Copeland v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 24 July 1979 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Charles Stephen Ralston, New York City, with whom Alexander G. Park, Washington, D. C., and Bill Lann Lee, New York City, were on the brief, for appellant.
Alice L. Mattice, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts pro hac vice by special leave of Court with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Kopp, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Charles E. Hill and Douglas L. Parker, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Also Paul Blankenstein, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by WILKEY, Circuit Judge.
The sole question in this appeal is whether the District Court may award attorneys' fees to the United States in a case where it has been sued "vexatiously and in bad faith" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Appellant maintains that such an award is barred by the plain language of the provision for attorneys' fees contained in the Act. We disagree. In light of the Act's legislative history and underlying purposes, we think that it left undisturbed the equitable principles which historically have permitted a court discretion to award attorneys' fees in circumstances like those of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 1
The facts of this case, as they were found by the trial court, are not disputed and may be recounted briefly. Plaintiff-appellant, Ms. Copeland, is a black woman employed by the Community Services Administration. Since 1974 she has worked as a program specialist of grade GS-11 in the Office of Human Rights, previously she held other positions with the CSA and its predecessor agency, the Office of Equal Opportunity. Plaintiff's two most recent promotions were the result of filing grievances unrelated to racial or sex discrimination.
From April 1975 through December 1976 plaintiff's supervisor was Carlos Ruiz, the Associate Director for Human Rights at CSA, against whom plaintiff filed unsuccessfully some nine grievances and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints. A complaint filed with the CSA on 27 June 1975 is the subject of this suit. It alleged, Inter alia, that plaintiff was denied career ladder promotions and merit promotions, was denied the opportunity for training, and was harassed by her supervisors, all because of her race and sex.
After a trial the district court found that plaintiff had "failed to establish even a Prima facie case of discrimination." 2 The court observed that at all relevant times blacks comprised 80 percent of the staff of the Office of Human Rights, that women outnumbered men by a ratio of two to one, and that Ruiz had "promoted mostly black females." 3 The court specifically found that plaintiff had proffered "no credible evidence" to substantiate her allegations. Rather, the evidence showed that the promotions in question had been denied for wholly objective and permissible reasons.
Finding, moreover, that the plaintiff had "acted vexatiously, maliciously, and in bad faith" 4 in maintaining the suit, and in so doing had "intentionally abused the judicial process," 5 the district court awarded the government reasonable attorneys' fees as part of its costs. The court found specifically that plaintiff had presented "no evidence" of discrimination "other than her bald, abstract, and repetitive allegations." 6 Both of plaintiff's witnesses "were shown to be intensely biased" against Mr. Ruiz; and one admitted to "hav(ing) designs" on Mr. Ruiz's job. 7 Plaintiff and this witness were "completely incredible" and were found to be "conduct(ing) a vendetta" against Mr. Ruiz and others in the CSA management, "harassing them by virtually every means available including use of the EEO process to bring baseless charges of discrimination." 8 The instant suit, the court concluded, was the "culmination of a long series of intentionally vindictive and abusive actions taken to harass (plaintiff's) superiors." 9
The district court relied, in making the award, on traditional equitable principles, "separate and apart from (Title VII)," 10 permitting an award of fees to a litigant if the losing party has acted in bad faith. Plaintiff, Not disputing the district court's finding of bad faith, brought this appeal solely to review the legal question whether the attorneys' fee provision of Title VII permits an award to a government defendant "under any circumstances." 11
Although it is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of a statute 12 or enforceable contract 13 providing otherwise, each litigant pays his own attorneys' fees, 14 there exist certain well-settled exceptions permitting an award of fees in particular situations. Thus a court may permit a party preserving or recovering a fund, benefiting others in the same manner as himself, to recover his costs, including attorneys' fees, out of the fund or directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit. 15 Also, "a court may assess attorneys' fees for the 'willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of the fine to be levied on the defendant . . . .' " 16 Finally, and at issue in this case, a party ordinarily may be permitted his attorneys' fees "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .' " 17
The rationale for "fee-shifting" in instances of bad faith is essentially punitive. 18 It is contemplated that the assessment of fees in such cases will deter abusive litigation in the future, thereby avoiding harassment and protecting the integrity of the judicial process. Of course, recovery of fees incidentally compensates the prevailing party for costs which should not have been incurred, and to that extent it is not inconsistent with the presumption underlying the general rule disfavoring fee awards, that the parties act in good faith, although not with perfect knowledge of the merits of their claims. Relying upon this exception, courts have assessed attorneys' fees against both plaintiffs and defendants shown to have acted in bad faith. 19
In the instant case it is not disputed that plaintiff acted in bad faith in bringing her Title VII suit, nor is it disputed that factually this case falls well within the equitable exception permitting an award of fees when compelled by "overriding considerations of justice." 20 That is, of course, not an end to the matter, "for even where 'fee-shifting' would be appropriate as a matter of equity, Congress has the power to circumscribe such relief." 21 Although "Congress has not repudiated the judicially fashionable exceptions to the general rule against allowing substantial attorneys' fees," 22 still, as the Supreme Court restated in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, "the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards (in suits brought under federal law) are matters for Congress to determine." 23
Plaintiff contends that Congress in this case has foreclosed an award of fees to the United States "under any circumstances." 24 The putatively preemptive language is contained in § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 25 which was made applicable to employment discrimination suits against the federal government in 1972 by the addition to Title VII of § 717(d). 26 Section 706(k) provides as follows:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the (Equal Employment Opportunity) Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person. 27
Title VII is thus one of numerous statutes "granting or protecting various federal rights" 28 which contain express exceptions to the general rule against recovery of attorneys' fees. Much of the law governing fee awards under § 706(k) is settled. Thus, an individual prevailing as a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit, including one brought against the federal government, "ordinarily is to be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances." 29 Also, the provision has been construed to permit an award of fees to a private employer who prevails, upon a finding that a suit, including one brought By the United States, was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." 30
Plaintiff naturally concedes that had her suit been one against a private employer the award of attorneys' fees would have been appropriate. Plaintiff argues rather plausibly, however, that the language of § 706(k), allowing fees to prevailing parties "Other than the Commission or the United States," 31 may fairly be read as a general prohibition of awards in favor of the federal government. We do not find the statutory language so unambiguous, however. Moreover, nothing in the concededly sparse legislative history evinces any intent to extinguish, in suits involving the federal government, the historic power of equity courts to assess attorneys' fees against a party who has acted in bad faith. 32 And we decline to infer such an intent, especially when to do so would plainly contradict one of the acknowledged purposes of § 706(...
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...the Court, manifested the sort of bad faith that should be strongly sanctioned and deterred in future cases. See Copeland v. Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 1044, 100 S.Ct. 730, 62 L.Ed.2d 729 (1980) (purpose of bad faith award is "punitive" and to "deter ab......
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