Corcino-Rodriguez v. State Ins. Fund Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: 10-1405 (MEL) |
| Parties | VIRGEN M. CORCINO-RODRIGUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE INSURANCE FUND CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
On May 14, 2010, plaintiffs Virgen M. Corcino-Rodríguez ("Corcino") and Myriam Burgos Ocaña ("Burgos") (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, inter alios, defendants State Insurance Fund Corporation ("SIFC"), Zoimé Álvarez-Rubio ("Álvarez"), and Saúl Rivera-Rivera ("Rivera") (collectively, "defendants"). (D.E. 1). Plaintiffs allege claims under the First Amendment for political discrimination, the Due Process Clause,1 and the Equal Protection Clause,2 as well as claims for violations of the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 21, 2012, under the doctrine known as Younger abstention. (D.E. 54). Defendants filed a supplemental motion on April 12, 2012, also on the issue of abstention.3 (D.E. 58). In said motion, defendants brought to the attention of the court a grant of certiorari by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in González-Segarra, et al. v. StateInsurance Fund Corporation, Civ. No. CC-2011-01051, KLRA 201100611. (D.E. 58, at 2). Without explicitly referring to the doctrine of abstention established by Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), defendants argued that "[p]laintiffs' claims in this case are centered on this issue and the same set of facts of González-Segarra, and will depend on the judgment issued by the Supreme Court." Id. One of the issues that will be addressed by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, according to defendants, is "the validity of the nullification of the appointments of twenty three (23) employees, who like Plaintiffs', were appointed through a [sic] 'internal' announcement procedure." Id.
A court may choose to stay a case under the Pullman doctrine if the case meets a two-part test: "(1) substantial uncertainty exists over the meaning of the state law in question, and (2) settling the question of state law will or may well obviate the need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question." Batterman v. Leahy, 544 F.3d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 2008). On October 23, 2012, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground of Pullman abstention because defendants failed to meet the first prong.4 (D.E. 154, at 7-8). Specifically, defendants failed to identify which Puerto Rico provision or law was ambiguous or had a substantially uncertain meaning, much less the nature of the ambiguity or uncertainty.
On February 7, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded a separate case with instructions to stay proceedings pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision in González Segarra. Casiano-Montañez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., No. 12-1453, 2013 WL 494354 (1st Cir. Feb. 7, 2013). Defendants and plaintiffs have filed briefs on the issue of whether the First Circuit's decision is applicable in the instant case. (D.E. 164; 165; 166). Following theFirst Circuit's decision in Casiano-Montañez, this court determines upon reconsideration of its previous order (D.E. 154), for the reasons set forth below, that the proceedings of the instant case shall be stayed pending the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision in González Segarra.
Casiano-Montañez and the instant case arise out of the same broad set of facts.5 Álvarez became the Administrator of the SIFC on January 2, 2009, shortly after elections in Puerto Rico. Álvarez ordered an audit of personnel appointments made at the SIFC between 2001 and 2008. This investigation revealed that 232 appointments had been made through internal job postings rather than external announcements. On October 8, 2009, attorney José Roberto Feijoo drafted a legal opinion at the behest of SIFC indicating that "'internal job announcements' permitted under the SIFC's Personnel Regulations first require an extensive written 'marketing plan and audit of positions' by the Administrator of the SIFC." (D.E. 1, ¶ 59; D.E. 1 in Civ. No. 11-1002 (DRD), ¶ 119). Plaintiffs in both Casiano-Montañez and the instant case were among those persons who received notices of intent to dismiss as a result of this audit. Specifically, Álvarez sent a memorandum dated January 8, 2010, to plaintiffs in both cases informing them of SIFC's intent to declare their appointments null and void because they had been conducted through internal job announcements, rather than external ones, allegedly in violation of the "merit principle" espoused in the Public Service Human Resources Administration Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 1461-1462h. (D.E. 1, ¶¶ 49, 62; D.E. 81-1, ¶ 38; D.E. 88-2, ¶ 38; D.E. 1 in Civ. No. 11-1002 (DRD), ¶¶ 115, 122); Casiano-Montañez, 2013 WL 494354, at *1.
