Copeland v. Hussmann Corp., No. 4:06CV839 JCH.

• Decision Date: 26 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 4:06CV839 JCH.
• Parties: James COPELAND, Plaintiff, v. HUSSMANN CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

462 F.Supp.2d 1012

James COPELAND, Plaintiff, v. HUSSMANN CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:06CV839 JCH.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

October 26, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James N. Foster, Jr., McMahon Berger, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

Gene P. Graham, Jr., Deborah Blakely, White, Allinder, Graham & Buckley, L.L.C., Independence, MO, for Plaintiff.

ORDER

HAMILTON, District Judge.

These Matters are before the Court on Defendants Hussmann Corporation ("Hussmann") and Ingersoll-Rand Company's ("Ingersoll") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6), filed June 7, 2006, and Defendants Hussmann and Ingersoll's Motion for Costs of Previously Dismissed Action (Doc. No. 8), filed June 7, 2006. The matters are fully briefed and ready for disposition.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Copeland ("Copeland") began his employment with Hussmann in September 1996 and was terminated on October 21, 2003. (Compl. ¶ 10-12). Plaintiff, an African-American male, alleges that throughout his tenure at Hussmann he was subjected to acts of racial discrimination and harassment, was passed over for promotion on three occasions, and was ignored by management when he complained about the racist atmosphere. (Pl.'s Memo. in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Response"), Doc. No. 12).

Plaintiff's allegations of racial discrimination are as follows. In. October 1996, Gary Myers ("Myers") a white employee who allegedly had a racial animus towards Plaintiff, called Plaintiff "a low-life motherfucker." (Compl., Doc. No. 1 ¶ 14). Pat Landwehr ("Landwehr"), Plaintiff's white supervisor, learned of these comments but did not punish Myers. In February 1998, Plaintiff applied for a promotion for which he was eligible; however, a white individual was chosen instead of him. (Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiff believes this choice was motived by his race. In June 1998, Earl Bail ("Bail"), a white forklift driver, was having a disagreement with an African-American forklift driver. (Id. at ¶ 16). Shortly thereafter, Bail stated over the office radio that "I can fix him, if someone brings the truck, I will bring the rope."¹ (Id.). Plaintiff complained to Landwehr, who promised that Bail would not be allowed to use a forklift or the company radio again; however, Bail was using it again within three weeks. (Id. at ¶ 18-19). In March 2000, Plaintiff again applied for a promotion. His supervisor, a white male, passed him over for a white worker even though Plaintiff was more qualified. (Id. at ¶ 20). In March 2001, Plaintiff applied for a promotion for the third time. Again his white supervisor passed him over. This time an African-American male was given the job, but was demoted two years later. (Id. at ¶ 20).

In May 2001, Copeland and Bill Gorry ("Gorry"), a white male, began working together after Copeland was asked to train him. (Id. at ¶ 22). Evidently, Gorry had a history of racial animus and Plaintiff alleges that over the course of the next two years,² Gorry engaged in a pattern of racist behavior. Shortly after they began working together, Plaintiff told Gorry that he did not like "black jokes;" in response, Gorry brought in a picture of a person in black-face and asked Plaintiff if it was his grandmother. (Id. at ¶ 25). Gorry refused to take the picture down and management took no action. (Id. at ¶ 26). Two weeks later, Gorry told Plaintiff "those niggers down there would like nothing more than to see me fired" and "Oh James you're not a nigger like those motherfuckers down there. You're a different kind. If my family had owned niggers like you, my family would be rich today." (Id. at ¶ 27-28). When Plaintiff complained to his white supervisor, Robert Pinkowski ("Pinkowski"), about these comments, Pinkowski appeared to get angry at Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 29). Plaintiff met with the head of human resources, Defendant Terry Herrington ("Herrington"), about this incident and was told by Herrington that he would make it clear Gorry was being punished because of Plaintiffs complaints.³ (Id. at ¶ 33). Gorry's harassment continued, as he now believed he was immune from remedial action because Herrington would protect him. (Id. at ¶ 35-36).

