Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 16158,16158
• Citation: 730 P.2d 1005,112 Idaho 85
• Parties: , 64 A.L.R.4th 1, 55 USLW 2384, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,234 Shane L. CORBRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, and John and Jane Does I Through X and John Does Corporation I Through V, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1005

730 P.2d 1005

112 Idaho 85, 64 A.L.R.4th 1, 55 USLW 2384,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,234

Shane L. CORBRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, and John and Jane Does I Through X and John Does Corporation I Through V, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 16158.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Dec. 19, 1986.

John Souza, of the firm Whittier & Souza, Pocatello, for plaintiff-appellant.

John R. Goodell (argued), and William D. Olsen, of the firm Racine, Olsen, Nye, Cooper & Budge, Pocatello, for defendants-respondents.

Before DONALDSON, C.J., SHEPARD and BISTLINE, JJ., and McFADDEN and McQUADE, JJ. Pro Tem.

PER CURIAM.

On January 5, 1982, Mr. Corbridge was severely injured while operating a forklift/loader manufactured by defendant Clark Equipment Company. He was steering the loader as it was being towed by a tractor over a rough railroad crossing through a new snowfall of 18 to 24 inches. Mr. Corbridge was sitting in the driver's seat but was not wearing the seatbelt. Prior to the accident, the loader had become stuck in the snow several times.

While attempting to cross the railroad crossing, after violenting rocking back and forth several times, the loader rolled directly forward landing upside down and throwing Corbridge partially out of the driver's seat. The protective cage which surrounds the driver landed on top of Corbridge's legs and severely injured them.

The loader was manufactured by Clark Equipment in 1977 and sold the same year to Foulger Equipment of Pocatello. Foulger leased the machine to various parties until July of 1978 when it sold the loader to Farmer's Grain Cooperative, Mr. Corbridge's employer at the time of the accident. Farmers used the loader to load and unload grain, clean up grain spills and move railroad grain cars. Mr. Corbridge began working for Farmer's in February or March of 1980. He was taught how to operate and drive the loader by another Farmer's employee.

On June 24, 1983, Mr. Corbridge filed a products liability action against Clark which alleged negligent design, manufacture and labeling. Clark filed a motion for summary judgment based solely on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations, I.C. §§ 6-1403(3) and 5-219(4), barred the action. The district court denied the motion holding that the action was timely because the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run on the date of injury in 1982, not on the date of manufacture in 1977.

Clark filed a second motion for summary judgment challenging the merits of the case and again raised the statute of limitations as a defense. In the interim, this Court decided the case of Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984). Upon the facts presented in Wing, it was stated that the statute of limitations for a wrongful labeling cause of action begins to run at the time of sale of the mislabeled product, not at the time when the buyer suffers actual injury. As a result, Judge McDermott believed he had little choice but to grant the motion time-barring plaintiff's cause of action based on a mislabeling theory. In addition, he ruled in favor of defendant Clark Equipment on the merits, holding that Mr. Corbridge had not established sufficient facts, through affidavits or otherwise, to resist Clark's motion. The trial court also ruled, as a matter of law, that the loader was being misused in a manner for which it was not designed at the time of Mr. Corbridge's accident. This appeal ensued.

Plaintiff raises essentially three issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that towing the Bobcat in deep snow over a rough railroad crossing established the affirmative defense of product misuse? (2) Whether the court erred in ruling that plaintiff had not established facts sufficient to create a material issue of fact? (3) Whether the court erred in ruling that the statute of limitations on a failure to warn or properly label cause of action begins to run at the time of sale? Affirming on the first two issues, we need not pass on the statute of limitations issue.

A motion for summary judgment generally presents only matters of law. On appeal, we review the record only in order to ascertain that there is no genuine triable issue of material fact. In doing so we construe the record most favorably to the party against whom the motion is directed. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469-70, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241-42 (1986); Boise Car & Truck Rental Co. v. Waco, Inc., 108 Idaho 780, 781, 702 P.2d 818 (1985).

We first consider whether the affirmative defense of product misuse was established as a matter of law. The Idaho Products Liability Reform Act, I.C. § 6-1405(3)(a) defines misuse of a product as follows:

"Misuse" occurs when the product user does not act in a manner that would be expected of an ordinary reasonably prudent person who is likely to use the product in the same or similar circumstances.

Product misuse is an affirmative defense in an action against the manufacturer; in addition, the manufacturer has no duty to foresee, protect or warn against product misuse. McBride v. Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 761, 673 P.2d 55, 63 (1983).

The deposition testimony of Mr. Corbridge was that the ordinary uses of the machine were to load and unload grain, clean up grain spills and to push railroad cars. However, plaintiff's counsel argues that the presence of a hook on the loader, which was used to attach a tow chain on the day of the accident, indicates that towing was a proper use of the machine.

Viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, these facts support a conclusion that the machine was intended to be towed. However, plaintiff's counsel has overlooked the essential point that it was not towing per se which was a misuse, but towing through deep snow over a rough railroad crossing with an abrupt incline which constituted the precise misuse. Testimony to the effect that the loader had a short wheel base also supports the conclusion that the machine was not fashioned suitably for towing under the "circumstances" here present. I.C. § 6-1405(3)(a).

While the language defining misuse in I.C. § 6-1405(3)(a) creates a jury question where the undisputed facts lead to only one reasonable conclusion the court may rule as a matter of law. Mico Mobile Sales & Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 412-13, 546 P.2d 54, 58-59 (1975) (involved foreseeability of a superseding cause). Here we cannot say the trial court erred.

Next, we discuss whether the plaintiff established facts sufficient to create a material issue of fact on the issues of defective design, manufacture, and inspection. Whether a products liability action is predicated on negligence or strict liability, the plaintiff must prove (1) injury, (2) that the injury was proximately caused by a defect, (3) that the defect existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer. Farmer v. International Harvester, 97 Idaho 742, 746-47, 553 P.2d 1306, 1310-11 (1976). To prove a prima facie case, a plaintiff must not only show that the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, but there must be a lack of evidence of abnormal use and the absence of evidence of reasonable secondary causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant. Id. at 747, 553 P.2d at 1311. I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides in relevant part:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.

It is well settled that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 549, 691 P.2d 787, 795 (Ct.App.1984), review den. (1985). This Court has held:

Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362, 368 (1969) (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1234, p. 133 (Rules ed. 1958). (Emphasis original.)

In this case, Clark Equipment's brief in support of its summary judgment motion was accompanied by a diagram of the loader as it was when it left the control of the manufacturer. The diagram established the presence of a sign warning the user to fasten the...