Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-1979,80-1979
• Citation: 410 So.2d 648
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Parties: CORAL REEF NURSERIES, INC. and Santana Groves, Inc., Petitioners, Cross- Respondents, v. The BABCOCK COMPANY, a Florida corporation, et al., Respondents, Cross- Petitioners, v. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision, Respondent.

Page 648

410 So.2d 648

CORAL REEF NURSERIES, INC. and Santana Groves, Inc., Petitioners, Cross- Respondents, v. The BABCOCK COMPANY, a Florida corporation, et al., Respondents, Cross- Petitioners, v. DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision, Respondent.

No. 80-1979.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 9, 1982.

Williams, Salomon, Kanner, Damian, Weissler & Brooks and Gary S. Brooks, Miami, for Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc., and Santana Groves, Inc.

Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Lipoff, Quentel & Wolff and Alan C. Gold and Clifford A. Schulman, Miami, for The Babcock Company.

Robert A. Ginsburg, County Atty. and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for Dade County, Florida.

Before BARKDULL, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.

Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. and Santana Groves, Inc. are owners of agricultural property adjacent to and in the vicinity of two large tracts of land owned by The Babcock Company. ¹

On July 20, 1977, Babcock filed an application requesting a zoning change for the entirety of the property to EU-M (half-acre estates) from the existing GU (interim use) classification. In January 1978, the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County denied the application, finding, inter alia, that the subject property was viable for use as agricultural land and that the application failed to adequately address the economic impact which the loss of agricultural land would have on the community. Babcock petitioned the Circuit Court, Appellate Division, for certiorari review of the Commission's action. ²

While that proceeding was pending, Babcock filed two new rezoning applications. These applications (one for each tract) substantially differed from the preceding application in that they addressed the concerns raised by the Commission at the earlier hearing and sought to minimize the impact on the area's future growth and development. Among other things, the new applications (1) were accompanied by a Restrictive Covenant which called for park and school dedications and for the construction of new roadways; (2) provided for rainbow zoning with low density on the western and southern borders (adjacent to agricultural land) and higher density on the eastern fringe (adjacent to residential land); (3) called for no roadways on the western and southern boundaries; (4) provided for sewer mains to be brought only to the northeastern portion of the tracts with the western and southern borders to be serviced solely by septic tanks. Each of these new elements was calculated to discourage future growth beyond that envisioned by the county planners in the 1985 Master Plan development area.

In July 1979, a year and a half after the denial of Babcock's initial application, the Board of County Commissioners, finding that there were changes in the area of the subject property and in the requests justifying a decision favorable to Babcock, approved the new applications. This time, Coral Reef and Santana, the opponents of the zoning change, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court. ³ Babcock's petition for certiorari and the appeals of Coral Reef and Santana were consolidated for decision.

In July 1980, the Circuit Court, deciding, inter alia, that (1) both the 1978 action of the Commission denying Babcock's rezoning application and the 1979 action of the Commission granting Babcock's rezoning application were fairly debatable ⁴; and (2) the Commission action in 1979 was not barred by the doctrine of administrative res judicata, because (a) zoning actions are "legislative" in nature, and (b) the County's zoning code permits refiling after a prescribed time ⁵; upheld the 1979 zoning change.

Coral Reef and Santana petitioned us to review the Circuit Court's ruling by certiorari. Asserting that certiorari was not the proper method of review, Babcock moved to dismiss the petition, cross-appealed, but as a safety measure, cross-petitioned for a writ of certiorari. Dade County, designating itself as cross-appellee or cross-respondent, answered. We have jurisdiction to entertain the petition and cross-petition for certiorari. ^{6 6} See Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2)(B); O'Connor v. Dade County, 410 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Save Brickell Avenue, Inc. v. City of Miami, 393 So.2d 1197 (Fla.3d DCA 1981).

Coral Reef and Santana contend that the Circuit Court was correct in holding that the Commission's 1978 decision denying rezoning was fairly debatable, but incorrect in holding that administrative res judicata did not bar the Commission's approval of rezoning in July 1979. ⁷ Simply stated, they say that only the 1978 denial of rezoning should stand affirmed.

