Coral Springs Street Systems v. City of Sunrise

• Decision Date: 21 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-7951-CIV-ZLOCH.,01-7951-CIV-ZLOCH.
• Citation: 287 F.Supp.2d 1313
• Parties: CORAL SPRINGS STREET SYSTEMS, INC., a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SUNRISE, a Florida municipality, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

287 F.Supp.2d 1313

CORAL SPRINGS STREET SYSTEMS, INC., a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SUNRISE, a Florida municipality, Defendant.

No. 01-7951-CIV-ZLOCH.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

February 21, 2003.

Thomas Richard Julin, Dorothy Patricia Wallace, Hunton & Williams, Miami, for Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc., a Florida corporation, plaintiff.

Michael Thomas Burke, Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke & George, Fort Lauderdale, for City of Sunrise, a Florida municipality, defendant.

OMNIBUS ORDER

ZLOCH, Chief Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant, City of Sunrise's Motion For Summary Judgment (DE 11) and the Plaintiff, Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc.'s Motion for Final Summary Judgment (DE 15). The Court has carefully reviewed said Motions, the entire court file and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

The Plaintiff, Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "Coral Springs") commenced the above-styled cause by filing a Complaint (DE 1) against the Defendant, City of Sunrise (hereinafter the "City") seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees for alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Coral Springs alleges that on September 6, 2001, it submitted an application to the City for a permit to construct an off-premises outdoor advertising sign within the City of Sunrise. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Coral Springs further alleges that on November 13, 2001, the City notified Coral Springs in writing that it had rejected its application for a permit because the proposed sign did not comply with the City's Land Development Code. (Id. ¶ 11.) Coral Springs further alleges that the Land Development Code was unconstitutional at the time it submitted its application for a permit, and that it has vested rights under the laws of Florida to the permit it requested from the City. (Id. ¶¶ 12-17.) The Court has jurisdiction over the above-styled cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367.

The following material facts are undisputed.¹ Coral Springs is a corporation that leases or purchases real estate upon which it erects and maintains billboards. Once the billboards are erected Coral Springs leases the billboard space to individuals or entities wishing to communicate messages to the general public. Coral Springs also uses the billboards to advertise its own noncommercial public service messages.

On March 17, 1999, Street Information Systems, Inc., another billboard company not involved in the instant lawsuit, entered into a lease agreement with Sawgrass Ford, Inc. (hereinafter "Sawgrass Ford"). (DE 14, Def's App. of Docs., Ex. F.) Sawgrass Ford is an automobile dealership located at 14501 W. Sunrise Blvd., within the City of Sunrise. Under the lease agreement, Sawgrass Ford agreed to lease to Street Information Systems, Inc., for a period of twenty (20) years, a piece of land on its property for the purpose of erecting an outdoor advertising billboard. Specifically, the billboard would be located on the west side of the Sawgrass Ford property alongside the Sawgrass Expressway. On August 1, 2000, Street Information Systems, Inc. assigned its rights, title and interest in the lease to Coral Springs. (Id., Ex. G.)

On September 6, 2001, Coral Springs submitted an application to the City for a permit to erect one off-premises outdoor advertising sign on the Sawgrass Ford property. (Id., Ex. D.) At that time, Chapter 16, article XIV of the City's Land Development Code (hereinafter the "Sign Code") governed the permitting and regulation of signs. On November 13, 2001, the City advised Coral Springs in writing that its application had been denied. (Id., Ex. E.) In response to the denial, Mr. Thomas R. Julin, Esq., counsel for Coral Springs, notified the City by letter dated November 25, 2001 that it was Coral Springs' position that the Sign Code was unconstitutional. (DE 17, Pl.'s Exs. in Support of Mot. for Final Summ. J., Ex. 4.) On December 11, 2001, the City amended its Sign Code by adopting Ordinance No. 402-01-K (hereinafter the "Amended Sign Code"). On or about December 31, 2001, Coral Springs filed the instant lawsuit.

In its Motion For Summary Judgment (DE 11), the City argues that (1) Coral Springs' claims are moot due to its enactment of the Amended Sign Code; (2) assuming Coral Springs' claims are not moot, the Sign Code was constitutional at the time Coral Springs submitted its application; (3) to the extent some portions of the Sign Code are declared invalid, such portions can be severed from the valid portions of the Sign Code; and (4) Coral Springs does not have a vested right to the issuance of the building permit. Conversely, in its Motion for Final Summary Judgment (DE 15), Coral Springs argues that (1) the City's Sign Code was unconstitutional on its face on September 6, 2001 when it submitted its application; (2) the invalid portions of the Sign Code cannot be severed from the valid portions of the Sign Code; and (3) it has vested rights to the requested permit.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper

... if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11th Cir. 1990). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Indeed, "the moving party bears the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Only when that burden has been met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.1991).

The moving party is entitled to "judgment as a matter of law" when the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case to which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). In other words, the standard for granting summary judgment is the same as the standard for granting a directed verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The appellate courts, therefore, will generally affirm the granting of summary judgment if on any part of the prima facie case there would be insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to a jury. Id. at 252-256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barnes v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir.1987). The evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed, however, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his or her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Barnes, 814 F.2d at 609; Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Davis, 804 F.2d 1580, 1582 (11th Cir.1986). Where the moving party properly supports its motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must, through affidavits or as otherwise provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 684 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Eberhardt, 901 F.2d at 1580.

III. Discussion

A. The Sign Code

The Sign Code was enacted to "create a comprehensive system of street graphic controls, thereby facilitating clear communication, reduced traffic or structural hazards, and an enhanced aesthetic appearance of the city." Sign Code, art. XIV, § 16-247(a). It defines various types of signs. Id. at § 16-247(b). An "off-premise sign," such as the one Coral Springs applied for, is defined as "[a]ny sign advertising a commercial establishment, activity, product, service or entertainment, which is sold, produced, manufactured, available or furnished at a place other than on the property on which the sign is located." Id. at § 16-247(b)(24). To achieve its purpose of facilitating communication, reducing traffic hazards and enhancing the aesthetics of the city, the Sign Code prohibits certain signs. Id. at § 16-248(a). For example, § 16-248(a) prohibits the following signs: animated or flashing signs; banner signs; buntings or flags; off-premises commercial signs or billboards; temporary and permanent signs, other than public interest signs, placed on any public property; and any sign not prescribed as a permitted sign. Id. at § 16-248(a)(2), (3), (4), (6), (12) & (16).

At the same time, however, § 16-248(a) excepts certain signs from its prohibition on signs. For example, the following signs are permitted: animated or flashing signs that display the time or temperature; temporary grand opening or special event banner signs; the United States flag; bus shelter or bench signs, and temporary project signs; and temporary and permanent public interest signs. Id. at § 16-248(a)(2), (3), (4), (6) & (12).

Other sections of the Sign Code also permit certain signs. Section 16-250, for example, permits certain public interest signs, such as signs placed on bus benches,...