Corbett v. People

• Citation: 153 Colo. 457,387 P.2d 409
• Decision Date: 18 November 1963
• Docket Number: No. 20057,20057
• Parties: Joseph CORBETT, Jr., Alias Walter Osborne, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 409

387 P.2d 409

153 Colo. 457

Joseph CORBETT, Jr., Alias Walter Osborne, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado.

No. 20057.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Nov. 18, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 30, 1963.

William H. Erickson, H. Malcolm Mackay, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Richard L. Eason, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant in error.

McWILLIAMS, Justice.

By direct information Joseph Corbett, Jr., alias Walter Osborne, was charged with the murder of Adolph Coors, III on February 9, 1960, to which charge Corbett pled not guilty. Upon trial a jury of his peers adjudged him to be guilty of murder in the first degree, fixing his punishment at life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary. By the present writ of error Corbett seeks reversal of the judgment and sentence entered thereon.

Although it is contended that the trial court committed error in some 103 particulars, in our view the dominant issue posed by this writ of error pertains to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. At the close of the People's case, Corbett moved for a directed verdict of not guilty for the announced reason that 'the evidence * * * is insufficient as a matter of law of justify the submission of the case to the jury.' This motion was denied, whereupon Corbett elected not to call witnesses in his own behalf, counsel declaring that 'the defendant stands on his motion and rests.'

Corbett contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of 'not guilty' and a fortiori that the judgment entered on the jury's determination that he was guilty of first degree murder cannot be permitted to stand and must therefore be set aside.

There is no serious contention that the People failed to establish the corpus delicti. Without recounting the grisly evidence in this regard at this point, we conclude that by evidence which was both direct and circumstantial in nature, the People proved, prima facie, that Coors died as the result of a criminal act.

The more precise issue is whether the People established, prima facie, that it was Corbett who committed the homicide. The evidence in this regard was virtually all circumstantial, there being no eye-witnesses to the homicidal act and the accused never having confessed thereto--a situation which frequently prevails in a criminal proceeding.

A thoughtful review of the record convinces us that there is ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered thereon, and this even though the evidence in the main is circumstantial in nature. To give meaning to this conclusion and to demonstrate its application to the situation before us, the evidence adduced upon trial must be summarized in some detail. Before doing so, however, it is deemed profitable to make some brief comment at the very outset as to the inherent nature of circumstantial evidence, and its standing in a criminal proceeding.

20 Am.Jur. Evidence, sec. 273, at p. 261 sets forth the general rule that 'whatever may be established by direct evidence in a criminal case may also be established by circumstantial evidence,' noting that 'the rule is one of necessity * * * [as] * * * only few convictions could be had if direct testimony of eyewitnesses were required.' This is a common sense rule necessitated by the obvious, i. e. crimes are frequently committed at a time and place where no observers are present and though some accused of a crime do 'confess', many others do not. This same authority then flatly declares that 'circumstantial evidence in criminal cases may be fully as satisfactory as positive testimony and will sometimes even outweigh it.'

As proof of the fact that the foregoing general rule is not of recent origin, but one of long standing, we quote with approval the remarks of Justice Park in his charge to the jury in the case of King v. John Thurtell (Jan. 1824), as such is set forth in a footnote in 2 Wheeler's Criminal Cases, page 462:

'The eye of Omniscience can alone see the truth in all cases; circumstantial evidence is there out of the question, but clothed as we are with the infirmities of human nature, how are we to get at the truth without a concatenation of circumstances? Though in human judicature, imperfect as it must necessarily be, it sometimes happens, perhaps in the course of one hundred years, that in a few solitary instances, owing to the minute and curious circumstances which sometimes envelope human transactions, error has been committed from a reliance on circumstantial evidence; yet this species of evidence, in the opinion of all those who are most conversant with the administration of justice, and most skilled in judicial proceedings, is much more satisfactory than the testimony of a single individual, who swears he has seen a fact committed.'

