Copeland v. Copeland

• Decision Date: 16 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2007-CC-0177.,2007-CC-0177.
• Parties: Jennifer Devall COPELAND v. Alvin C. COPELAND.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

966 So.2d 1040

Jennifer Devall COPELAND v. Alvin C. COPELAND.

No. 2007-CC-0177.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

October 16, 2007.

Correro, Fishman, Haygood, Phelps, Walmsley & Casteix, James Richard Swanson, Loretta Gallaher Mince, Lance C. McCardle, New Orleans, for applicant.

Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann, Phillp A. Wittmann, Daria, B. Diaz, New Orleans, Magee & Devereux, Mary Clemence Devereux, Covington, Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hauver, Robert Charles Lowe, Suzette Marie Smith, New Orleans, Joseph Marc Vezina, for respondent.

VICTORY, J.

We granted this writ application to address whether the trial court, on remand, abused its discretion in sealing certain documents in the Copeland divorce/custody case. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The divorce proceedings between Jennifer Devall Copeland and Alvin Copeland (the "Copelands") sparked the interest of the Times-Picayune, L.L.C. newspaper (the "Times-Picayune"). The Copelands filed a Joint Motion to Seal the Record, which the trial court granted. The Times-Picayune intervened, seeking to unseal the entire record. The trial court denied the newspaper access by ruling that the Times-Picayune could not intervene and ordering that the entire record remain sealed. The court of appeal also denied the Times-Picayune access, stating that "on the showings made, we find no error" in the trial court's ruling. Copeland v. Copeland, 06-0713 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/27/06). This Court granted the Times-Picayune's writ application and held that "the judgment of the trial court sealing the entire record is vacated and set aside." Copeland v. Copeland, 06-1023 (La.6/2/06), 930 So.2d 940 ("Copeland I"). We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on the parties' motion to seal consistent with the following reasoning:

Considering the strong constitutional bias in favor of open access by the public to court proceedings, we find the trial court's blanket order sealing the entire record in this case to be overbroad. Although there may be some justification for sealing certain sensitive evidence in a proceeding, the parties have the burden of making a specific showing that their privacy interests outweigh the public's constitutional right of access to the record. The trial court, should it grant such relief, must ensure that its order is narrowly tailored to cause the least interference possible with the right of public access.

Id. at 941.

In accordance with this ruling, the trial court conducted a hearing on July 5, 2006 on the Copeland's motion to seal the record. After the hearing, the court issued a Judgment and Written Reasons for Judgment that left all of the substantive pleadings in the case, except Mrs. Copeland's initial Petition for Divorce, under seal. The substantive pleadings under seal are as follows: Al Copeland's Answer and Reconventional Demand and supporting affidavits, filed March 30, 2006; Jennifer Devall Copeland's Answer to Reconventional Demand, filed April 4, 2006; Joint Stipulation, filed April 4, 2006; two Consent Judgments, entered on February 17, 2006 and April 4, 2006; and a Judgment of Divorce entered April 4, 2006. In support of its ruling, the trial court stated as follows:

In this case the sealing of the record is meant to protect the children from the public, to shield them from the embarrassment, ridicule, and derision of their peers and from unwanted scrutiny of unscrupulous strangers whose knowledge of the finer details of the children's custody and visitation arrangements might enable them to do the children harm.

The court of appeal denied the Times-Picayune's writ application. Copeland v. Copeland, 06-1941 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06). We granted the Times-Picayune's writ application to consider whether the trial court complied with our ruling in Copeland I. Copeland v. Copeland, 07-0177 (La.3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1102.

DISCUSSION

Although there is no express federal constitutional provision providing for access to judicial records and proceedings, as early as 1947, the United States Supreme Court held that "a trial is a public event [and][w]hat transpires in the court room is public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1596 (1947). In 1978, the Court also recognized that the public has a right to inspect and copy public court records.¹ Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978).

Unlike the federal constitution, the Louisiana Constitution has an "open courts" provision, providing that "[a]ll courts shall be open ..." La. Const. art. I, § 22.² Citing this provision, we have held that "[o]penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, cause all trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and generally give the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system." State v. Birdsong, 422 So.2d 1135, 1137 (La.1982) (citing Gannett, supra, 443 U.S. at 383, 99 S.Ct. 2898).

In addition, Article 12, § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be denied the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies and examine public documents, except in cases established by law." Louisiana's Public Records Law contains a broad definition of public records and numerous specific exceptions to this law. La. R.S. 44:1(A)(2)(a) (defining "public records" as "[a]ll books, records, writings . . . having been used, ... or retained for use in the conduct, transaction, or performance of any business . . . under the authority of the constitution or the law of this state . . ."); La. R.S. 44:31 (mandating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Chapter or as otherwise specifically provided by law, and in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, any person of the age of majority may inspect, copy, or reproduce any public record"); see also La. C.C.P. art. 251 (providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, [the clerk of court] shall permit any person to examine, copy, photograph, or make a memorandum of any of these records at any time during which the clerk's office is required by law to be open").

Recognizing the public's right of access to public records is of constitutional dimension, we held in Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933, 936 (La.1984), that the right of the public to have access to mortgage and conveyance records on file with the clerk of court "is a fundamental right, and is guaranteed by the constitution." We further held:

The provision of the constitution must be construed liberally in favor of free and unrestricted access to the records, and that access can be denied only when a law, specifically and unequivocally, provides otherwise. Whenever there is doubt as to whether the public has the right of access to certain records, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the public's right to see. To allow otherwise would be an improper and arbitrary restriction on the public's constitutional rights.

Id. Since Title Research Corp., we have reaffirmed that "the public has a constitutional right of access to court records." Copeland I, supra, 930 So.2d at 941 (citing Title Research Corp., supra); In re John Doe, 96-2222 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 900, 901(holding that "[a]s a general rule, pleadings filed in this Court are public records and are not subject to being sealed.")³

However, the fact that a document is filed in the court record does not necessarily mean that it will be accessible by the public. In commenting on a court's power to restrict the public's access to court records, the United States Supreme Court held that "the right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute" and that "every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and [that] access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes." Nixon, supra, 435 U.S. at 599, 98 S.Ct. 1306.⁴ The Court declined to "identify all the factors to be weighed in determining whether such access is appropriate," but recognized that "the discretion as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id.⁵ As we held in Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 00-1360 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 715, 721, regardless of the fact that the public records law does not contain any specific exceptions for records and documents maintained by this Court, this Court has a "constitutional, inherent duty and responsibility to regulate all facets of the practice of law," which includes "the right to determine when and under what circumstances sensitive materials under our exclusive superintendency and control should be shielded from disclosure."

A trial court's discretion in exercising this right often comes in the form of sealing all or part of a court record. Although Louisiana has no specific statutory provision allowing trial courts to seal court records, general provisions exist under which trial courts exercise this power. For instance, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 191 provides that "a court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law." In addition, La. C.C.P. art. 1631(A) provides that "[t]he court has the power to require that the proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to control the proceedings at the trial, so that justice is done."

In this case, the trial court treated the motion to seal as a motion for protective order pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1426. This article pertains to discovery and provides that upon motion, the court "may make any order...