Coppola v. Logistec Connecticut, Inc.

Decision Date03 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 17604.,17604.
Citation925 A.2d 257,283 Conn. 1
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesMichael COPPOLA v. LOGISTEC CONNECTICUT, INC., et al.

David A. Kelly, Glastonbury, with whom, on the brief, was Marie E. Gallo-Hall, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Peter D. Quay, for the appellee (named defendant).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SULLIVAN, Js.

SULLIVAN, J.

The plaintiff, Michael Coppola, appeals1 from the decision of the compensation review board (board) affirming the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner for the third district (commissioner) dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (state act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the board improperly concluded that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction over his claim against the named defendant, Logistec Connecticut, Inc.,2 because the injury occurred on the navigable waters of the United States and, therefore, the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim under article three, § 2, and article one, § 8, of the constitution of the United States3 and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (longshore act). We agree with the plaintiff and reverse the board's decision.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff testified at a hearing before the commissioner that the defendant is in the business of unloading ships in New Haven harbor. The plaintiff had worked as a laborer for the defendant and its predecessors intermittently over several years. He resumed working for the defendant on June 14, 1999. On that date, he was assigned to work on the docks "unhooking" cargo. On the next day, June 15, 1999, he was assigned to unload copper from the hold of a ship. As the plaintiff was descending into the ship's hold, a step broke beneath him and he fell. He was taken by ambulance to Yale-New Haven Hospital, where he was treated for a broken hip and a broken wrist.

The plaintiff filed a claim under the longshore act and was awarded compensation in a decision dated April 28, 2003. The plaintiff also filed a claim under the state act. On September 15, 2003, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the state claim for lack of jurisdiction claiming that, because, at the time of his injury, the plaintiff had been engaged in maritime employment in a vessel floating on the navigable waters of the United States, the longshore act was his exclusive remedy. The commissioner found that the plaintiff "was employed by [the defendant] on June 15, 1999, when he was seriously injured as a result of a fall in the hold of a ship, docked in New Haven and floating on navigable waters of the United States. . . ." He also found that the plaintiff "has an accepted claim for these injuries under the provisions of the [longshore act] for which he is receiving benefits." Relying on this court's decision in Leszczymski v. Andrew Radel Oyster Co., 102 Conn. 511, 527-28, 129 A. 539 (1925), in which this court held that, under Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917), the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over maritime injuries occurring on navigable waters, the commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to correct the commissioner's findings, in which he requested new findings that, inter alia, the plaintiff is a Connecticut resident, the defendant is a Connecticut corporation, the employment contract was entered into within this state and the place of the injury was New Haven. He also argued that the commissioner and the federal government had concurrent jurisdiction over the claim. The defendant objected to the motion on the ground that the proposed findings were merely restatements of the plaintiff's arguments, and that "[t]he situs of the accident was on a vessel floating in the water and that has already been made clear in the record." The commissioner denied the plaintiff's motion.

The plaintiff appealed from the commissioner's dismissal of his claim to the board. He also filed a motion for summary remand in which he requested that the board remand the matter to the commissioner for additional findings. The defendant objected to the motion on the ground that "the only relevant fact is whether the injury occurred in the hold of the vessel, which was floating on the navigable waters of the United States. . . ." After a hearing, the board issued its decision affirming the commissioner's dismissal of the claim. The board noted that this court's decision in Leszczymski had been rendered before the enactment of the longshore act and that later developments in the case law suggested that the rigid rule set forth in Jensen may have been modified so that state compensation laws constitutionally could be applied to some claims involving injuries occurring on navigable waters. The board concluded, however, that "[t]he effect of [the longshore act] and federal case law are interpretive matters within the province of our higher appellate courts," and that it was bound by Leszczymski until that case is overruled. The board did not rule on the plaintiff's motion for summary remand. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff claims on appeal that the board improperly: (1) determined that the state did not have jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) failed to address his motion for summary remand and the commissioner's denial of his motion to correct. We conclude that the state has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government over claims involving injuries incurred on navigable waters when the employer and the employee are locally based, the employment contract is performed within the state and partly on land, the injury took place on the state's territorial waters and the employer was required under the state act to secure compensation for any land based injuries incurred by the employee. We further conclude that, because the defendant concedes that the plaintiff's claim would not be barred if he had been injured on land, the record is sufficient for this court to determine that the state act constitutionally applies to the claim and there is no need to remand the matter to the commissioner for additional fact-finding. Accordingly, we reverse the board's decision.

"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals. The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established. The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board. . . . A state agency is not entitled, however, to special deference when its determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265, 272, 901 A.2d 1176 (2006). Whether the state act constitutionally applies to claims involving injuries that occurred on the navigable waters of the United States is a pure question of law.4 In Leszczymski v. Andrew Radel Oyster Co., supra, 102 Conn. at 527-28, 129 A. 539, this court addressed that question and concluded that the commissioner had no jurisdiction over maritime claims. As the board recognized, however, we have never reconsidered the question in light of the many important developments in federal statutory and case law that have taken place since that decision.

Accordingly, we conclude that our review of this issue is plenary.

We begin our analysis by reviewing the development of the law governing state and federal jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims involving maritime employment. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, 244 U.S. at 210, 37 S.Ct. 524, the United States Supreme Court considered a claim that the New York workers' compensation law was unconstitutional as applied to provide benefits to the widow of a longshoreman who had been killed while unloading cargo on a ship floating in navigable waters. The longshoreman had been employed at the New York office of the plaintiff, a Kentucky corporation, which also owned the ship on which he had been killed. Id., at 207, 37 S.Ct. 524. The court began by noting that "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, extends the judicial power of the United States `To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;' and Article I, § 8, confers upon the Congress power `To make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this [c]onstitution in the government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof.'" Id., at 214-15, 37 S.Ct. 524. The court then recognized that, "[i]n view of these constitutional provisions . . . it would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied." Id., at 216, 37 S.Ct. 524. "[N]o such legislation is valid [however] if it . . . works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Id.

The court in Jensen found that "[t]he work of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 26, 2010
    ... ... No. 18135 ... Supreme Court of Connecticut ... Argued April 29, 2009 ... Decided January 26, 2010 ... [986 ... Transco, Inc., 288 Conn. 303, 311, 953 A.2d 13 (2008); Coppola v. Logistec ... ...
  • Uphold v. Illinois Workers' Compensation
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 24, 2008
    ... ... See Coppola v. Logistec Connecticut, Inc., 283 Conn. 1, 5, 925 A.2d 257, 260 (2007) ... ...
  • Durando v. City of New York
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • December 5, 2011
  • Deschenes v. Transco, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • November 27, 2007
    ... ... TRANSCO, INC., et al ... No. 17852 ... No. 17853 ... Supreme Court of Connecticut" ... Argued September 6, 2007 ... Decided November 27, 2007 ... [935 A.2d 627] ...    \xC2" ... has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola v. Logistec Connecticut, Inc., 283 Conn. 1, 5-6, 925 A.2d 257 (2007); see also Tracy v ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Workers' Compensation Developments 2007-2009
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 83, 2009
    • Invalid date
    ...7. 283 Conn. 840, 930 A.2d 653 (2007). 8. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq. 9. 283 Conn. at 856. 10. 283 Conn. 1, 925 A.2d 257 (2007) 11. 283 Conn. 129, 925 A.2d 311 (2007). 12.Coppola, 283 Conn. at 6 n. 4. 13.Id. at 4-5. The summary above does not truly......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT