Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel

• Decision Date: 19 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 13133,13133
• Citation: 673 P.2d 490,99 Nev. 823
• Parties: , 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 171 Harriet COPELAND, Appellant, v. DESERT INN HOTEL and Summa Corporation and Hughes (Aviation) Air Corporation, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 490

673 P.2d 490

99 Nev. 823, 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 171

Harriet COPELAND, Appellant, v. DESERT INN HOTEL and Summa Corporation and Hughes (Aviation) Air Corporation, Respondents.

No. 13133.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Dec. 19, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1984.

Terry & Winter, Carson City, for appellant.

Lionel, Sawyer & Collins, and Malani L. Kotcha and Andrew S. Brignone, Las Vegas, for respondents.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice. We reverse the order dismissing the complaint, in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant brought a complaint in district court on July 15, 1980, and filed an amended complaint on August 21, 1980. The first cause of action in the amended complaint alleged a violation of NRS 613.330(1). ¹ The second cause of action alleged violations of sections 503-505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794a (Supp. V 1981).

The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice on November 26, 1980. Matters outside the pleadings were presented to and not excluded by the district court. The motion was therefore treated as one for summary judgment. See NRCP 12(b), 56.

Appellant's affidavit, submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss, stated that appellant was hired by respondents on March 16, 1979, and was terminated on April 3, 1979. The affidavit also indicated that appellant visited the offices of the Nevada Equal Rights Commission (NERC) for the purpose of filing a complaint of discrimination within the applicable statutory period. The affidavit further indicated that a NERC representative was told the relevant facts, whereupon he informed appellant that he would "get back to" her. Additionally, appellant stated that she was never informed that she was required to complete any forms or sign any statements in order to file a complaint. The affidavit detailed appellant's other efforts to obtain relief, including the pursuit of a complaint to the United States Department of Labor. Finally, the affidavit indicated that appellant later returned to the NERC and was told that "there was nothing the [NERC] could do" for her.

The district court did not include findings of fact and conclusions of law with its order, but the record indicates that the dismissal of the first cause of action was based upon appellant's purported noncompliance with the applicable limitations period.

NRS 613.420 grants to any person injured by an unfair employment practice within the scope of NRS 613.310 to 613.400, inclusive, the right to apply to the district court for an order restoring any rights to which the person is entitled under those provisions. NRS 613.430 prohibits the bringing of such actions after 180 days from the date of the act complained of, but tolls the running of that period during the pendency of any complaint made to the NERC.

Appellant contends that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because the allegations contained in her affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact. We agree.

This court has repeatedly held that trial courts should exercise great care in granting summary judgment. See, e.g., Mullis v. Nevada National Bank, 98 Nev. 510, 654 P.2d 533 (1982). Pleadings and documentary evidence must be construed most favorably to the party against whom the motion is made. Id. Summary judgment is only appropriate when the pleadings and papers on file show that there is no genuine issue of fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hicks v. BHY Trucking, Inc., 99 Nev. 519, 665 P.2d 253 (1983).

The federal courts have considered questions similar to those presented in this appeal while dealing with complaints to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Recently, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that filing a timely claim with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal suit, but "a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (footnote omitted). The holding in Zipes is consistent with earlier federal cases that recognized the doctrine of equitable tolling of limitations periods. See, e.g., Chappell v. EMCO Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir.1979). Federal courts, looking to the "remedial and humanitarian underpinnings of Title VII," have been reluctant to allow "procedural technicalities" to bar discrimination claims. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460-64 (5th Cir.1970). See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972); Heiniger v. City of Phoenix, 625 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1980); Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.1980) B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1013-16 (2d ed. 1983); Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) p 1939 [1982].

We approve of the general reasoning of the above authorities. Like their federal counterparts, the Nevada antidiscrimination statutes have laudable goals and will be broadly construed. We therefore adopt the doctrine of equitable tolling in...