Corbin v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., C-77-0029-CBR.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. C-77-0029-CBR.,C-77-0029-CBR.
• Citation: 432 F. Supp. 939
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Walter E. CORBIN, Plaintiff, v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., a corporation, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 655, Defendants.

432 F. Supp. 939

Walter E. CORBIN, Plaintiff, v. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC., a corporation, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 655, Defendants.

No. C-77-0029-CBR.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

May 25, 1977.

Robert H. Cashman, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.

Robert S. Venning, Robert T. Haslam, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Pan American.

Kenneth N. Silbert, Brundage, Beeson, Tayer & Kovach, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Teamsters.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RENFREW, District Judge.

This action stems from the events surrounding plaintiff's demotion nearly eight years ago on October 31, 1969. Plaintiff alleges that the demotion and other continuing acts of defendant Pan American World Airways, Inc. ("Pan Am"), violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq., because those acts discriminated against him on the basis of race. He brings a second claim pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging that Pan Am breached its collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America ("Local 655"). Plaintiff brings a third claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 alleging that Local 655 breached its statutory duty under the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., to represent him fairly in union grievance proceedings. Defendant Pan Am filed a motion for summary judgment which has been joined in by defendant Local 655.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been employed by Pan Am since April 20, 1966. At various times during the past eleven years, he has served as either a Service Supply Clerk ("Clerk") or a Lead Service Supply Clerk ("Lead Clerk"). Although plaintiff now serves as a Lead Clerk, he contends that because of his race, he was wrongfully denied a Lead Clerk's position from November 1969 until his December 1976 promotion.

Promotion to the position of Lead Clerk is governed by the policies contained in Article 9 of the Union Agreement between Pan Am and Local 655.¹ In order to appreciate fully the nature of plaintiff's complaint, an understanding of the promotions policy is required. Article 9 sets out detailed procedures whereby any employee may bid for a job classification of higher rank when it is posted as a vacancy by the company. After a vacancy is posted for five days, the position is awarded to the "most senior qualified bidder." According to Pan Am's Director of Employee Relations at San Francisco International Airport, because virtually every Clerk satisfies the minimum qualifications required of a Lead Clerk, in practice, the higher position is simply awarded to the most senior employee who bids within the five days.

In December 1967, plaintiff bid on a Lead Clerk opening and was awarded the position in accordance with the Article 9 procedures. But, on October 31, 1969, faced with adverse economic conditions, Pan Am demoted plaintiff and the three other most junior Lead Clerks in an effort to consolidate its Supply Service. Subsequent to the 1969 demotion plaintiff did not bid on any Lead Clerk vacancy until July 6, 1976. At that time, plaintiff was denied the available position because a more senior employee also bid. On plaintiff's second bid since the demotion, made in December 1976, he was awarded the Lead Clerk's position which he currently occupies.

Plaintiff first challenged the legality of the demotion through the grievance procedures provided for in the union agreement. Along with two of the other demoted Lead Clerks, plaintiff instituted a grievance action contending that their demotions breached the collective bargaining agreement and that, although officially, demoted, they were still being required by Pan Am to perform the tasks of a Lead Clerk but for a Clerk's salary. A System Adjustment Board, composed of two union and two company representatives as called for by Article 19 of the union agreement, deadlocked on whether to uphold the grievance. After further unsuccessful efforts to resolve the dispute, an impartial referee was appointed to reach a final decision. The referee's September 5, 1974, decision upheld the demotions as valid under the collective bargaining agreement. However, the referee did find that plaintiff continued to perform as a de facto Lead Clerk for thirty days following his 1969 demotion and ordered that he be compensated accordingly. The other two grievants were not awarded any back pay.

On April 22, 1975, approximately seven months after the referee's final decision, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), contending that he had been demoted and denied reinstatement to the position of Lead Clerk because of his race, that he continued to perform in a Lead Clerk's capacity at a Clerk's rate of pay and that Local 655 had failed to provide him with fair representation during the grievance procedures because of his race. On October 19, 1976, plaintiff received a "Right to Sue Letter" from the EEOC. This suit was then filed on January 5, 1977.

II. LMRA CLAIMS

Plaintiff's second and third claims against Pan Am and Local alleging violations under the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Although overlooked by the parties, it is well established that labor disputes between air carriers and their employee unions are governed by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., as made applicable to air carriers by 45 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. Dones v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 408 F.Supp. 1044, 1045-1046 (D.P.R.1975); American Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America International, AFL-CIO, 202 F.Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y.1962). As noted above, Article 19 of the Pan Am-Local 655 union agreement explicitly states that labor disputes are to be resolved pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.

Federal courts do not have jurisdiction over actions brought pursuant to the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., where the parties involved are common carriers and employees governed by the Railway Labor Act. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. United Transportation Union, 471 F.2d 8, 9 (6 Cir. 1972); Dones v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., supra, 408 F.Supp. at 1046; Bell v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 58 F.R.D. 566, 568-569 (S.D. W.Va.1973); Bruno v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 229 F.Supp. 716 (D.Mass.1964). The reason for the above rule is no mystery — the LMRA explicitly excludes employees and employers governed by the Railway Labor Act from its provisions. Section 2 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 142, provides:

"When used in this chapter —

* * * * * *

"(3) The terms * * * `employer', `employee', * * * shall have the same meaning as when used in subchapter II of this chapter as amended by this chapter."

In subchapter II, section 101 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152, provides:

"When used in this subchapter —

* * * * * *

"(2) The term `employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include * * * any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time * * *.

"(3) The term `employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include * * * any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time * * *."

An employee governed by the provisions of the Railway Labor Act may assert a breach of the duty of fair representation against the union under that statute. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, 401 F.2d 87 (3 Cir. 1966). And in certain cases where it is alleged that the employer has acted in conjunction with the union to discriminate against employees, the employer is properly joined in the action. See Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29, 90 S.Ct. 770, 25 L.Ed.2d 21 (1970); Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 393 U.S. 324, 328-329, 89 S.Ct. 548, 21 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). But neither of these principles can be brought to bear in an action where plaintiff seeks to invoke jurisdiction under the LMRA. Accordingly, plaintiff's second and third claims will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

III. TITLE VII CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Pan Am discriminated against him on the basis of race by (1) reclassifying and demoting him in 1969, (2) failing to promote him to Lead Clerk on at least four occasions when that position became available after 1969, and (3) requiring him to perform the same work as six non-black employees but for a lower rate of pay. Defendant Pan Am contends that plaintiff's Title VII claims must be either dismissed or disposed of by summary judgment because (1) plaintiff's EEOC claim was not filed within the 90-day statute of limitation in effect at the time of the alleged discriminatory act in 1969,² (2) Pan Am's failure to promote plaintiff until December 1976 was not racially motivated but was proper since prior to that date, plaintiff was never the "most senior qualified bidder", and (3) plaintiff fails to allege facts which state a valid claim of discriminatory compensation because of his race.

Although plaintiff previously submitted two of these Title VII claims to arbitration, he is entitled to a de novo review of the claims by the federal courts, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), which is...