Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., C-1637

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Citation: 648 S.W.2d 292
• Docket Number: No. C-1637,C-1637
• Parties: Gary CORBIN, Petitioner, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Respondent.
• Decision Date: 06 April 1983

Page 292

648 S.W.2d 292 Gary CORBIN, Petitioner,
v.
SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Respondent. No. C-1637. Supreme Court of Texas. April 6, 1983.

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Crawford, Grissom, Crow & Richards, Carl Crow, Kenneth C. Raney, Jr., Houston, for petitioner.

Art Stone, Dallas, for respondent.

SPEARS, Justice.

Gary Corbin sued Safeway Stores, Inc. ("Safeway") for damages resulting from personal injuries he suffered when he slipped on a grape and fell in a Safeway produce aisle. The trial court granted Safeway's motion for directed verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for Safeway. (Opinion unpublished pursuant to Rule 452 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.) We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial.

In October 1977 Gary Corbin slipped on a grape or grapes directly in front of the self-service grape bin in a Safeway produce aisle and fell on the store's green linoleum tile floor. While sprawled on the floor, he noticed several ruptured and discolored grapes lying around him. He saw no mat or other floor covering of any kind in the area where he fell. As a result of the fall, Corbin injured the collateral ligaments and the kneecap of his right knee. He was hospitalized and underwent surgery to repair the damaged knee.

At trial, a store manager trainee and a district manager of Safeway testified that company policy required each store to keep large non-skid, non-slip walk-off mats in front of the grape display. According to these two employees, the reason for this requirement was that Safeway recognized that customers frequently either knock grapes off their stems or drop them, creating a great risk that someone will subsequently step on a slippery grape peel and fall on the linoleum floor. Safeway required mats in front of its grape bin displays because it knew from experience that the grape bin was an unusually hazardous and continual source of slippery material on which customers may fall. The mats were

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considered necessary because store employees were unable adequately to supervise the floor to ensure that it remained free of grapes.

The question presented is whether an invitee who sustains personal injuries from slipping and falling in a store may recover damages by introducing evidence that a proximate cause of the fall was the storeowner's failure to use reasonable care to protect its customers from the known and unusually high risks accompanying customer usage of a self-service display of goods. We hold that such proof establishes a right to have a jury determine the storeowner's liability, even in the absence of evidence showing the storeowner's actual or constructive knowledge of the presence on the floor of the specific object causing the fall.

The directed verdict in this case can be upheld only if the record contains no evidence of probative force to raise material fact questions. See Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex.1978). In reviewing the directed verdict, we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to Corbin, discarding all contrary evidence and inferences. See id.; Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.1976). If reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of the controlling facts, jury issues exist, and the directed verdict cannot stand. Id.

In Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Tex.1972), this court accepted Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) as a summary description of the duty of reasonable care that an occupier of premises owes to invitees. Section 343 provides,

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, ¹ and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Thus, when an occupier has actual or constructive knowledge of any condition on the premises that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to invitees, he has a duty to take whatever action is reasonably prudent under the circumstances to reduce or to eliminate the unreasonable risk from that condition. The occupier is considered to have constructive knowledge of any premises defects or other dangerous conditions that a reasonably careful inspection would reveal. Adam Dante Corp. v. Dante, 483 S.W.2d at 455.

In subsequent cases, we emphasized that an invitee's suit against a store owner is a simple negligence action. See Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536, 537 (Tex.1975); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex.1978). As a result, the standard of conduct required of a premises occupier toward his invitees is the ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under all the pertinent circumstances. Section 343 simply tailors the traditional test of the conduct of a reasonably prudent person to a specific category of defendants, namely, premises occupiers. Consequently, an occupier's liability to an invitee depends on whether he acted reasonably in light of what he knew or should have known about the risks accompanying a premises condition, not on whether a specific set of facts or a specific breach of duty is established.

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In this case, Corbin was Safeway's invitee. See, e.g., Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex.1975). To recover from Safeway, therefore, Corbin had the burden to prove (1) that Safeway had actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises; (2) that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Corbin; (3) that Safeway did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or to eliminate the risk; and (4) that...