Coppola v. United States, 14375.
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
| Writing for the Court | MATHEWS and ORR, Circuit , and WIIG |
| Citation | 217 F.2d 155 |
| Parties | Anthony COPPOLA and Karl M. Noble, Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 14375.,14375. |
| Decision Date | 22 November 1954 |
217 F.2d 155 (1954)
Anthony COPPOLA and Karl M. Noble, Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 14375.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
November 22, 1954.
W. T. Choisser, Douglas H. Clark, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellants.
Jack D. H. Hays, U. S. Atty., Robert S. Murlless, Asst. U. S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before MATHEWS and ORR, Circuit Judges, and WIIG, District Judge.
MATHEWS, Circuit Judge.
Appellants, Anthony Coppola and Karl M. Noble, were indicted in two counts, were arraigned, pleaded not guilty, had a jury trial, were convicted on both counts, were sentenced and have appealed. Questions presented are (1) whether the indictment charged an offense against the United States, (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellants' conviction and (3) whether the District Court erred in admitting certain evidence.
I
Count 1 of the indictment alleged that on or about February 2, 1952, in Maricopa County, Arizona, appellants "did then and there knowingly, unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously dispense and distribute to one R. S. Cantu, a certain derivative of cocoa1 leaves, to-wit, approximately 1/8 grain of cocaine, which said cocaine was not then and there in nor from the original stamped package containing said cocaine." Thus count 1 charged an offense against the United States, namely, a violation of 26 U.S. C.A. § 2553(a), 53 Stat. 271, 58 Stat. 721.2
Count 2 of the indictment alleged that on or about February 2, 1952, in Maricopa County, Arizona, appellants "did unlawfully, fraudulently and feloniously distribute and give away to one R. S. Cantu a certain quantity of cocaine, a derivative of cocoa3 leaves, which said
As indicated above, the word "coca" was misspelled in each count of the indictment, but this was not, as appellants contend, a fatal defect.5 Appellants were not misled or otherwise prejudiced by the misspelling. They knew that they were charged with dispensing and distributing cocaine not in or from the original stamped package and with distributing and giving away cocaine not in pursuance of a written order on a form issued for that purpose by the Secretary of the Treasury. It is commonly known, and therefore judicially known, that cocaine is a derivative of coca leaves. It was therefore unnecessary to state this fact in the indictment.6 Therefore the words "a certain derivative of cocoa leaves, to-wit," in count 1, and the words "a derivative of cocoa leaves," in count 2, were surplusage and — since appellants were not prejudiced thereby — may be disregarded.7
II
There was evidence to the following effect:
On February 2, 1952, R. S. Cantu and Charles Hall Van Natter8 went to King's Bar,9 also called King's Cocktail Lounge, in Phoenix, Maricopa County,...
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Vasquez v. City of Reno, Civ. No. 78-0055-HEC.
...a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 1985. We are sure that Congress did not intend such a result." (emphasis added). 217 F.2d at 155. The principles of Jennings v. Nester apply to the Reno Civil Service Commission in the case at bar. A point in time herein existed, after......
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United States v. Lamont, 301
...in the light of the facts of which the court takes judicial notice. See, among a wealth of precedents, Coppola v. United States, 9 Cir., 217 F.2d 155; Kempe v. United States, 8 Cir., 151 F.2d 680, 684; First Nat. Bank of Genoa v. American Surety Co. of New York, 239 App.Div. 282, 267 N.Y.S.......
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United States v. Barner, Cr. No. 12930.
...the Court is authorized to take judicial notice (United States v. Lamont, 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 312; and Coppola v. United States, 9 Cir., 217 F.2d 155). If, after such consideration and a fair construction of the accusatory pleading, the necessary facts to establish the elements of the offense ......
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Jennings v. Nester, 11234.
...and convicted of the same crime a second time. We must assume, without an allegation to the contrary, that the three years served by the 217 F.2d 155 plaintiff because of his first conviction were taken into account when he was sentenced the second time, and that he has not suffered any add......
-
Vasquez v. City of Reno, Civ. No. 78-0055-HEC.
...a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 1985. We are sure that Congress did not intend such a result." (emphasis added). 217 F.2d at 155. The principles of Jennings v. Nester apply to the Reno Civil Service Commission in the case at bar. A point in time herein existed, after......
-
United States v. Lamont, 301
...in the light of the facts of which the court takes judicial notice. See, among a wealth of precedents, Coppola v. United States, 9 Cir., 217 F.2d 155; Kempe v. United States, 8 Cir., 151 F.2d 680, 684; First Nat. Bank of Genoa v. American Surety Co. of New York, 239 App.Div. 282, 267 N.Y.S.......
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United States v. Barner, Cr. No. 12930.
...the Court is authorized to take judicial notice (United States v. Lamont, 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 312; and Coppola v. United States, 9 Cir., 217 F.2d 155). If, after such consideration and a fair construction of the accusatory pleading, the necessary facts to establish the elements of the offense ......
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Jennings v. Nester, 11234.
...and convicted of the same crime a second time. We must assume, without an allegation to the contrary, that the three years served by the 217 F.2d 155 plaintiff because of his first conviction were taken into account when he was sentenced the second time, and that he has not suffered any add......