Corcoran v. Bos. Sci.

• Decision Date: 16 February 2022
• Docket Number: 20-CV-603S
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York
• Parties: PAMELA CORCORAN, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON SCIENTIFIC, Defendant.

PAMELA CORCORAN, Plaintiff,
v.
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC, Defendant.

No. 20-CV-603S

United States District Court, W.D. New York

February 16, 2022

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, United States District Judge.

I. Introduction

This is an employment action where Plaintiff, Pamela Corcoran, alleges her former employer, Boston Scientific, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII"), for sex discrimination and retaliation; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 121132 ("ADA"), for disability discrimination and retaliation; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Plaintiff claims Defendant reassigned her from a lucrative sales region due to her sex and in retaliation for her past complaints, reducing her salary as a result.

Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or alternatively for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 5). As a Summary Judgment Motion, Boston Scientific argues Plaintiffs claims are time barred while contending in its Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiff generally fails to state a claim.

For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion (Docket No. 5) is converted into a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. As such, that Motion is granted in part and the claims deemed untimely herein are dismissed. Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims for alleged events before January 7, 2019, are time barred. All her ADA

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discrimination and retaliation claims before that date also are barred. Plaintiffs Equal Pay claims for paychecks from May 21, 2018, are timely, but claims before this date are time barred. Defendant's alternative Motion to Dismiss (id) the remaining timely claims is granted in part (dismissing her Equal Pay Act claims) and denied in part (allowing her sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII to proceed).

Following adjudication of this Motion, the remaining claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII arising after January 7, 2019, in the Complaint are discernable without requiring amended pleading. Defendant thus shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this Decision and Order to file an Answer to these surviving claims and the case will be referred to a Magistrate Judge for further pretrial proceedings.

II. Background

A. Facts

The facts in this record are not contested and the parties' versions are consistent (see Docket No. 1, Compl.; Docket No. 5, Def.'s Statement of Material Facts). Given this consistency and absent objection, this Court will cite to the Complaint (Docket No. 1), Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 5), and, where applicable for the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendant's uncontested sworn statements submitted in support of its Motion (Docket No. 5). Defendant employed Plaintiff as a business partner in the northeastern region of Defendant's Interventional Cardiology division (Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of Action, Additional Evidence of Sex Discrimination ¶ 16; Docket No. 5, Def. Atty. Decl. Ex. A (Plaintiff's Attorney's letter, Mar. 20, 2019)). She later developed a stress-induced

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disability (Docket No. 1, Compl. at 2, Factual Background, ¶ 10). Plaintiff remained with Defendant until she resigned sometime in August 2019 (Docket No. 5, Def. Statement ¶1; Docket No. 5, Prust Decl. ¶ 7). Defendant termed her resignation voluntary (Docket No. 5, Def. Statement ¶ 1; Docket No. 5, Prust Decl. ¶ 7).

During her tenure, Defendant tied Plaintiffs salary to revenue generated from her assigned sales region. Her assigned region generated $22 million in annual revenue, earning Plaintiff an annual salary of $375, 000. (Docket No. 1, Compl. at 3, First Cause of Action, Element 2, ¶¶ 3, 4; see Docket No. 5, Def. Statement ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was the only female business partner in her assigned region. She also observed that, in 2017, only five of 38 Defendant's business partners were women, but, in 2018-19, seven of 56 partners were women. (Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of Action, at 4-5, Additional Evidence of Sex Discrimination ¶¶ 16-18.)

After Plaintiff complained about being discriminated against, she alleges that Defendant assigned her to a different sales territory (Docket No. 5, Def. Statement ¶¶ 2-6). The new territory generated only $11 million in annual revenue (id. ¶¶ 4, 6; Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of Action at 4, Element 2, ¶ 5). Plaintiffs reassignment reduced her salary to approximately $250, 000 per year (Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of Action, at 4, Element 2, ¶ 6). Meanwhile, Defendant allegedly compensated her male replacement with an annual salary greater than $375, 000, more than she earned (id., First Cause of Action, at 4-5, Additional Evidence of Sex Discrimination, ¶¶ 19-20, First Cause of Action, at 4, Element 2, ¶ 7). Defendant contends that Plaintiffs reassignment was part of a company-wide realignment and Plaintiffs new territory annually generated $13 million (Docket No. 5,

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Def. Statement ¶ 6). Defendant denies Plaintiffs sales quota dropped below $6 million, contrary to her allegations (id. ¶ 11; Docket No. 5, Prust Decl. ¶ 6; see Docket No. 5, Def. Memo, at 6; but cf. Docket No. 1, Compl. Second Cause of Action, Element 2, Adverse Action ¶ 32, Third Cause of Action, Element 2, Adverse Action ¶ 51).

