Corbitt v. Corbitt

Decision Date22 July 2022
Docket Number2200786
PartiesJohn Carlton Corbitt v. Sara Renee Galyon Corbitt
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court (DR-19-900148.01)

HANSON, Judge.

John Carlton Corbitt ("the father") appeals from a judgment entered by the Morgan Circuit Court ("the trial Court") modifying an earlier judgment entered by the 22d Judicial Circuit of Missouri ("the Missouri court") that dissolved the marriage of the father and Sara Renee Galyon Corbitt ("the mother"). The trial court's judgment, among other things, awarded the mother sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties' children, A.J.C. and C.W.E.C. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the cause.

Background

On February 15, 2013, the Missouri court entered a judgment that divorced the parties ("the divorce judgment"). The divorce judgment awarded the parties joint custody of the children, who were born on August 21, 2004, and June 29 2009, respectively; further, the father was ordered to pay the mother child support in the amount of $879 per month. It also contained provisions governing the parties' respective custodial periods. After the parties divorced, the parties relocated to Tipton County, Tennessee. Thereafter the father filed in the Tipton County Chancery Court ("the Tennessee court") a petition to modify his child-support obligation, averring that he had been laid off from his employment. The Tennessee court reduced the father's child-support obligation to $650 per month. Subsequently, each party relocated to Morgan County.

In February 2020, the mother filed in the trial court a petition to modify the custody award, the father's child-support obligation, and the provisions governing the parties' respective custodial periods that had been included in the divorce judgment. The mother asserted in her petition that the father had been "purposefully underemployed in an effort to keep his child-support at a lower rate" and that the parties' sharing of joint custody of the children was not working because, the mother said, the parties could not agree on educational, extracurricular, and medical matters regarding the children. The father filed an answer to the mother's petition and a counterclaim requesting that he be awarded sole physical custody of the children and an amount of monthly child support calculated pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin. The father subsequently, filed an amended counterclaim requesting that the trial court hold the mother in contempt for violating the divorce judgment by preventing A.J.C. from visiting with the father.

On April 15, 2021, a trial was conducted. Before testimony was taken, the trial court reiterated its understanding of an agreement the parties had reached about the children giving testimony. Thereafter, the trial court stated the following:

"I can't be present when I'm not in this courtroom with you and your children at your home, but what my preference is is that you leave their testimony alone so they don't have to repeat it to you. … Your attorney will be in there to guide the testimony as best that they can[,] best[] as best [sic] that anybody can when someone else testifies. So any kind of punishment or retribution or even prying into what [the children] testified to should be avoided and, you know, if the [children] -- hopefully whatever we do here will get things back on track and y'all will never have to use the court system again. … So if you have to come back, and I learn from the [children] that they were pried into after they were asked to testify, put forth to testify, then, obviously, that would play into how the Court would view, you know, whatever parenting skills might be up for grabs or up for trial, so just try to avoid that."

In confirming the trial court's understanding of the parties' agreement, the mother's counsel stated: "Your Honor, I think we've come to an agreement that with respect to the children testifying that we would consent to have that done without the parties present." The mother's counsel clarified that each party's counsel, along with the court reporter, would be present while the children testified. The trial court allowed for a response from the father's counsel, and the father's counsel responded: "Just other than [sic] we would invoke the rule and so forth, have all of the witnesses other than the parties outside."

The father brought forth three witnesses, who all claimed to be observers of the father's relationship with the children. One witness, William Corbitt, who is the children's paternal grandfather, testified that the father had spent as much time as possible with the children and that the children had seemed to enjoy their time with the father. Corbitt testified that it had been approximately one year since he had last seen A.J.C. spend time with the father but that C.W.E.C. had continued to visit with the father. The other two witnesses, Chris Herbison and Mike St. Pierre, testified that they had observed the father's interactions with the children. Herbison testified that the father's parenting style was "nothing out of the ordinary" and that the father was a disciplined and responsible adult who loved the children and wanted "nothing but the best for his children." St. Pierre testified that he had witnessed the father correcting the children whenever they had done something wrong but added that the father had never raised his voice when doing so. According to St. Pierre, the father always explained to the children what they had done wrong before punishing them. One of the punishments that St. Pierre had observed the father implement on the children was requiring them to perform push-ups.

The father's testimony centered mainly on A.J.C.'s refusal to visit with him. The father claimed that the mother had "poisoned" the minds of the children and that that was the reason that A.J.C. refused to visit with him. According to the father, the mother or the children's maternal grandmother had bribed A.J.C. by offering to purchase a vehicle for his use if he did not visit with the father. The father also contended that the mother was unwilling to coparent because, he said, the mother did not agree with his ideas or decisions about the children's education, health care, and religious training. The father argued that the mother did not discipline the children, especially A.J.C., enough or as forcefully as she should. The father further testified that the mother had supported A.J.C.'s idea of attending a vocational school instead of a college or university. Finally, the father testified that he had never been purposefully underemployed and that his current annual salary was $80,000.

The mother testified that she was employed part-time as the Director of Faith Formation for the Messiah Lutheran Church in Madison and earned an annual salary of $22,500. The mother added that she earned an additional $3,600 per year from that same church because she had performed data administration for the church as well. The mother testified that she was a candidate to become a deacon in the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which, she said, would allow her to become a full-time employee. However, at the time of trial, the mother was still a part-time employee at Messiah Lutheran Church, and she stated that she occasionally took care of dogs for extra income. Although the mother testified that she had earned extra income from taking care of dogs in the year the trial took place, the mother clarified that she was not guaranteed that income every year going forward.

In response to the father's contention that she had prevented A.J.C. from visiting with the father, the mother testified that she had actually encouraged A.J.C. to visit with the father or, at the very least, to spend time with the father at an archery range. The mother further explained that she had not bribed A.J.C. by promising him a vehicle if he did not visit the father; rather, the mother testified, she had been contemplating providing A.J.C. with a vehicle so that he could, among other things, drive himself to visit with the father.

The mother further testified that C.W.E.C. had been tested and accepted into an educational program for gifted students. According to the mother, that program would have allowed C.W.E.C. to engage in projects and activities that a regular school curriculum did not include.

The school attended by C.W.E.C. had required both parents to consent to his being taken out of class for three hours per week to engage in the program activities. However, according to the mother, the father believed that the program was a waste of time and allowed C.W.E.C. only to observe the other students in the program as they performed program projects and activities.

Additionally the mother testified that, at school, A.J.C. had made a remark about a firearm and that he had been reported to school administrators based on that remark. A school-resource officer then went to both parties' homes to perform home visits. Because A.J.C. had been suspended from school, the home visits were necessary for A.J.C. to be allowed to return to school. The school-resource officer inspected the mother's home for any weapons. The mother did not have any firearms in her home and did not resist the school-resource officer's inspection of her home. In contrast, according to the mother, the father possessed firearms in his home, and he initially forbade the officer's inspection of his home. Because the father did not initially allow the school-resource officer to inspect his home, A.J.C. was not immediately allowed to return to school; only after several weeks had passed did the father allow the school-resource officer to inspect his home to facilitate A.J.C.'s return to...

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