Copp v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co.

• Citation: 50 F. 164
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Decision Date: 21 April 1892
• Parties: COPP v. LOUISVILLE & N. RY. CO.

50 F. 164

COPP v. LOUISVILLE & N. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Louisiana.

April 21, 1892

B. R Forman, for plaintiff.

Bayne &amp Denegre, for defendant.

BILLINGS District Judge.

The plaintiff has brought a suit under the act of congress known as the 'Interstate Commerce Act,' (24 St. U.S. p 380, Secs. 3, 9,) to recover the amount of freight paid by him to the defendant in excess of that paid to it by others for similar service. An exception was filed by the defendant interposing the plea of the limitation or prescription in force under the statute of the state of Louisiana. The statute relied upon is Rev. Civil Code, art. 3536, which provides that 'the following actions are also prescribed by one year: That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses. ' It is claimed by the defendant that this is an action for a quasi offense, and it is controlled by the state statute. Code Prac. art. 28, declares that 'personal actions are grounded on four causes: Contracts, quasi contracts, offenses, and quasi offenses,' and article 32 further defines personal actions arising from quasi offenses to be when the ground of action is the injury done to another by one of those faults which are not considered as real crimes or offenses. It has not been questioned, and I think cannot be questioned, that the fault complained of by the plaintiff is included within the definition of 'quasi offenses.' The question is whether this state statute of limitations applies to this action. The action arises from a law of congress against discrimination in the charges for the transportation of merchandise. Where there has been discrimination, congress has created a right of action in favor of the party against whom it has been made for the excess of the charge collected from him, as compared with that collected from others. It is to be observed that in the act of congress there is no limitation as to time, and that, unless the state statute applies, there is no limitation. On the other hand, the action is authorized in case of discrimination, with or without damage; and to that extent it is a statute in the nature of a statutory provision for an action to protect the interests of the public, i.e., to secure a uniform rate of charge for the transportation of merchandise by common carriers, and giving an action even in case the party discriminated against had paid no more than the value of the service of transportation. Nevertheless it is a purely civil action, and, by denomination or definition, is within the meaning of the state statute of limitations. The question is whether section 721 of the United States Revised Statutes, being a portion of section 34 of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789, includes the limitation or prescription for actions known as 'quasi offenses' contained in the Louisiana statute. In Angell on Limitations, Sec. 24, the rule is laid down as follows:

'Under the 34th section of the judiciary act of 1789, the acts of limitations of the several states, where no special provision has been made by congress, form a rule of decision in the courts of the United States; and the same effect is given to them as is given to them in the state courts.'

This passage from Angell is adopted by the supreme court as a correct statement of the law in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall., at page 537. In Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 414, the supreme court quote approvingly that in the courts of the United States the law of the former governs, and say that 'statutes of limitation, unless the plaintiff can bring himself within their exceptions appertain ad tempus et modum actionis instituendae, and not ad valorem contractus. ' In McIver v. Ragan, 2 Wheat. 25, at page 29, Chief Justice MARSHAL says: 'It would be going far to add to these exceptions,'...