Following her departure in 2019, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant demanded that she repay it "multiple thousands of dollars" (Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of Action, at 4, Element 2, Adverse Actions, ¶ 8, Second Cause of Action, at 6, Element 2, Adverse Actions, 1| 33, Third Cause of Action, at 8, Element 2, Adverse Actions, ¶ 52). On September 16, 2019, Defendant's HR Service Center noted Plaintiff was overpaid for a leave of absence she took in April 2019. Defendant paid Plaintiff at a regular work rate while she was in fact on leave for 72 hours. Defendant asked Plaintiff to remit $1, 952.72 overpayment and she did so. (Docket No. 5, Def. Statement ¶¶ 12, 13.)

Meanwhile, Plaintiff claims she exhausted her administrative remedies and filed a charge of discrimination on November 1, 2019, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and subsequently received a Right to Sue letter (Docket No. 1, Compl., at 2, ¶¶ 5-7). Defendant contends that it did not receive this initial charge, but it eventually received an EEOC charge from Plaintiff dated December 5, 2019 (Docket No. 5, Def. Memo, at 7, 21 n.10; id, Def. Atty. Decl. ¶¶3-4, Ex. C). Defendant's exhibit of the initial EEOC charge is dated November 7, 2019 (Docket No. 5, Def. Atty. Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. B).

B. Complaint

In the First Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges sex discrimination because of the retaliatory reassignment of her sales territory (Docket No. 1, Compl., First Cause of

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Action, at 3-5). She also claims that, when she applied for her original position with Defendant, an unnamed male superior told her that she should not work but instead should be at home with her son (id., First Cause of Action, at 4, Additional Evidence of Sex Discrimination ¶ 14). Upon her information and belief, Plaintiff contends that the wives of the male colleagues stayed home and did not work outside of the home (id. ¶ 15). The record does not disclose when this interview episode occurred.

In the Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges her reassignment was an adverse action under the ADA based upon her stress-induced disability (id., Second Cause of Action, at 6, Element 2, Adverse Action ¶¶ 26-33; see id ¶ 10). Plaintiff claims that "her disability is demonstrated by her request to take multiple medical leaves due to stress at work" (id ¶ 25).

In the Third Cause of Action, she alternatively claims that Defendant retaliated in this reassignment, violating both Title VII and the ADA (id., Third Cause of Action, at 7-9).

In the Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff finally claims that Defendant violated the Equal Pay Act by reducing her salary due to the assignment to a less remunerative territory due to her sex. She also claims Defendant assigned male employees to her former territory and paid them more than she earned. (]d, Fourth Cause of Action, at 9-10.) Plaintiff seeks recovery of lost wages and benefits; damages for her pain and suffering; payment of unreimbursed medical expenses; payment of costs for this action; reinstatement of pension and health care status; and punitive damages (id., WHEREFORE CI.).

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C. Defendant's Pending Motion (Docket No. 5)

Defendant now alternatively moves to dismiss or for summary judgment (Docket No. 5)^[1]. Responses initially were due by July 21, 2020, and reply by July 28, 2020 (Docket No. 8). Plaintiff submitted his timely responding papers (Docket No. 12) and Defendant replied (Docket No. 13).

D. Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement (Docket No. 14) and Droz v. Boston Scientific, U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington

On October 19, 2020, Plaintiff moved for consideration of supplemental authority, a decision in a Western District of Washington case against Defendant, Droz v. Boston Scientific, No. 2:20-CV-48-RSM-DWC, 2020 WL 5203585 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2020). Plaintiff cites Droz for the proposition that Defendant allegedly committed similar sex discrimination against another female employee. (Docket No. 14.) In Droz, Lindsay Droz was a female former sales employee of Boston Scientific who alleged she was paid less than male employees and had had her sales territory reduced (id), see Droz, supra, 2020 WL 5203585, at *1. As Plaintiff did here, Droz later resigned for medical reasons, Id. at *2. The district court in Western District of Washington granted Droz' Motion to Compel, Droz, supra, 2020 WL 5203585. Corcoran now argues that her case was like Droz' case and therefore Corcoran's present allegations are plausible (Docket No. 14, PI. Supp'al Memo, at 2-3).

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One day after this Court granted...