Copeland v. Internal Revenue Servs.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Northern District of Texas
PartiesBRUCE DWAIN COPELAND, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICES, et al, Defendants.
Docket NumberCivil Action 3:20-CV-3288-L-BH
Decision Date04 August 2021

Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge[1]

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court for recommendation are the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants City of El Reno and Paul Broyles, filed February 12, 2021 (doc. 12), Defendant City of Cedar Hill's Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Brief in Support, filed February 16, 2021 (doc. 16), AAG Breanna Griffin's Motion to Dismiss, filed March 11, 2021 (doc. 19), and Defendant Jasmine Bhatt's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support filed June 18, 2021 (docs. 32, 33). Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motions to dismiss by Griffin, Cedar Hill, Bhatt, and El Reno and Broyles should be GRANTED, and the claims against the remaining defendants should be sua sponte DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 30, 2020, Bruce Dwain Copeland (Plaintiff), filed this pro se action against the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), IRS employees Joy South (South) and Stephen Schrader (Schrader) in their individual capacities, the Canadian County District Court (CCDC), the City of El Reno, Oklahoma (El Reno), El Reno city marshal Paul Broyles (Broyles) in his individual capacity, the Office of the Texas Attorney General (OAG), OAG attorney Breanna Griffin (Griffin)[2] in her individual capacity, the Dallas County District Court (DCDC), the City of Cedar Hill, Texas (Cedar Hill), Genesis Women's Shelter (Genesis), Genesis attorney Rachel Elkin (Elkin) Mosaic Services (Mosaic), and Mosaic attorney Jasmine Bhatt (Bhatt) (collectively Defendants). (doc. 3 at 2-3.)[3]

The complaint generally alleges that “the events complained of occurred in Dallas County.” (Id. at 2.) It also alleges that El Reno is a municipality in Oklahoma and that Broyles is the city marshal in El Reno with his “principle address” in Oklahoma. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts claims against IRS, South, Schrader, El Reno, Broyles, CCDC, OAG, Griffin, DCDC, and Cedar Hill for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; against all Defendants for conspiracy to violate his civil rights, fraud, and negligence; against Griffin, South, Schrader, and Broyles for abuse of office; against IRS, South, and Schrader for violation of his rights under Bivens; against IRS, South, and Schrader for unauthorized collections “under IRC § 7433(a); against IRS for failure to release lien; and against IRS and OAG for injunctive relief. (Id. at 4-6.) He alleges no material facts in support of these claims. He requests monetary damages and a judgment against IRS “to remove all liens and collections.” (Id. at 6.)

The Clerk of Court issued summonses for Broyles, CCDC, Cedar Hill, El Reno, DCDC, Elkin, Genesis, Griffin, Schrader, and South on October 30, 2020. (doc. 5.) On February 10 and 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed proofs of service indicating that copies of the summons and complaint had been served on Griffin, El Reno, South, CCDC, DCDC, and Bhatt. (docs. 10-15.) On March 11, 2021, he moved for entry of default against CCDC, DCDC, and Bhatt, and the Clerk entered default on March 23, 2021. (docs. 23, 25, 26, 28.)

On February 12, 2021, El Reno and Broyles moved to dismiss the claims against them under Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(6). (docs. 12, 13.) Plaintiff responded on March 11, 2021, and El Reno and Broyles replied on March 23, 2021 (docs. 27, 29).

On February 16, 2021, Cedar Hill moved to dismiss the claims against it under Rule 12(b)(6). (doc. 16.) Plaintiff responded on March 11, 2021, and Cedar Hill replied on March 23, 2021 (docs. 22, 30).

On March 11, 2021, Griffin moved to dismiss the claims against her under Rules 12(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5), and (b)(6). (docs. 19, 20.) Plaintiff did not respond to the motion.

On June 18, 2021, Bhatt moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against her under Rules 12(b)(2), (b)(4), and (b)(5). (doc. 33.)[4] Plaintiff did not respond.

II. RULE 12(b)(1)

Griffin moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against her for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (doc. 20 at 5.)

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). They “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion “may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). A court must dismiss the action if it determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) “is not a determination of the merits, ” and it “does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, considering Rule 12(b)(1) motions first “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Id.

The district court may dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981). A motion to dismiss based on the complaint alone presents a “facial attack” that requires the court to merely decide whether the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1998). “If sufficient, those allegations alone provide jurisdiction.” Id.

Here, Griffin relies solely on Plaintiff's complaint in support of her motion. The motion therefore presents a facial attack that does not require the resolution of factual matters outside the pleadings. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 412-13.

B. Standing

Griffin argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert any of the claims alleged in the complaint against her because his pleadings “do not clearly identify an injury in fact to [him].” (doc. 20 at 5.)[5]

Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,' that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to Cases' and ‘Controversies.' U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980). “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that [plaintiffs], based on their complaint, must establish that they have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Like other jurisdictional requirements, this requirement is “not subject to waiver, ” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996), and the Supreme Court “insist[s] on strict compliance” with it, Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. “Even when standing is not raised by the parties, the Court must, where necessary, raise the issue sua sponte.” Reed v. Rawlings, No. 3:18-CV-1032-B, 2018 WL 5113143, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2018) (citing Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 654 n.83 (5th Cir. 2018)); see also Legacy Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 881 F.3d at 366 n.2 (citing K.P., 627 F.3d at 122). Courts are also to assess a plaintiff's “standing to bring each of its claims against each defendant.” Coastal Habitat Alliance v. Patterson, 601 F.Supp.2d 868, 877 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (citing James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2001), aff'd by 385 Fed.Appx. 358 (5th. Cir. 2010)).

To satisfy the prerequisites of Article III standing [the] plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements[, and when] a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly... allege facts demonstrating' each element.” Id. (citations omitted); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1998) (“The triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.”). While ‘at the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice' to establish standing, ” Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560), [a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing, ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990). [I]f the plaintiff does not carry his burden clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a...

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