Corcoran v. Department of Social Services
Decision Date | 09 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 16955.,16955. |
Citation | 859 A.2d 533,271 Conn. 679 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Pamela D. CORCORAN v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES. |
Charles D. Ray, Hartford, with whom were K. Bradoc Gallant, New Haven, and, on the brief, Ingrid L. Moll, Mt. Pleasant, SC, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Hugh Barber, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.
The plaintiff, Pamela D. Corcoran, appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing her appeal from the decision of the defendant, the department of social services (department), to discontinue her medicaid benefits because her assets, in the form of a testamentary trust, exceeded the prescribed limits. The plaintiff claims that the trial court, by incorrectly concluding that the department's administrative hearing officer properly excluded an earlier order of the Probate Court construing the trust, improperly dismissed her administrative appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the administrative hearing officer should have admitted and given preclusive effect to the Probate Court's previous construction of the trust. In the alternative, the plaintiff claims that the trial court: (1) improperly affirmed the hearing officer's conclusion that the assets of the testamentary trust were available to the plaintiff; and (2) improperly affirmed the hearing officer's decision to exclude extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent. We conclude that the trial court properly concluded that: (1) the hearing officer was not collaterally estopped from construing the trust; (2) the hearing officer correctly determined that the trust was an asset available to the plaintiff; and (3) the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in excluding extrinsic evidence offered to prove the testator's intent. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This appeal involves two separate proceedings, a Probate Court hearing and an administrative hearing before a department hearing officer, related to the construction of a trust created by Lyman M. Corcoran (testator), in his will of November 3, 1987, for the benefit of the plaintiff, his daughter. The testator's will provided that, upon his death, his residuary estate should be divided equally among his three daughters, Robin C. Turek, Imogen J.C. Kellogg and the plaintiff. Pursuant to the will, Turek and Kellogg each would receive their one-third share directly, while the remaining one-third was to be held in trust for the plaintiff, who is mentally disabled.1
The testamentary language creating the trust provided that "[i]f my daughter [the plaintiff] is then living, the trust established for her shall be retained by my trustees to hold, manage, invest and reinvest said share as a Trust Fund, paying to or expending for the benefit of [the plaintiff] so much of the net income and principal of said Trust as the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall deem proper for her health, support in reasonable comfort, best interests and welfare...." Additionally, the will provided that "[a]mong the circumstances and factors to be considered by the trustee in determining whether to make discretionary distributions of net income or principal to a beneficiary are the other income and assets known to the trustee to be available to that beneficiary and the advisability of supplementing such income or assets."
The testator died on May 29, 1989. Thereafter, the Probate Court appointed the plaintiff's sisters as trustees of the trust, which they funded in 1992. From the time the trust was funded until December 31, 2000, the trust receipts totaled $854,307.95. During the same period of time, the plaintiff received $150 from the trust.2
Following the testator's death,3 the department granted the plaintiff's application for financial and medical assistance under the state administered medicaid program (medicaid benefits).4 As of February, 2001, the plaintiff's monthly income included $19 from Supplementary Social Security Income (SSI), $531 from Social Security and $175.46 from employment. Upon learning that the plaintiff was the beneficiary of the trust created by the testator, the department notified the plaintiff, by a letter dated February 26, 2001, that it was discontinuing her medicaid benefits because her assets, including the trust, exceeded the relevant asset limits.5 At the plaintiff's request, an administrative hearing was scheduled for April 26, 2001, to review the department's decision to terminate her medicaid benefits.
Shortly before the department notified the plaintiff of its intention to discontinue her medicaid benefits,6 the trustees petitioned the Probate Court, pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-98(a)(4),7 to construe the terms of the trust "as they pertain to any rights the State ... may have to claim reimbursement from the Trust for benefits heretofore provided ... and/or for any such benefits provided by the State to the [plaintiff] in the future."8 Specifically, the trustees asked the Probate Court to issue "a ruling classifying said Trust as a `special needs' trust, from which it is neither appropriate nor required to reimburse said State for benefits received by [the plaintiff] ...." The Probate Court scheduled a hearing for May 4, 2001.
Prior to the Probate Court's hearing, the department conducted the scheduled administrative hearing to determine whether the department properly discontinued the plaintiff's medicaid benefits. Before the hearing officer, counsel for the department argued that the department properly had characterized the trust as a general support trust, the assets of which were available to the plaintiff, and properly had discontinued the plaintiff's medicaid benefits because of excess assets. The plaintiff's counsel contended that the trust was more properly characterized as a supplemental needs trust from which the plaintiff could not compel distributions, and counsel asked the hearing officer to delay ruling on the issue until the construction action pending before the Probate Court was resolved. Because the plaintiff was not present at the hearing, however, the hearing officer requested that the plaintiff's counsel either produce the plaintiff or provide medical evidence explaining her absence. Thereafter, the hearing officer suspended the proceedings until such medical evidence was provided or the plaintiff appeared before her.
The department subsequently notified the Probate Court of the pending administrative proceedings and urged the court not to proceed with the hearing scheduled for May 4, 2001. The department premised this request on the fact that it already had litigated this "exact issue," namely, the proper construction of the trust, before the hearing officer and should not be forced to defend its actions in two separate forums.
Over the department's objection, the Probate Court conducted the scheduled hearing.9 In an order dated June 12, 2001, the court determined that the testator intended the "trust at issue ... to be ... a `special needs, discretionary trust' not otherwise available to the state...." The Probate Court also stated: "Although [this] court lacks the power to order any department of the state ... to reinstate benefits to a party before this court, it respectfully requests that the state do so in this case...."10
Before the Probate Court issued its order, the administrative hearing reconvened with the plaintiff in attendance on May 31, 2001. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer, at the department's request, agreed to keep the hearing record open until June 8, 2001, to allow the department time to submit a rebuttal and comments. On July 12, 2001, the hearing officer issued a ruling on the hearing record, indicating that she had closed the record on June 8, 2001, four days prior to the issuance of the Probate Court's decision on June 12, 2001. Thereafter, on July 17, 2001, the hearing officer issued a decision upholding the department's decision to discontinue the plaintiff's medicaid benefits because the trust was an asset that was available to her and, therefore, her assets exceeded the regulatory limits.11
The plaintiff subsequently requested reconsideration of the decision pursuant to General Statutes § 4-181a(a)(1)(a).12 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the department should reconsider both the ruling closing the record on June 8, 2001, and the resulting decision in light of the Probate Court's order of June 12, 2001. Her motion was denied.13 Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17b-6114 and 4-183,15 the plaintiff appealed from the hearing officer's decision to the Superior Court.
In a four count complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the department: (1) improperly applied Connecticut law regarding availability of assets; (2) made factual findings that were clearly erroneous in light of the substantial evidence in the record as a whole; (3) exceeded its statutory authority by improperly excluding the Probate Court's decision; and (4) resolved the issue in a manner contrary to federal law. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, concluding that the hearing officer properly determined that the plaintiff was the beneficiary of a general support trust. Additionally, the trial court determined that the hearing officer's decision to exclude the Probate Court's order was not improper. The trial court based this determination on its conclusion that the "findings by the Probate Court do not resolve whether under the statute and regulations administered by the department, the trust is an inaccessible asset."
The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment of dismissal to the Appellate Court. Thereafter,...
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