Babcock contends that the Circuit Court was correct in holding that administrative res judicata did not bar the Commission from taking its subsequent action, and that, therefore, the 1979 approval of rezoning should stand affirmed. But if administrative res judicata is held to apply to this zoning matter, then, says Babcock, the doctrine does not act as a bar here because of the substantial and material changes in the application and circumstances after the 1978 denial of rezoning. Babcock's fallback position is that if no such changes are found to exist and administrative res judicata bars the 1979 rezoning, then the 1978 denial of rezoning was not fairly debatable and should be reversed.

The County in some respects disagrees with Coral Reef and Santana; in other respects, with Babcock. It says (disagreeing with Babcock) that the Circuit Court was correct in holding that both the 1978 and 1979 actions of the Commission were fairly debatable, and incorrect in holding that administrative res judicata does not apply to zoning matters. But (disagreeing with Coral Reef and Santana) the County says that substantial and material changes in the application and circumstances prevent the doctrine of administrative res judicata from acting as a bar in this case, and the 1979 rezoning should be affirmed. Thus, the County suggests that we affirm the ruling of the Circuit Court, but not entirely for the reasons given by that court. Since we agree that both the 1978 and 1979 actions of the Commission were fairly debatable and, absent other considerations, must be upheld, our discussion will be limited to the applicability of administrative res judicata to the 1979 action of the Commission. ⁸

I

A.

The doctrine of administrative res judicata is firmly entrenched as part of the decisional law of the State of Florida in relation to zoning cases. See Wager v. City of Green Cove Springs, 261 So.2d 827 (Fla.1972); City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So.2d 473 (Fla.1957); Burger King Corporation v. Metropolitan Dade County, 349 So.2d 210 (Fla.3d DCA 1977); Taub v. Metropolitan Dade County, 296 So.2d 566 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, 296 So.2d 544 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Metropolitan Dade County v. Crowe, 296 So.2d 532 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners v. Rockmatt Corporation, 231 So.2d 41 (Fla.3d DCA 1970). The doctrine "... is applicable to rulings or decisions of administrative bodies (citation omitted), and to rulings of such bodies dealing with zoning regulations unless it can be shown that since the earlier ruling thereon there has been a substantial change of circumstances relating to the subject matter with which the ruling was concerned, sufficient to prompt a different or contrary determination ...." Metropolitan Dade County Board of County Commissioners v. Rockmatt Corporation, supra, 231 So.2d at 44.

Babcock argues that the applicability of the doctrine to zoning cases depends on whether the action of the administrative body is legislative or quasi-judicial in nature, and that only in the latter instance does the doctrine apply. According to Babcock, since applications for zoning district boundary changes in Florida have traditionally and uniformly been said to be "legislative" actions of the zoning body identical in legal force and effect to the original legislative action in enacting the zoning ordinance sought to be changed, and only applications for special exceptions or variances are said to be "quasi-judicial" in nature, administrative res judicata should not apply to the zoning change here.

We reject Babcock's argument for two reasons. First, its contention that administrative res judicata does not apply to "legislative" zoning changes, as distinguished from "quasi-judicial" special exceptions or variances, is belied by abundant case law to the contrary. ⁹ See Wager v. City of Green Cove Springs, supra; Burger King Corporation v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra; Taub v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra; Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra; Metropolitan Dade County v. Crowe, supra; Aronovitz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 290 So.2d 536 (Fla.3d DCA 1974); Metropolitan Dade County v. Jennings, 196 So.2d 33 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). See also Jet Air Freight v. Jet Air Freight Delivery, Inc., 264 So.2d 35 (Fla.3d DCA 1972); Rubin v. Sanford, 168 So.2d 774 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Carol City Utilities, Inc. v. Miami Gardens Shopping Plaza, Inc., 165 So.2d 199 (Fla.3d DCA 1964).

Second, and far more important, it is the character of the administrative hearing leading to the action of the administrative body that determines the label to be attached to the action and, in turn, determines the applicability of the doctrine of administrative res judicata. The procedural due process which is afforded to the interested parties in a hearing on an application for rezoning is identical to that afforded in a hearing on variances or special exceptions. See Section 33-36, Code of Metropolitan Dade County. Each contains the safeguards of due notice, a fair opportunity to be heard in person and through counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; and it is...