Copeland v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1988 |
| Parties | Bobby E. COPELAND and Leah J. Copeland v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Henry F. Sheffield. 87-166. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Lee L. Hale, Mobile, for appellants.
Geary A. Gaston and William W. Watts III of Vollmer, Philips, Killion, Brooks & Schell, Mobile, for appellees.
The plaintiffs, Bobby E. Copeland and his wife Leah J. Copeland, appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). Henry Sheffield moved to dismiss the appeal as far as it pertains to him; we consolidated his motion with the merits of the appeal.
On or about July 22, 1984, Bobby E. Copeland was travelling east on Halls Mill Road in Mobile County when he struck a disabled vehicle owned by Henry Sheffield. Copeland was injured and, upon discovering that Sheffield had no automobile liability insurance, sued his own insurer, State Farm, for the benefits of his uninsured motorist coverage. Leah Copeland asserted a claim based on lost consortium. State Farm answered the Copelands' complaint and filed a third-party complaint against Henry Sheffield, contending that his negligence caused the accident. Sheffield answered State Farm's complaint and filed a claim against the Copelands for the damage the collision caused to Sheffield's vehicle. The Copelands answered this claim, and the pleading stage of the case ended so far as this appeal is concerned.
We turn our analysis first to Henry Sheffield's motion to dismiss the appeal. Although the Copelands' complaint alleged that Sheffield was negligent, it sought recovery against State Farm only. Each ad damnum clause in the complaint sought judgment against "the defendant." The complaint indicates that it was to be served only upon State Farm. Most importantly, the caption of the complaint listed only one defendant--State Farm. "In the complaint the title shall include the names of all the parties...." Ala.R.Civ.P. 10(a). The Copelands, then, never filed a claim against Sheffield. Without having sued him, they could not possibly have obtained a final judgment against him, and without a final judgment, the Copelands have nothing to appeal from as to Sheffield. See Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. v. Jehle-Slauson Const. Co., 466 So.2d 83, 88 (Ala.1985); Ala.R.App.P. 3(c). Accordingly, we grant Henry F. Sheffield's motion to dismiss the appeal insofar as he is concerned.
At trial, the Copelands sought to introduce various documents and testimony concerning medical expenses incurred by Mr. Copeland. The trial court excluded some of this evidence. Although it is argued in their brief on the merits, the Copelands withdrew this issue in their reply brief; consequently, we will not consider this issue.
At one point in the trial, the Copelands attempted to impeach Sheffield with evidence of a prior "conviction" for grand larceny. Although this point is not entirely clear in the record, the "conviction" appeared to have been in reality a juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency. The Copelands argue that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence constituted error. We, of course, recognize the general rule that "a juvenile court adjudication cannot be introduced to impeach a witness even if the adjudication was for a crime involving moral turpitude," C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 145.01(4) (3d ed. 1977), and the statutory declaration that a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal "conviction," Code 1975, § 12-15-72; where, as here, there is no proof or offer of proof establishing that the adjudication sought to be made the basis of the impeachment was in fact a criminal conviction, we see no error in excluding the evidence.
The Copelands' final issue pertains to several comments and admonitions made to their trial counsel 1 by the court in the presence of the jury. Several times during the trial, their lawyer chose not to abide by, or ignored, various evidentiary rulings and proceeded into forbidden matters; each time he was admonished. Once, while the lawyer was reading portions of a deposition into evidence, the court instructed him to read without inflection, not as if he were in a "dramatic school." Several times he was warned not to comment on the evidence during a witness's testimony, and he was once instructed not to converse with the jury while the court and defense counsel were at sidebar. The record also quite clearly reflects that the atmosphere in the courtroom was quite...
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