Copenhefer v. Horn

Decision Date27 September 2012
Docket NumberNos. 03–9000,03–9001.,s. 03–9000
Citation696 F.3d 377
PartiesDavid C. COPENHEFER, Appellee/Cross–Appellant v. Martin HORN, Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections; Philip Johnson, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Greene; Joseph Mazurkiewicz, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institute at Rockview, Appellants/Cross–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John H. Daneri, Esq. (ARGUED), Erie County Office of District Attorney, Erie, PA, for Appellants/Cross–Appellees, Martin Horn, Philip Johnson, Joseph Mazurkiewicz.

Matthew C. Lawry, Esq. (ARGUED), Defender Association of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant, David C. Copenhefer.

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO and BARRY, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

The Commonwealth appeals the order of the District Court granting David Copenhefer habeas relief from his sentence of death, and Copenhefer cross-appeals the District Court's denial of habeas relief with respect to his conviction. We will reverse to the extent that the District Court vacated Copenhefer's sentence of death, and affirm to the extent that it otherwise denied Copenhefer relief.

II. Procedural History

In March 1989, David Copenhefer was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, Pennsylvania, of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. The penalty phase began shortly thereafter, with the jury finding, as to the murder conviction, two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Based on the jury's finding, a sentence of death was mandatory under Pennsylvania law. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the court imposed the death sentence fixed by the jury, and consecutive sentences totaling twenty to forty years on the remaining counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction and sentence. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 526 Pa. 555, 587 A.2d 1353, 1354–55 (1991). Copenhefer then filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). The trial court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court again affirmed. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 553 Pa. 285, 719 A.2d 242 (1998).

In December 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. He withdrew a second PCRA petition after the Commonwealth agreed to waive the exhaustion of state court remedies with respect to the claims in his § 2254 petition, and a third PCRA petition was dismissed as untimely.

The Magistrate Judge, in an extensive Report and Recommendation (App.42–157), recommended denying relief with respect to the conviction, but granting relief from the sentence of death on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer's lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The District Court, finding the objections of the parties to be without merit, adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court, vacated Copenhefer's sentence of death, and denied relief with respect to his conviction. Both parties appealed. We granted Copenhefer a certificate of appealability with respect to his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth's theory that the victim lingered before dying and his claim that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994).1

III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review of its legal conclusions is plenary. Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir.2001). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If the state court did not reach the merits of a claim, these deferential standards do not apply. Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 718 (3d Cir.2004).

IV. Factual Background

In affirming the conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accurately summarized the complicated facts of the kidnapping/murder scheme now before us, and the overwhelming evidence that supported the verdict:

On June 16, 1988, Sally Weiner received a telephone call purportedly from a congressman's office asking that she meet with the caller to discuss arrangements for the presentation of a civic award to her husband. The next day, around noon, she drove to the agreed meeting place, parked her car, and was never seen again alive. Several hours later, her husband, Harry, manager of the Corry office of Pennbank, received a telephone call playing a recorded message from his wife telling him she had been kidnapped and that the kidnapper demanded ransom money from the bank. Mr. Weiner was directed to retrieve a duffel bag from the parking lot outside his bank; the bag contained additional threats and instructions. Mr. Weiner called a vice president of the bank, as well as the bank's security office, local police, state police, and the FBI. Mr. Weiner never received the additional radio instructions necessary to follow the directions contained in the duffel bag and therefore did not comply with the kidnapper's demands.

Sally Weiner's body was discovered two days later on June 19, 1988, in a rural area north of her home. She had died as the result of a gunshot wound to the back of her head.

Initial investigations by the FBI, state police, and local police resulted in the discovery of a series of computer-generated notes and instructions, each one leading to another, which had been concealed at various hiding places in and around Corry, Pennsylvania. The investigation also produced several possible suspects, including appellant, David Copenhefer, who owned a nearby bookstore, had had unproductive transactions with Mr. Weiner's bank, and apparently had bad personal relations with the Weiners.