The SIFC offered informal administrative hearings to plaintiffs in both cases. Each plaintiff requested a hearing. After the hearings, the SIFC affirmed Álvarez's decision with respect to each plaintiff. All of the plaintiffs in both cases were terminated or demoted between March and September of 2010. Each plaintiff, except for Corcino, filed administrative appeals before the SIFC's Board of Appeals. (D.E. 1, ¶¶ 67, 71; D.E. 81-1, ¶¶ 62, 65, 68-69; D.E. 88-2, ¶¶ 62, 65, 68-69; D.E. 1 in Civ. No. 11-1002 (DRD), ¶¶ 27-98, 126); Casiano-Montañez, 2013 WL 494354, at *1.
The causes of action in both cases, as alleged in the complaints, are substantially identical.6 In both cases, plaintiffs allege that their adverse employment decisions constituted political discrimination and procedural due process violations. "In order to establish a procedural due process claim under section 1983, a plaintiff 'must allege first that it has a property interest as defined by state law and, second, that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived it of that property interest without constitutionally adequate process.'" Marrero-Gutiérrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting PFZ Props., Inc. v. Rodríguez, 928 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1991)). Thus, in support of their due process claims, plaintiffs allege that they had property interests in their SIFC positions under Puerto Rico law, and were not provided with constitutionally adequate process when they were deprived of said positions. (D.E. 1, ¶¶ 94-103; D.E. 1 in Civ. No. 11-1002 (DRD), ¶¶ 151-59).
As the First Circuit noted, the SIFC's "decision to nullify the appointments made pursuant to internal hiring calls has spawned numerous other lawsuits in both Puerto Rico andfederal courts." Casiano-Montañez, 2013 WL 494354, at *1. As here, the plaintiffs in one such case, González Segarra, "argued that internal hiring calls were legal, that their due process rights were violated, and that political discrimination motivated their dismissals or demotions." Id. The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals determined that the appointments were valid, but that the petitioners had failed to establish a due process violation or a prima facie case of political discrimination. Certiorari to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has been granted in González Segarra; the case has been fully briefed and awaits decision. Ultimately, the First Circuit concluded that a stay was appropriate due to the pending case before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.
As an initial matter, "it is well settled that the pendency of an action in state court is not a per se bar to related federal court proceedings." Id. Rather, "federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them.'" Id. (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Nevertheless, "[t]his duty ... is not absolute." Id. In particular, under the doctrine of abstention set forth in Pullman, when a "'federal constitutional challenge turns on a state statute, the meaning of which is unclear under state law' ... a federal court ... 'should stay its hand in order to provide the state court an opportunity to settle the underlying state-law question and thus avoid the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.'" Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith Motor Co., Inc., 257 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris County Com'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 (1975)). Pullman abstention is a discretionary doctrine. See Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Caño Martín Peña v. Fortuño, 604 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1600, 179 L. Ed. 2d 499 (U.S. 2011); Currie v. Group Ins. Comm'n, 290 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2002). This doctrine "serves a dual purpose: it avoids the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of apremature constitutional adjudication." Ford Motor Co., 257 F.3d at 71 (internal quotations omitted). As discussed above, two elements must be met for a court to choose to stay a case under the Pullman doctrine: "(1) substantial uncertainty exists over the meaning of the state law in question, and (2) settling the question of state law will or may well obviate the need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question." Batterman, 544 F.3d at 373.
The guarantee of procedural due process in the U.S. Constitution protects persons from deprivations of property by the state without due process of law. Nonetheless, "property interests are not defined by the Constitution." Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 334 (1st Cir. 1992). "'Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law ....'" Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). As such, "[i]n order for plaintiffs to have procedural due process rights in their employment, each plaintiff must have had a reasonable expectation, based on a statute, policy, rule, or contract, that he or she would continue to be employed." Concepción Chaparro v....
To continue reading
Request your trial