Copeland v. Tanner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-2801 SECTION "H"(2)
| Decision Date | 27 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-2801 SECTION "H"(2) |
| Parties | WALTER J. COPELAND, JR. v. ROBERT TANNER, WARDEN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct hearings, including an evidentiary hearing if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and, as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Upon review of the entire record, I have determined that a federal evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).1 For the following reasons, I recommend that the instant petition for habeas corpus relief be DENIED and the petition DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The petitioner, Walter J. Copeland, Jr., is incarcerated in the B.B. Rayburn Correctional Center in Angie, Louisiana.2 On June 8, 2005, Copeland was indicted in St. Tammany Parish on the charge of second degree murder.3 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the case as follows:
On March 11, 2005, the victim, Toney Dewayne Sylve, was shot and killed inside his residence in Slidell, Louisiana. The victim's girlfriend, Kelly Callender, was present when the shooting occurred. She testified that two masked men wearing gloves and dark clothing entered the residence, held her and the victim at gunpoint, and demanded money. The victim was shot in the chest during the robbery. Michael Richardson and defendant were subsequently convicted as the perpetrators of the homicide.
State v. Copeland, 2008 WL 5377642, at *1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/08); State Record Volume 10 of 11, Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal Opinion, 2007-KA-2551, December 23, 2008.
On July 31, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing and denied Copeland's motions to suppress his statement and other evidence, including his identification.4 After the court's ruling, Copeland's counsel announced his intention "to take a writ on yourdenial of my motion to suppress [Copeland's statement]."5 On October 2, 2006, the Louisiana First Circuit denied Copeland's writ application without opinion.6 On January 19, 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court also denied relief without opinion.7
On January 29, 2007, Copeland's trial commenced in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court for St. Tammany Parish. On February 3, 2007, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.8 The state trial court sentenced Copeland on May 29, 2007, to 35 years in prison.9
On direct appeal, Copeland's counsel asserted three arguments: (1) The trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Copeland was not advised of the reason for his arrest or detention. (2) The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding the crime of accessory after the fact. (3) The sentence imposed was excessive.10 On December 23, 2008, the Louisiana First Circuit affirmed Copeland's conviction, finding no merit with respect to claims (1) and (3), and finding that the trial court erredin failing to give the requested accessory after the fact charge, but that the error was harmless.11 On November 20, 2009, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Copeland's writ application without opinion.12
Copeland's conviction became final 90 days later, on February 18, 2010, when he did not seek a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1998)); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).
On August 5, 2009, Copeland's counsel filed an application for post-conviction relief in the state trial court, arguing that Copeland received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.13 On December 4, 2009, counsel filed a supplemental application for post-conviction relief with a memorandum supporting his ineffective assistance claim.14 On March 30, 2011, the trial court denied Copeland's post-conviction application.15 On July 5, 2011, the Louisiana First Circuit denied Copeland's related writ applicationwithout opinion.16 On March 12, 2012, the Louisiana Supreme Court also denied Copeland's writ application without opinion.17
On November 19, 2012, Copeland's counsel filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in which he asserts the following claims:18 (1) Copeland's right to effective assistance of counsel was denied when appellate counsel failed to raise the error of insufficient evidence to support the conviction. (2) Copeland's due process rights were violated when the trial court erroneously denied suppression of Copeland's statement. (3) Copeland's due process rights were violated by the trial court's erroneous refusal to instruct the jury on accessory after the fact. (4) Copeland received an excessive sentence. The State filed a response in opposition to Copeland's petition, conceding that the petition was timely filed, but arguing that Copeland has failed to fully exhaust his state court remedies.19
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, comprehensively revised federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The AEDPA went into effect on April 24, 199620 and applies to habeas petitions filed after that date. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). The AEDPA therefore applies to Copeland's petition which was filed in this court on April 16, 2012.
The threshold questions in habeas review under the AEDPA are whether the petition is timely and whether the claims raised by the petitioner were adjudicated on the merits in state court; i.e., the petitioner must have exhausted state court remedies and must not be in "procedural default" on a claim. Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)).
The State concedes - and I find - that Copeland's petition is timely filed. The State, however, asserts that Copeland's petition is a mixed petition, presenting two claims which were not exhausted in the state courts. Nevertheless, because the unexhausted claims are without merit, I will address them without requiring full exhaustion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for questions of fact, questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Nobles, 127 F.3d at 419-20 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c)).
Determinations of questions of fact by the state court are "presumed to be correct . . . and we will give deference to the state court's decision unless it 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). The amended statute also codifies the "presumption of correctness" that attaches to state court findings of fact and the "clear and convincing evidence" burden placed on a petitioner who attempts to overcome that presumption. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A state court's determination of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and receive deference, unless the state court's decision "'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [Supreme Court precedent.]'" Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 2000)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 U.S. 782 (2001); Hill, 210 F.3d at 485. The United States Supreme Court has clarified the Section 2254(d)(1) standard as follows:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 412-13 (2000); accord Penry, 532 U.S. at 792-93; Hill, 210 F.3d at 485. "'A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state court decision applied [a Supreme Court case] incorrectly.'" Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002)) (brackets in original); accord Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). Rather, under the "unreasonable application" standard, "the only question for a federal habeas court is whether the state court's determination is objectively unreasonable." Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the state court applied the precedent to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Price, 538 U.S. at 641 (citing Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24-25); Wright v. Quarterman, 470 F.3d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 2006).
Copeland argues that his counsel was ineffective on appeal because he failed to argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his manslaughter conviction.Copeland contends that the evidence showed he was guilty of nothing more than being an accessory after the fact.
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 2012); Woodfox v. Cain, 609...
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