Corbin v. Apfel
| Decision Date | 28 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-15489,97-15489 |
| Citation | 149 F.3d 1051 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 16056B, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5814, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8073 Judy CORBIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, * Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Richard E. Donaldson, Las Vegas, Nevada, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael R. Power, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, California, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court * for the District of Nevada Lloyd D. George, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00327-LDG.
Before: BROWNING and SNEED, Circuit Judges, and ZAPATA, ** District Judge.
Judy Corbin appeals the district court's denial of her request in a Social Security disability action for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. Corbin argues that, in considering her fee request, the district court erred by focusing on whether the government's position as to the question of her disability was substantially justified. Instead, she claims that the court should have focused on whether the government's decision to defend on appeal procedural errors made by the Administrative Law Judge who reviewed her case was substantially justified. Because the errors made by the ALJ--a failure to make key findings and weigh basic evidence--were fundamental to the decision-making process at the agency level, we agree, and reverse and remand to the district court.
§ 2412(d). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Judy Corbin ("Corbin") filed a claim for Social Security Disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income with the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner"). At the time of the claim, Corbin was 39 years old, but claimed a variety of ailments which allegedly prohibited her from engaging in regular work. The claim for benefits was ultimately denied by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") assigned to the case.
The district court affirmed the ALJ decision, and Corbin appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Corbin v. Chater, No. 95-15482, 1996 WL 396726 (9th Cir.1996). This court, in an unpublished memorandum disposition, reversed and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further hearings because it found that the ALJ committed two errors. Specifically, the ALJ failed to determine whether Corbin's testimony regarding "excess pain" she suffered as a result of her medical problems was credible, and whether one of her doctors--who had ordered her to lift no more than five pounds--had intended the lifting restriction to be temporary or permanent.
Corbin then filed a motion in district court for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). That statute states that a court shall award fees to a prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The district court denied the motion on the grounds that the ALJ did not lack evidence regarding the two issues in which it failed to make determinations. Rather, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate that evidence. The district court then held that when there is "some evidence" supporting the original denial of benefits the government's position is "substantially justified" and fees are not warranted. This timely appeal ensued.
This court reviews a district court's denial of an EAJA claim for abuse of discretion. Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1996).
"Substantial justification" under the EAJA means that the government's position must have a reasonable basis in law and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (); Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir.1988). Substantial justification does not mean "justified to a high degree," but simply entails that the government must show that its position meets the traditional reasonableness standard--that it is "justified in substance or in the main," or "to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541. The government's position must be "substantially justified" at "each stage of the proceedings." Williams v. Bowen, 966 F.2d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir.1991).
On this much the parties agree. Their conflict hinges not on the determination of the proper test, but rather on the question of what government position it is that the court must examine in search of "substantial justification." The Commissioner argues that the government's position as to whether Corbin is actually disabled is what is truly at issue. Corbin asserts that the court should look to the government's decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors committed by the ALJ.
Corbin's position is correct. See Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918, 921-22 (9th Cir.1996) (); Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569-71 (9th Cir.1995) ().
The Commissioner's position, one shared by the district court, is an accurate interpretation of what was previously considered the law of this circuit. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir.1985) (); Wolverton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.1984) ().
However, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Shalala v....
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Table of cases
...La. Jan. 10, 1995), § 1210.5 Copes v. Chater , 983 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D. Mo. 1997), §§ 105.5, 204.8, 208.1, 1105.8 Corbin v. Apfel , 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998), 9th-08, § 702.4 Corchado v. Shalala , 953 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D. Mass. 1996), §§ 105.2, 107.12, 205.2, 205.5 Cordero v. ......
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Table of Cases
...La. Jan. 10, 1995), § 1210.5 Copes v. Chater , 983 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D. Mo. 1997), §§ 105.5, 204.8, 208.1, 1105.8 Corbin v. Apfel , 149 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998), 9th-08, § 702.4 Corchado v. Shalala , 953 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D. Mass. 1996), §§ 105.2, 107.12, 205.2, 205.5 Cordero v. ......