In late 2002, Gorry asked Plaintiff if he wanted some fried chicken for lunch because "I know your people like fried chicken." (Id. at ¶ 39). Plaintiff complained to Pinkowski and another supervisor, Glenn Compton, who told Plaintiff he would "take care of it." (Id. at ¶ 40). Gorry was terminated on November 11, 2002; however, Plaintiff learned that he was terminated as part of a reduction in the work force and not because of his racist behavior. (Id. at ¶ 42-45).

In early 2003, Myers evidently threatened Plaintiff while Pinkowski looked on. (Id. at ¶ 45). No investigation occurred and Myers received no sanction. Plaintiff also alleges that he repeatedly complained of racist graffiti in the bathroom, but nothing was done about it.⁴ (Id. at ¶ 47-49). Plaintiff was terminated on October 21, 2003 and believes the termination was retaliation for his complaining about the hostile work environment. (Id. at ¶ 50). Plaintiff was replaced by a white female. (Id. at ¶ 52).

Plaintiff's case also has an extensive procedural history. Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on March 2, 1999. (Response, pg. 2). Plaintiff's bankruptcy schedules did not include any potential lawsuits against Defendants. (Id.). The bankruptcy court confirmed Plaintiff's plan on May 12, 1999. (Id.). Plaintiff was discharged from bankruptcy on December 10, 2003 and the Trustee completed his final report and accounting on February 11, 2004. (Id.). The bankruptcy case was closed on February 24, 2004. (Id.).

On February 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against Defendants and received a right to sue notice on August 3, 2004. (Memo. in Supp. of Def's Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. No. 7 pg. 2). On May 28, 2004 Plaintiff filed a petition in Missouri state court, alleging Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id.). That action was removed to this Court and was voluntarily dismissed by the Plaintiff on October 29, 2004. (Id.). Before Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action, Hussmann and Ingersoll removed the case to this Court, filed an answer, and filed two motions to dismiss. (See Docket for 4:04-cv-00832-JCH). No discovery, written or otherwise, had occurred by the time of dismissal. (Pl.'s Suggestions in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Costs, Doc. No. 13 pg. 6). On August 30, 2004 Plaintiff filed another action in Missouri state court, this time alleging that Defendants had violated the Missouri Human Rights Act. (Id.). On May 18, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing,⁵ or in the Alternative, by Judicial Estoppel. (Id. at pg. 3). On June 9, 2005 the state court granted Defendant's motion based on the lack of standing argument and denied the judicial estoppel argument as moot.⁶ (Id.)

On March 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reopen his Chapter 13 case with the bankruptcy court so that he could amend his schedules to add the discrimination claims against the Defendants. (Id. at pg. 4). On March 9, 2006, the bankruptcy court granted Plaintiff's motion, but his request to determine that the discrimination claims were not property of the estate was denied. (Id.). On March 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed his amended schedules containing the discrimination claims. (Id. at pg. 5). The bankruptcy court closed the case on April 4, 2006 after the Trustee filed a response stating that he had no objection to the filing of amended schedules and was not going to take further action on the case. (Id. at Ex. I). Plaintiff filed this present action for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, on April 18, 2006 in Missouri state court. It was removed to this Court on May 31, 2006. (Notice of Removal, Doc. 2).

As stated above, Defendants Hussmann and Ingersoll⁷ filed this Motion to Dismiss on June 7, 2006. (Doc. No. 6). Hussmann and Ingersoll argue that this Court should invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel and dismiss all of the Plaintiff's claims. Alternatively, they argue that all of Plaintiff's claims based on incidents occurring before 2002 are time barred and that Plaintiff's disparate impact claims are beyond the scope of § 1981. Finally, Hussmann and Ingersoll argue that they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(d) because Plaintiff's present cause of action is the same as the one that he voluntarily dismissed in 2004.

MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Additionally, the Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir.2005). A cause of action should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless, from the face of the Complaint, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Jackson Sawmill Co., Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 306 (8th Cir.1978). Thus, a motion to dismiss is likely to be granted "only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Fusco v. Xerox Corp., 676 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir.1982) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Dismiss

A. Judicial Estoppel

The purpose of judicial estoppel is to "protect the integrity of the judicial process." Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., ...