Corbett v. Boston & M.R.r.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1914
• Citation: 219 Mass. 351,107 N.E. 60
• Parties: CORBETT v. BOSTON & M. R. R. (two cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

219 Mass. 351

107 N.E. 60

CORBETT v. BOSTON & M. R. R. (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

November 24, 1914

COUNSEL

Fred H Eaton and Frederic N. Chandler, both of Lawrence, for plaintiff.

Henry F. Hurlburt and Philip N. Jones, both of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

The husband of the plaintiff met his death on July 8, 1912, from injuries received while working for the defendant. The plaintiff brought the first action in her own name and right to recover damages for his death under the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act, which in such cases gives a right of action to the widow of the employé. Subsequently having been appointed administratrix of the estate of her husband, she brought an action as such administratrix under the Employers' Liability Act of the United States alleging that the deceased was engaged at the time of his death in service upon a train in interstate commerce. Each of these actions was against the defendant to recover damages for the death of the same person. They came on for trial together in the Superior Court. The judge ruled that the bringing of the action under the federal Employers' Liability Act had the effect of superseding the action under the state Employers' Liability Act and of depriving the court of jurisdiction to hear that action during the pendency of the other action. In the action under the state statute he ordered judgment for the defendant and reported the correctness of his rulings to this court.

Even if the presiding judge was right in his ruling, judgment ought not to have been rendered in favor of the defendant in the action under the state statute. A court without jurisdiction over a cause cannot enter judgment in favor of either party. It can only order that the cause be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

But we are of opinion that the ruling was wrong. The federal act in the field covered by it supersedes all state statutes. As to matters within the scope of the federal power, legislation by Congress is supreme. So long as Congress had not acted as to liability for injuries received by employés of railroads while engaged in interstate commerce, legislation by the states touching that subject, being within the police power, was valid. But when Congress exerted its jurisdiction to regulate in this respect commerce between the states, state statutes previously operative in that sphere yielded to its paramount and exclusive power. Michigan Central R. R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 66, 33 S.Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 S.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156; Taylor v. Taylor, 232 U.S. 363, 34 S.Ct. 350, 58 L.Ed. 638; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 501, 34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062. The federal act has no greater extent. It does not undertake to affect the force of the state statute in its appropriate sphere. The state law is as supreme and exclusive in its application to intrastate commerce as is the federal law to interstate commerce. If the employé of a railroad engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce is injured or killed while in the former service, the carrier's liability is controlled and must be determined solely by the federal law; if in the latter service, such liability rests wholly upon the state law. Wabash R. R. v. Hayes, 234 U.S. 86, 34 S.Ct. 729, 58 L.Ed. 1226.

The facts and not the pleadings determine whether the wrong done in any given case confers a right to recover under the federal or the state statute. The allegations in the plaintiff's declarations in these two actions do not constitute the test whether the jurisdiction of the court is under the federal or state statute. These simply are the basis for a judicial inquiry into the facts which alone can determine that question. It is a familiar principle that, where inconsistent courses are open to an injured party and it is doubtful which ultimately may lead to full relief, he may follow one even to defeat, and then take another, or he may pursue all concurrently, until it finally is decided which affords the remedy. The assertion of one claim which turns out to be unsound, so long as it goes no further, is simply a mistake. It is not and does not purport to be a final choice, nor an election. A party is not obliged to select his procedure at his peril. Jennings v. Wall, 217 Mass. 278, 281, 282, 104 N.E. 738; Moore v. Sanford, 151 Mass. 285, 24 N.E. 323, 7 L. R. A. 151; Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass. 412, 415, 90 N.E. 859, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 808; Wm. W. Bierce, Ltd., v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340, 347, 27 S.Ct. 524, 51 L.Ed. 828; Snow v. Alley, 156 Mass. 193, 195, 30 N.E. 691; Brown v. Woodbury, 183 Mass. 279, 281, 67 N.E. 327; Rankin v. Tygard, 119 C. C. A. 591, 602, 198 F. 795. This rule has been followed frequently in actions where it was doubtful whether the remedy of the plaintiff was under our Employers' Liability Act or at common law. Brady v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 154 Mass. 468, 28 N.E. 901; Howard v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 203 Mass. 273, 89 N.E. 615; Murray v. Knight, 156 Mass. 518, 31 N.E. 646; D'Almeida v. Boott Mills, 209 Mass. 81, 95 N.E. 398, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 751. It is equally applicable to the cases at bar. The principle is not changed in any material respect, because the question relates to remedies afforded by the statutes of different sovereign powers, each exclusive within its own domain. The relief is sought in the same forum, for the state court has jurisdiction of the cause of action, whichever statute may be controlling. Mondou v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R., 223 U.S. 1, 57, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44.

There are strong practical considerations in the administration of justice which lead to the same result. It oftentimes would be a great hardship upon the parties to compel them to try out first the question whether the federal act applies, and, if it in the end shall be decided that it does not, then to test by further litigation their rights under the state statute. The short period of limitations provided in each act often might expire before a final decision could be reached. If adverse to the plaintiff on the ground of error in the form of relief sought, he thus might be barred from a just recovery. Although both the federal and state statutes as to amendments are liberal (Rev. St. U.S. § 954; R. L. c. 173, § 48) and are liberally interpreted in cases of this sort (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 33 S.Ct. 135, 57 L.Ed. 355, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 134; Herlihy v. Little, 200 Mass. 284, 86 N.E. 294), nevertheless the allowance of such amendments rests commonly in the sound discretion of the trial judge and is not subject to revision on exceptions. As it is not a matter of right, substantial interests might be lost through no fault of a plaintiff who constantly had been alert...