Copous v. ODECO Oil & Gas Co., 87-3132

• Decision Date: 07 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3132,87-3132
• Citation: 835 F.2d 115
• Parties: Vernon J. COPOUS, Sr., etc., Plaintiff, v. ODECO OIL & GAS CO., Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUILDING SERVICE & REPAIR, INC., Third Party Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 115

835 F.2d 115

Vernon J. COPOUS, Sr., etc., Plaintiff, v. ODECO OIL & GAS CO., Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUILDING SERVICE & REPAIR, INC., Third Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-3132.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 7, 1988.

Peter L. Hilbert, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

James R. Sutterfield, James M. Walker, New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before KING ^* and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and PARKER ^**, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

I.

ODECO, Inc. appeals from the district court's determination that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act (OIA), La.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9:2780 (West 1987), applies to the master service agreement in effect between appellant, ODECO, Inc., and appellee, Building Service & Repair, Inc. (BSR). We agree with the district court that the OIA applies to the service contract and therefore precludes ODECO's claim for indemnity predicated on the contract.

In 1983, ODECO entered into a master service agreement with BSR governing future work that BSR might perform for ODECO. In early 1986, ODECO engaged BSR to renovate portable living quarters located on ODECO's stationary production platform located in South Pelto Block 12, Gulf of Mexico, off the Louisiana coast.

Plaintiff, Vernon J. Copous, Sr., was employed as a carpenter for BSR. Copous alleged that he was replacing ceiling tile in the living quarters on the platform when the ladder from which he was working fell and he was injured. Copous sued ODECO for damages and ODECO sought indemnification from BSR under the terms of the master service agreement. BSR moved for summary judgment and for dismissal of ODECO's third party demand on grounds that the OIA rendered the indemnity provisions of the master service agreement unenforceable and thus precluded ODECO's indemnity claim. The district court granted BSR's motion and this appeal followed.

II.

The only question presented by this appeal is whether the OIA applies to the master service agreement containing the indemnity provisions upon which ODECO relies. Louisiana Rev.Stat. Sec. 9:2780(B) renders unenforceable certain indemnity provisions in agreements pertaining to exploration for and production of oil and gas. Section 9:2780(C) defines "agreement" in part as follows:

The term "agreement" as it pertains to a well ... as used in this section, means any agreement ... concerning any operations related to the ... production ... including but not limited to ... repairing, and improving ... or otherwise rendering services in or in connection with any well ..., constructing, improving, or otherwise rendering services in connection with any ... structure intended for use in the ... production of any mineral, or any agreement to perform any portion of such work or services or any act collateral thereto.... (emphasis added).

ODECO argues that Sec. 9:2780(C) does not encompass an agreement for renovation of living quarters on a production platform. According to ODECO, the connection between the contract to renovate the living quarters on the platform and the production of oil is too tenuous to merit application of the OIA.

In support of this argument, ODECO relies on a Texas Court of Appeals decision interpreting a Texas statute. In Transworld Drilling Co. v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 693 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.Ct.App.1985). Transworld contracted with Levingston for repair and alteration of an offshore drilling rig owned by Transworld and located in Levingston's shipyard. A workman was injured while installing a replacement crane on the rig and sued Levingston Shipbuilding. Levingston brought a declaratory judgment action against Transworld seeking a determination that Transworld was required to defend Levingston under the terms of the service contract. The Texas court held that the Texas statute was not intended to cover "a contract for the repair of an offshore drilling rig where there is absolutely no connection with the drilling of a well." Id. at 23.

Despite the similar language in the Texas and Louisiana statutes, the decisions of the Texas courts on the Texas statute are at best persuasive authority. In any event, we need not decide whether a contract to repair drilling equipment in a shipyard, a location remote from the drilling site, is within the scope of the...