Respondent have the power to enact any ordinances not repugnant to the constitution and laws of this state. Section 79.110.

The Missouri Supreme Court has held Section 70.220 constitutional in St. Louis Housing Authority v. City of St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 239 S.W.2d 289, 293 (Mo. banc 1951). Franklin County, Missouri, is clearly a political subdivision of the state with which Respondent may contract and cooperate pursuant to both the Missouri Constitution and Section 70.220.

Section 70.280, titled "Office of facility taken over may be abolished and duties transferred," provides:

The governing body of any municipality or political subdivision shall have the power to abolish the office of the facility taken over by any other municipality or political subdivi
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