Colorado has recognized that circumstantial evidence 'is not always inferior in quality [to direct evidence] nor is it necessarily relegated to a 'second rate' status', and further that 'circumstantial evidence may be, and frequently is, most convincing and satisfactory.' Pena v. People, 147 Colo. 253, 363 P.2d 672 and Martinez v. People, 63 Colo. 347, 166 P. 241.

In Militello v. People, 95 Colo. 519, 37 P.2d 527 it was said

'The attacks upon much of this evidence, including the contention that it should have been stricken on defendant's motion, are based upon the theory that isolated statements do not prove definite facts. This is seldom possible and never essential. A case of circumstantial evidence can rarely be so constructed. Its very nature implies the weaving of a fabric of known facts, which, often infinitesimal or immaterial, or even prejudical when considered alone, become important only as they are tied to others and when so tied lead to inevitable conclusions as to facts in issue. * * *'

Having thus demonstrated that circumstantial evidence is no stranger in a court of law and that on the contrary it has both standing and statute, the next question posed is 'how much' circumstantial evidence is required to sustain a conviction in a criminal proceeding, be it for a homicide or otherwise. The answer thereto is the same quantum as in a criminal proceeding based on direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence, i. e. sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, no more, no less.

In Conferti v. People, 79 Colo. 666, 247 P. 1065, it was stated that to sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence:

'* * * [i]t is not true that circumstantial evidence must be such that no possible theory other than guilt can stand, but that the theory of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt, i. e., the circumstances must not be consistent with innocence within a reasonable doubt (16 C.J. 763-765), and the jury must decide. It cannot be possible that circumstantial evidence must amount to a mathematical demonstration while direct evidence need only go beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is conflicting, and the jury have decided.'

In like vein, it was stated in Militello v. People, supra, a criminal prosecution for arson based on circumstantial evidence, that:

'In prosecutions for arson the rule as to the proof of corpus delicti and intent is the same as in prosecutions for other crimes where direct evidence is relied on. * * * Exclusion of every 'possible theory other than guilt' is not required. * * * Exclusion of 'every other rational hypothesis,' which means reasonable hypothesis, is the test * * *.'

See, also, Gonzales v. People, 128 Colo. 522, 264 P.2d 508 and Davis v. People, 137 Colo. 113, 321 P.2d 1103.

In the light of these well-settled principles, what are the 'known facts' in the instant case which when 'tied' together led the jury to the conclusion that Corbett murdered Coors and because of their incriminating nature 'exclude every rational [i. e. reasonable] hypothesis other than [that] of guilt'? Let us examine the record.

Corbett, using the name of Walter Osborne, was employed by a Denyer paint company from March 19, 1956 to October 2, 1959, voluntarily terminating his employment on this latter date for the announced reason that 'he was going back to school.' A fellow employee testified that he and Corbett, known to him as Osborne, had several conversations wherein 'guns' and 'money' were the topic of their discussion. On one such occasion Corbett showed this witness a nine millimeter Llama automatic. Concerning 'money', this witness reported that Corbett on one occasion said that if 'he ever did something, it would be for a large amount of money--that he would never have to do it again.'

Another co-worker of Corbett's at the paint plant stated that Corbett had told him about 'his trips back into the hills', how he liked to go down through old gold mines and also hunt for small game near Central City and the Air Force Academy, and that on one occasion he [Corbett] had seen a large bear with a maimed foot or paw somewhere near the Academy premises.

This same witness testified that both he and Corbett were anxious to 'acquire a large sum of money' and that they had on occasion discussed ways and means of accomplishing such. In this regard Corbett was reported to have said that he had been 'planning something several years, two and one-half years, something very big--[that] it was not legal.' Corbett also reportedly declared that 'it would have to be several hundred thousand dollars to a million or it wouldn't be worth the risk, and that he [Corbett] had attempted to go into the venture the previous summer * * * that would be the summer of 1958 * * * [but] that something backfired during that time and he wasn't able to accomplish the fact.' Also, according to this witness, Corbett owned a .22 rifle and a hand pistol.

Finally, this same witness testified that once when he and Corbett were drinking some Coors beer Corbett 'mentioned something about the Coors...