An examination of trash discarded from appellant's store revealed drafts of the ransom note and directions. Subsequent search warrants resulted in seizure of incredibly comprehensive evidence against appellant. This included evidence tying appellant's fingerprints, computer, weapons and ammunition, clothing, automobile, and materials from his home and office to the victim or the murder site.

His fingerprints appeared on the original ransom note and on some of the hidden notes. Police discovered rough drafts of the ransom note, a map of the hidden notes, as well as the notes and directions themselves in appellant's handwriting, some of which bore his fingerprints. Appellant had a collection of guns, including two which might have fired the fatal bullet. He also had glazier ammunition, a nonstandard composition designed to fragment on impact so that after entering a body it will not exit and injure another person, of the type used to murder Mrs. Weiner. A metal rod from his home had been used to secure one of the hidden notes. Crepe paper torn from a roll at his store had been used to help secure another note. Human female skin tissue was found on his clothing. Tread marks matching appellant's automobile tires were found at one hiding place and at the murder scene. Finally, appellant's computer contained a series of drafts and amendments of the texts of the phone call to Mrs. Weiner on Thursday, the phone call to Mr. Weiner on Friday, the ransom note, the series of hidden notes, and a twenty-two point plan for the entire kidnapping scheme.

Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1354–55.

V. Discussion
A. The Commonwealth's Appeal

Adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the District Court concluded that the stipulated fact that Copenhefer had no prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance as a matter of law, and the failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury and the jury to find it as such violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court vacated the sentence of death, and the Commonwealth appeals. We will reverse.

At the outset, we set forth the rather extensive background of what brings us to this point. At the start of the penalty phase, the trial court gave preliminary instructions to the jury with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, describing in a general sense what they are—those things, for example, about the murder and the murderer that make the case more terrible or less terrible and more or less deserving of the death penalty—and also those specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances at issue in this case that are listed in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code. As relevant here, [m]itigating circumstances spelled out in the Statute,” the court told the jury, “would be when the killer has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.” App. 4456; see42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(1) (“mitigating circumstances shall include ... [that] the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.”). Also, the jury was told, it may consider “any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense.” Id. Defense counsel and the Commonwealth then orally advised the jury that they had...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • Simmons v. D'Ilio, Civil Action No. 14-2032 (FLW)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • April 27, 2017
    ...as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); see also Copenhefer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 392 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012). Petitioner's claim that the prosecutor attempted to bolster the credibility of Smith and Chavis through the refere......
  • Christie v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • May 20, 2015
    ...unless he can provide "a considerable amount of new, strong evidence to undermine" his conviction. Id.; see also Copenhafer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 390 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence . . . we agree . . . that [the petitioner] cannot show he was prejudiced"). Here, o......
  • St. Vallier v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-6118 (SDW)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • October 31, 2016
    ...fully investigate the telephone evidence. See, e.g., Saranchak v. Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 311 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Copenhafer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 390 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[i]n light of the overwhelming evidence . . . we agree . . . that [the petitioner] cannot show he was prejudiced"). Here......
  • McCalla v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • February 13, 2019
    ...finding a reasonable probability that, had McCalla fully understood the charge, he would have rejected the plea. See Copenhefer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 390 (3d Cir. 2012). B. Ground Two - Failure to Appeal In Ground Two, McCalla alleges, "The counsel was ineffective for failure to consult th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Sentencing
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...the Constitution requires nothing more), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Ariz., 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see, e.g. , Copenhefer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 392 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012) (federal court will not review state court’s proportionality review if undertaken in good faith); Roach v. Angelone......
  • Trials
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...going to call expert and calling expert could have subjected defendant to harmful evidence during cross-examination); Copenhefer v. Horn, 696 F.3d 377, 388-91 (3d Cir. 2012) (counsel’s failure to present expert testimony that victim would not have “lingered” after being shot not ineffective......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT