Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-14125,19-14125
• Citation: 6 F.4th 1247
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
• Parties: CORAL RIDGE MINISTRIES MEDIA, INC., d.b.a. D. James Kennedy Ministries, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc., Amazonsmile Foundation, Defendants - Appellees, Amazonsmile Foundation, Inc., et al., Defendants.

6 F.4th 1247

CORAL RIDGE MINISTRIES MEDIA, INC., d.b.a. D. James Kennedy Ministries, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. AMAZON.COM, INC., Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc., Amazonsmile Foundation, Defendants - Appellees,Amazonsmile Foundation, Inc., et al., Defendants.

No. 19-14125

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 28, 2021

David C. Gibbs, III, The National Center for Life and Liberty, Inc., Bartonville, TX, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Tim Cunningham, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Portland, OR, Bruce Edward Johnson, Ambika Kumar, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Seattle, WA, Harlan Irby Prater, IV, Robert Ashby Pate, Lightfoot Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Amazon.com, Inc., Amazonsmile Foundation.

Shannon L. Holliday, Benjamin Woodforde Maxymuk, Robert D. Segall, Copeland Franco Screws & Gill, PA, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc.

William J. Olson, William J. Olson, PC, Vienna, VA, for Amicus Curiae.

Before WILSON, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Coral Ridge Ministries Media (Coral Ridge), a Christian ministry and media corporation, appeals the district court's dismissal of its defamation claim against the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and religious discrimination claim against Amazon.com and the AmazonSmile Foundation (collectively, Amazon). Because we find that the district court did not err in dismissing this suit, we affirm.

I.

Amazon.com is the largest internet-based retailer in the world. AmazonSmile Foundation (AmazonSmile) is a tax-exempt corporation affiliated with Amazon.com. The AmazonSmile website allows customers to buy products as if they were using Amazon.com, but with every purchase Amazon will donate 0.5% of the price to an eligible charity selected by the customer. To be an eligible charity for the AmazonSmile program, an organization must be registered and in good standing with the Internal Revenue Service as a nonprofit organization under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) ; must agree to a Participation Agreement; and cannot "engage in, support, encourage, or promote intolerance, hate, terrorism, violence, money laundering, or other illegal activities." In relation to the last requirement, organizations that SPLC designates as hate groups are not eligible to participate in the AmazonSmile program. SPLC is an Alabama-based nonprofit organization that, among other things, publishes a "Hate Map"—a list of entities the organization has characterized as hate groups—on its website.¹ Coral Ridge applied to be an eligible charity for the AmazonSmile program, but Amazon denied its application because Coral Ridge is listed on the Hate Map as being anti-LGBTQ.²

Coral Ridge filed suit in the Middle District of Alabama, claiming, inter alia, that (1) SPLC defamed Coral Ridge by listing it on the Hate Map, and (2) Amazon violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act (Title II), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., by discriminating against it based on religion.³ In its complaint, Coral Ridge acknowledged that it opposes homosexual conduct, but denied that it is a hate group. It rejected SPLC's definition of hate group and instead said that the commonly understood definition of the term was "groups that engage in violence and crime."⁴ Coral Ridge asserted it did not fall within either this definition or SPLC's definition of the term. Additionally, Coral Ridge alleged that SPLC listed it on the Hate Map because of its religious beliefs about LGBTQ conduct. Therefore, according to Coral Ridge, a court could infer that Amazon discriminated against it by relying on the Hate Map. Both SPLC and Amazon moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In a thorough 141-page order, the district court dismissed the defamation claim on First Amendment grounds and dismissed the Title II claim primarily because it found that the AmazonSmile program was not covered by Title II in this instance. Alternatively, it held that Coral Ridge's interpretation of Title II created First Amendment problems. Finally, the district court found that Coral Ridge did not plausibly allege either intentional or disparate impact discrimination. It therefore dismissed Coral Ridge's suit in full.

II.

We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc. , 816 F.3d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 2016). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We need not, however, accept as true a complaint's conclusory allegations or legal conclusions. Id.

III.

Under Alabama law, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie defamation claim when he or she demonstrates: "(1) that the defendant was at least negligent (2) in publishing (3) a false and defamatory statement to another (4) concerning the plaintiff, (5) which is either actionable without having to prove special harm ... or actionable upon allegations and proof of special harm." Ex parte Bole , 103 So. 3d 40, 51 (Ala. 2012) (alterations accepted and emphasis omitted).

When applying state defamation law to public figures, the First Amendment imposes additional limitations.⁵ First, the alleged defamatory statement must be "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false." Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co. , 497 U.S. 1, 21, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Second, the statement must be actually false. Id. at 16, 110 S.Ct. 2695. And third, a public-figure plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the alleged defamatory statement with "actual malice"—"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). This actual malice test is subjective; the public-figure plaintiff must show that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the statement. Berisha v. Lawson , 973 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2020).

The district court dismissed Coral Ridge's defamation claim on the grounds that the term hate group has a "highly debatable and ambiguous meaning" and thus is not provable as false. Alternatively, the court found that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead that SPLC acted with actual malice.⁶ Because we agree that Coral Ridge failed to adequately plead actual malice, we affirm the dismissal of Coral Ridge's defamation claim.⁷

Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead facts that give rise to a reasonable inference that SPLC "actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity" of its hate group definition and that definition's application to Coral Ridge, or that SPLC was "highly aware" that the definition and its application was "probably false." Michel , 816 F.3d at 702–03. For starters, we can disregard the portions of the complaint where Coral Ridge alleged in a purely conclusory manner that the defendants acted "with actual malice" in publishing the Hate Map. Allegations such as these amount to threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, which are insufficient to state a claim. Id. ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Setting those allegations aside, Coral Ridge makes two basic contentions regarding actual malice. First, it claims that SPLC's definition of hate group is so far removed from the commonly understood meaning of the term that its designation of Coral Ridge as a hate group is "intentionally false and deceptive." This statement comes very close to being a conclusory assertion of the elements of the cause of action. Michel , 816 F.3d at 703. In any event, Coral Ridge does not plead any facts that would allow us to infer that SPLC doubted the veracity of its own definition of the term. Moreover, the complaint states that SPLC publicly disseminates its own definition of a hate group on its website; given that, it is hard to see how SPLC's use of the term would be misleading. Regardless of the commonly understood meaning of hate group, and regardless of whether SPLC's definition is the same, the complaint did not present any factual allegations that would allow us to infer that SPLC's subjective state of mind was sufficiently culpable. Berisha , 973 F.3d at 1312.

Second, Coral Ridge contends that SPLC acted "with reckless disregard for the truth" in designating Coral Ridge a hate group, even under SPLC's definition of the term. But Coral Ridge pleaded no facts that would allow us to infer that SPLC seriously doubted the accuracy of designating Coral Ridge a hate group. The complaint states that Coral Ridge "has never attacked or maligned anyone on the basis of engaging in homosexual conduct" and that "SPLC's conduct, in and of itself, would have created a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of SPLC's declaration."⁸ Although we must accept Coral Ridge's allegations as true at this stage, bare-bone allegations like these are insufficient to show that SPLC doubted the truth of its designation. Michel , 816 F.3d at 703. Accordingly, the district court was correct to dismiss Coral Ridge's defamation claim on the ground that Coral Ridge did not sufficiently plead actual malice, and we affirm as to this issue.⁹

IV.

Next, we review whether the district court was correct in dismissing Coral Ridge's religious discrimination claim. In relevant part, Title II states: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,...