Corbett v. Matz

• Decision Date: 13 February 1900
• Citation: 45 A. 494,72 Conn. 610
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CORBETT v. MATZ et al.

45 A. 494

72 Conn. 610

CORBETT

v. MATZ et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 13, 1900.

Error from city court of New Haven; Edwin C. Dow, Judge.

Action by Harry Matz and others against Thomas W. Corbett. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

William B. Stoddard and Jacob P. Goodhart, for plaintiff in error.

E. P. Arvine, George E. Beers, and E. P. Arvine, Jr., for defendants in error.

HALL, J. The defendants in error obtained a judgment of foreclosure in the city court of New Haven on the 20th of April, 1899, in an action in which the plaintiff in error appeared as a defendant, filed an answer, and was fully heard. The judgment file of that date, and in due form, states that the court found all the allegations of the complaint true. There was no continuance of the case for any purpose, and no further action taken upon it during that term. Under the city charter a new term of the court began on the first Monday of the following July. In the present writ of error, brought to reverse that judgment, the errors assigned are, in effect, that the facts found by the city court, and appearing upon the record of that court, are insufficient to support the judgment rendered, inasmuch as they show that the mortgage foreclosed was invalid, because the debt which it secured was a conditional, and not an absolute, liability. Writs of error upon matters of law reach only those errors which appear of record. As proof that the facts which are alleged to be insufficient to support the judgment appear upon the record, the plaintiff in error relies upon a finding of facts, and an amendment thereto, signed by the judge of the city court in the month of November following the date of the judgment, and directed by him to be made a part of the record. If by such action of the trial judge the facts thus found are made part of the record of the judgment rendered at the previous term of the court, the question of the sufficiency of such facts to support the judgment may be raised by writ of error. Goodrich v. Stanley, 23 Conn. 79-83; Town of Tolland v. Town of Willington, 26 Conn. 578; Town of Seymour v. Belden, 28 Conn. 444. Section 3, p. 91, Ct. Rules 1899, says, if the facts required to be found under sections 1107 and 1111 of the General Statutes are insufficient to support the judgment, that constitutes an error apparent upon the record. But, if the facts thus found by the trial judge are not a part of the record of the trial court, the question of the validity of the mortgage which was the subject of the foreclosure suit cannot be considered in this proceeding, since it is not claimed that the judgment is erroneous without those facts, or that, in the absence of those facts, the record discloses that the trial court, by any ruling or decision, held that a mortgage given under the circumstances detailed in the finding was valid. Apparently plaintiff's counsel rely upon the provisions of section 6 of chapter 194 of the Public Acts of 1897, as well as upon sections 1107 and 1111 of the General Statutes, as authorizing the finding made in November, and as empowering the judge to add those facts to the record of the trial court. But the provisions of section 6 of the act of 1897, requiring a judge to make a special finding of facts, and which are the same as those of section 4 of the Public Acts of 1882, have reference only to the preparation of a statement of facts to be made after judgment has been rendered, and to become a part of an appeal to this court. Such a finding is for the purpose of enabling the parties to present to this court by appeal the questions which were raised and decided in the trial court, and the judge is only required to make it at the request of the party giving notice of the appeal, which must be done within the time fixed by the statute. This act makes no provision for a finding in the absence of an appeal, and after the expiration of the time for taking one. Johnson v. Higgins, 53 Conn. 238, 1 Atl. 616; Thresher v. Dyer, 69 Conn. 409, 37 Conn. 979. It was no part of the purpose of this statute to enable the parties to an action to have spread upon the records of the trial court, as a part of the judgment, the facts conclusively determined in the action between them, and a special finding merely for the purpose of an appeal does not have that effect. That object, as well as "the inclusion of such facts in the judgment for the purpose of presenting the question whether the judgment is the true voice of the law upon the facts found," is amply provided for by sections 1107 and 1111 of the General Statutes. Kashman v. Parsons, 70 Conn. 295-304, 39 Atl. 179; Thresher v. Dyer, supra. We do not mean to say that a special finding of facts obtained for the purpose of an appeal may not, when the appeal is not pursued, be made the basis of a writ of error when the finding is made a part of the judgment by a court or judge having at the time control of its own judgment, and competent to erase or modify it. But such a finding becomes a part of the record of the trial court by force of section 1111, rather than of the act of 1897.

In this case the plaintiff in error made no attempt to appeal to this court from the judgment of the city court, and, as the time for taking such an appeal had long since passed when the finding was made, it is not a finding provided for by the law of 1897. But, if it could be so regarded, it would avail the plaintiff nothing in this action if the facts so found are inconsistent with those contained in the judgment file. The judgment file is the only formal written statement which expresses the decision rendered. Sections 94-96, Ct. Rules 1899. No allegation of the writ of error can be entertained which contradicts the record. The judge of the city court, after the expiration of the time for taking an appeal, and after the expiration of the term in which the judgment was rendered, had, therefore, no power to annul, modify, or supplement that judgment by incorporating in it as its foundation the facts set forth in the finding, unless he was authorized to do so by the provisions of sections 1107 and 1111 of the General Statutes. Section 10, c. 13, of the Revision of 1875 (page 444) provided only that courts of equity should cause the facts upon which their decrees were founded to appear on the record. By section 30 of the practice act (Pub. Acts 1879) this was amended so as to read as in section 1111 of the General Statutes: "All courts shall keep a record of their proceedings and cause the facts on...