Corbett v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: INGRAM
• Citation: Corbett v. State, 213 S.E.2d 652, 233 Ga. 756 (Ga. 1975)
• Decision Date: 18 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 29655,29655
• Parties: Eschol CORBETT, Jr., et al. v. The STATE.

Page 652

213 S.E.2d 652

233 Ga. 756

Eschol CORBETT, Jr., et al. v. The STATE.

No. 29655.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 18, 1975.

Dubignion Douglas, Dublin, for appellants.

Beverly B. Hayes, Dist. Atty., Dublin, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

INGRAM, Justice.

Appellants Eschol Corbett, Jr., and Virginia Murray were indicted with a third party on two counts of armed robbery. Appellant Corbett was found guilty of both counts and appellant Murray was found guilty of one count at their joint trial before a jury in Laurens Superior Court. Appellant Corbett received two sentences of 20 years imprisonment, to run concurrently, and appellant Murray received a sentence of 10 years imprisonment. This appeal complains that the trial court erred in denying appellants' post-conviction motion for a supersedeas bond and also erred in permitting the state to introduce evidence of prior convictions as to appellant Corbett during the sentencing phase of the trial. We affirmed as we find no error for any reason urged by appellants.

The trial court has discretion after conviction in felony cases to grant or deny bail. This discretion will not be controlled on appeal unless it has been abused. Appellants have made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Hardwick v. State, 131 Ga.App. 721, 206 S.E.2d 727.

The only other enumerated error relates to the admissibility of the prior convictions during the sentencing phase of the trial. A proper objection was made at the trial and overruled by the court. It is urged that notice of these convictions was not given by the state prior to trial. At the time this case was tried, Code Ann. § 27-2534 was applicable to it. This law provided that only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible at the sentencing phase of the trial.

In Gates v. State, 229 Ga. 796(4), 194 S.E.2d 412, 414 relied on by appellants, this court said: 'We believe that this statute means that notice of each specific conviction to be introduced in evidence by the State at the sentencing phase of the trial should be given to the party on trial or his attorney. And the fact that such notice was given should be clear and not cloudy, as in this case.'

However, the issue here is not whether the notice was clear but whether it was timely. The record shows this case was called for trial on a Friday afternoon, during the recess of a trial in another criminal case, for the sole purpose of selecting a jury with the actual trial to begin on the following day. The district attorney wrote on a yellow sheet of legal paper some notice that he expected to introduce several prior convictions of appellant Corbett and handed it to defense counsel. The jury was sworn and excused until the following day. There is a dispute between counsel as to whether this notice was given defense counsel before or after the jury was sworn on Friday afternoon. However, on the following day when court convened for the trial, the district attorney handed defense counsel copies of the written evidence of prior convictions he expected to introduce and defense counsel agrees these were in proper form. At that time, defense counsel made a motion to continue the case until the following Monday morning on grounds unrelated to the notice of prior convictions. The trial court granted the motion and all persons...