Copperfield Villas Ass'n v. Tuer

• Decision Date: 23 June 2022
• Docket Number: 356494
• Parties: COPPERFIELD VILLAS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARRY TUER, JR., and ALLISON TUER, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

COPPERFIELD VILLAS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BARRY TUER, JR., and ALLISON TUER, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 356494

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 23, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Livingston Circuit Court LC No. 18-030122-CH

Before: Gleicher, C.J., and Sawyer and Garrett, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this condominium bylaw enforcement action, the Copperfield Villas Association (CVA) alleged bylaw violations by Barry and Allison Tuer, owners of one of the association's condominiums. The parties reached a stipulated agreement settling the substantive claims but could not agree regarding the amount of attorney fees owed. The trial court determined that the association was entitled to $8,000 in attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the CVA challenges only the award of fees and costs. Because the trial court erred by limiting the association's award to attorney fees incurred before its first appeal, we reverse and remand for the trial court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees owed to the CVA for the entirety of the proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

This is the second time that this case has come before this Court. See Copperfield Villas Ass'n v Tuer, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 21 2020 (Docket No. 348518). In our previous decision, we described the allegations raised in the CVA's lawsuit:

Barry and Allison Tuer own a home in the Copperfield Villas site condominium development. The Tuers completed construction and moved into their home in early 2014. The CVA alleges that the Tuers violated the association Bylaws on multiple occasions over the years by failing to weed and maintain the lawn, parking their vehicles on the lawn, placing stones or gravel and a wooden curb on a common area, and without prior approval constructing a fenced-in dog kennel, expanding their driveway, and installing a parking lot. [Id. at 1.]

During the initial trial court proceedings, the court granted summary disposition in favor of the Tuers and dismissed the CVA's complaint, concluding that the CVA had failed to obtain approval of a majority of the condominium co-owners before filing its bylaw enforcement lawsuit. Id. at 6-7. The CVA appealed, and we reversed and remanded for further proceedings, noting that on remand the CVA could request attorney fees and costs under the Bylaws. Id. at 7 n 3.

On remand, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Tuers agreed to cure most of the alleged bylaw violations, but the parties disputed the amount of attorney fees and costs that the Tuers should pay CVA. The trial court indicated that it would award $8,000, which represented the fees incurred only up to the time of the first appeal. The trial court reasoned that the association did not need to pursue the first appeal, and therefore the Tuers should not be required to pay any subsequent legal fees incurred by the CVA:

[U]sing all this, what I believed in the attorney fee calculation was that the defendant did not have to pay attorney fees after the point which they agreed with defendant [sic] on some of those issues that they took forward. So once the defendant said I give [up] on these issues, there was no reason they have to keep going on those issues up to the . . . higher court, and the defendant need not have been charged for the cost incurred on litigating those issues.

* * *

[I]f the Court of Appeals looks at this, the real issue was . . . from the point at which the defendant said you're right, I give [up], on these issues, there was no need to go forward on it, so to those issues, I'm not going to award . . . attorney fees. [Emphasis added.]

The trial court's award was far below that sought by the CVA, which amounted to more than $20,000, because it did not include fees incurred during the first appeal or any proceedings afterwards. The CVA now appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously prohibited it from recovering attorney fees incurred during all of the proceedings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich.App. 131, 164; 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls "outside the range of principled outcomes." Edry v Adelman, 486 Mich. 634, 639; 786 N.W.2d 567 (2010). "Condominium bylaws are interpreted according to the rules governing the interpretation of a contract." Tuscany Grove Ass'n v Peraino, 311 Mich.App. 389, 393; 875 N.W.2d 234 (2015). Questions involving contract interpretation, as well as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. Id. "De novo review means that we review the legal issue independently" and without deference to the trial court. Wright v Genesee Co, 504 Mich. 410, 417; 934 N.W.2d 805 (2019).

III. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

CVA argues that the trial court erred by ruling that it could recover attorney fees only for those proceedings that occurred before the first appeal.^[1]

This case involves the proper interpretation of the Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq., and the CVA's Bylaws. "When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the Legislature's intent," which is accomplished "by giving the words selected by the Legislature their plain and ordinary meanings, and by enforcing the statute as written." Griffin v Griffin, 323 Mich.App. 110, 120; 916 N.W.2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If a statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as plainly written. McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich. 276, 286; 971 N.W.2d 584 (2018). Similarly, the words of condominium bylaws "are interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning," giving effect to "every word, phrase, and clause." Tuscany Grove Ass'n, 311 Mich.App. at 393.

MCL 559.206(b) of the Condominium Act provides:

In a proceeding arising because of an alleged default by a co-owner, the association of co-owners or the co-owner, if successful, shall recover the costs of the proceeding and reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the court, to the extent the condominium documents expressly so provide. [(Emphasis added).]

The condominium documents governing this dispute-the CVA's Bylaws-expressly allow for the recovery of attorney fees and costs, using language drawn from the Condominium Act. Article XIX, Section 2 of the Bylaws states:

In any proceeding arising because of an alleged default by any Co-owner, the Association, if successful, shall be entitled to recover the costs of the proceeding and such reasonable attorney fees (not limited to statutory fees) as may be determined by the court, but in no event shall any Co-owner be entitled to recover such attorney fees. [(Emphasis added).]

Regarding the award of attorney fees, Michigan follows the "American Rule," which states that "attorney fees are not recoverable as an element of costs or damages unless expressly allowed by statute, court rule, common-law exception, or contract." Reed, 265 Mich.App. at 164 (quotation marks omitted). "Parties can contract for the payment of attorney fees, and contractual provisions for the payment of reasonable attorney fees are judicially enforceable." Talmer Bank & Trust v Parikh, 304 Mich.App. 373, 403; 848 N.W.2d 408 (2014), vacated in part on other grounds 497 Mich. 857 (2014). Furthermore, "[a] contractual provision for reasonable attorney fees in enforcing provisions of [a] contract may validly include allowance for services rendered upon appeal." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original).

The trial court erroneously determined that the CVA could recover attorney fees for only a portion of the proceedings in this litigation. The trial court gave no legal basis for its rationale, and the Tuers provide none on appeal. The CVA was entitled to recover fees and costs for all aspects of the proceedings. MCL 559.206(b) provides that the CVA shall recover attorney fees and costs according to the relevant condominium documents, and the Bylaws expressly provide that the CVA may recover the fees and costs for any proceeding arising from an alleged bylaw violation. "Proceeding" includes an appeal from a lower court decision. See Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed) (defining "proceeding" as "all the steps taken or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action," such as "the taking of the appeal or writ of error"). By using the phrase "any proceeding," the Bylaws unambiguously authorize the recovery of attorney fees and costs incurred pursuing an appeal "arising because of an alleged default by any Co-owner." The allowable recovery under the Bylaws also includes the attorney fees incurred during the parties' subsequent litigation leading to the settlement agreement. By concluding otherwise, the trial court erroneously restricted the CVA's ability to obtain reasonable attorney fees and costs that the Bylaws plainly authorized.

Further the trial court's rationale improperly punishes the CVA for pursuing its rights on appeal. Before the CVA's first appeal, the parties had engaged in settlement discussions, and...